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I. PEELING THE COMPLEXITIES

This case is an exceedingly complex one.

The complexity of this case, and the unprecedented number of
claims,argumentsandAgreements involved, has resulted in a long
report with an unprecedentednumber offindings.

WTO, Panel Report on the European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,

WT/DS27JR/USA (May 22, 1997) (adopted 25 Sept. 1997) I
7.1, at 293; 7.399, at 401.
There is no sense in being anything other than direct. There was a war. It was
fought between allies. It was fought over a fruit. It might have been avoided. It
raised fundamental issues of principle. It taught us a great deal about the global
trading system on which we all rely and in which, directly or indirectly, we all

participate.
How did the Bananas War happen? Why did it happen? What are the
ramifications? These are the three questions I seek to address.
To this point in the history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATI) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), no case has been more

contentious than European Communities-Regimefor the Importation, Sale and
1 The two sides in the War, the United
Distributionof Bananas(EC-Bananas).

1. The official text of the Panel Report addressing the American complaint is WTO, Panel Reporton the
European Communities-Regimefor the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (22
May 1997) (adopted 25 Sept. 1997) [hereinafter Panel Report]. The official text of the Appellate Body Report is
WTO, Report of the Appellate Body on the European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (9 September 1997) (adopted 25 September 1997) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report]. Both texts are published on the WTO's website, http://www.wto.org. Throughout this
Article, I shall refer to these texts. The pagination in my citations is based on downloading the texts on 8 W' x 1 I"
paper. For convenience, I also provide the relevant paragraph numbers.
Likewise, I have obtained all other WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports referenced herein from the
WTO's website. Summaries of these reports are available on the website in a document called "Overview of the
State-of-Play of WTO Disputes." I have obtained the issuance and adoption dates from this document.
Reading an account of the Bananas War takes enough concentration as it is. There is no need to dissipate
intellectual resources or emotional patience on hundreds and hundreds of nettlesome footnotes. Accordingly, I
have endeavored to keep citations to a ninimum, imagining a hybrid format between an extended Essay and a fullblown, traditional law review Article. I hope the result is a readable-and entertaining-account. Throughout most
of Parts H-IV, I have provided a footnote at the begining of the appropriate section or sub-section that explains
the sources I used to develop the subsequent discussion. The relevant pages and paragraph numbers of the Panel
and Appellate Body Reports are set forth therein. To cite these sources on a sentence-by-sentence or paragraph-byparagraph basis would make this piece utterly unmanageable.
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States (the principal complainant) 2 and the European Community (EC) (the
respondent), 3 did not simply "slip" on bananas. The analogical pun has been used
in many oral and written discussions of the case,4 but it is inapposite. No one slips
on a banana peel. The peel is not slippery. Decades ago, Hollywood screen writers
settled upon the banana peel as something on which actors in slapstick comedies
would slip after some audiences found a different cause, dog droppings, too
offensive. More importantly, the "slippage" metaphor is too pacific. The United
States and the EC went to war.
Wars mean sound and fury, and it is easy to get lost in sound and fury. Who can
forget the tortured face of actor Tom Hanks in the film Saving PrivateRyan as he
scrambles to unscramble himself amidst exploding shells and falling debris? The
Bananas War has made his face our face. The intellectual serenity of the nicely
paneled, tastefully carpeted offices in which we trade scholars and lawyers work
now has been shattered. Any one of us who examines the WTO Panel and Appellate
Body Reports and does not admit to disorientation, at least occasionally, is either
a fool or a knave. The Reports are long and turgid, and they embody bitter
arguments. The Panel Report is 405 single-spaced pages.5 The Appellate Body
Report is 116 double-spaced pages.6
Sitting motionless behind our comfortable desks we stare at these ostensibly
cold tombs staring back at us from those familiar extensions of ourselves, our
bookshelves. We realize quickly that we are now in harm's way. For a full
understanding, if that is even possible, we know that neither Report can be read
once, or even twice. Many passages in each Report must be read many times to
reach even an approximate understanding of what happened and why. We say to

ourselves that we do not have the time. We worry we may not have the patience.
Yet, we fear that we cannot afford to eschew the effort.
To be sure, there are some short cuts that, I think, can help the trade scholar or
lawyer sort through the mess without simultaneously compromising the quality of
one's review. Most notably, and in general, the judges of Geneva have an irritating

2. I focus on the key claims raised by the United States, taking them to be more or less representative of
the claims raised by the co-complainants, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. This focus is justified
because the complainants acted jointly and severally, and the Panel and Appellate Body Reports tend to treat the
complainants as one. Of course, the discussion also highlights the EC's responses to the American claims. In
taking this short cut, I do not at all mean to understate the importance of the co-complainants in developing and
making successful arguments.
3. While the official name is now the European Union, or EU, in keeping with the case (particularly the
Panel and Appellate Body Reports), I shall use the name EC throughout.
4. See, e.g., Guy de Jonquieres, Slippingon a Banana Skin, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1998, at 13.
5. As suggested supranote 1,this page count is based on downloading the Panel Report from the WTO's
website, hup://www.wto.org, onto 8 x 11- inch pages. As the Panel itself stated, 'he complexity of this case,
and the unprecedented number of claims, arguments and Agreements involved, has resulted in a long report with
an unprecedented number of findings" Panel Report, supranote 1,1 7.399, at 401.
6. As suggested supranote 1, this page count is based on downloading the Appellate Body Report from
the WTO's website, http://www.wto.org, onto 8 x 11- inch pages.
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tendency to write reports containing large redundancies. The BananasReports are
no exception (and I shall elaborate in Part VI.A below). For now, suffice it to say
that the Appellate Body and Panel tend to regurgitate in tedious detail early on in
each Report the arguments of the complainant, respondent, and third parties. These
are land mines, or perhaps the better analogy is quicksand. Later, when setting forth
its findings, the Appellate Body or Panel provides a perfectly adequate and concise
summary of the relevant parts of those arguments. Were the Appellate Body and
Panels to shave the earlier discussion, even cut it entirely, I suspect little would be
lost, except to a researcher interested in modes of argumentation (perhaps an
interesting topic in its own right), or to the egos of the parties, who would not see
every last aspect of their submissions in print.
I have, therefore, allowed myself this one short cut. There are a few brief forays
into these dubious parts of the Reports, but largely only to elaborate on a point or
provide a fuller citation. For the most part, I have focused the discussion below on
the portion of the Appellate Body's Report in the Bananascase dealing with the
findings (i.e., Parts IV-V) and the portions of the Panel's BananasReport dealing
with the facts and findings (i.e., Parts III and VII-IX of its Report).
This focused effort is, I submit, worth it. The Bananas War is rich in facts and
legal issues, as well as in lessons for the future. At one extreme, some of these
matters are narrow and technical-trench warfare, as it were. There are the EC's inquota reservations for certain countries. There is the overlay of export certificates
and hurricane licenses. There is the EC's system for licensing companies providing
wholesale trade services in bananas. At the other extreme, there also is grand
strategy: that is, broad and policy-oriented debates. There is the meaning of mostfavored nation (MFN) and national treatment under the GATr, and the relation of
these meanings to the MFN and national treatment provisions of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). There is the problem of compliance with
Appellate Body recommendations. There is the conundrum of helping some
developing countries through a preferential trading regime while hurting others by
that regime. The bridge between these two extremes is the interaction-indeed, the
symbiotic relationship-between the details and the big picture.
Some of the small and large points have not gone unnoticed. There have been
countless journalistic accounts of the case, and bits and pieces of the case have been
discussed in parts of assorted law review articles and book chapters. But, there has
yet to emerge an account of the Bananas War that can satisfy the serious
international trade law scholar or practitioner. Those of us eager for battle demand
clarity and readability. We also demand rigor and thoroughness. I shall not pretend
to have met all of these demands with this Article. But, I have tried to do so without
falling into the trap of regurgitating the Panel and Appellate Body Reports or
writing a book (which, at a later date, may prove fruitful).
An early and crucial decision in contemplating this effort concerns position.
Where should the trade scholar or lawyer position herself? It is a theme articulated
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ever so ably by John Keegan in his masterpiece The Mask of Command,7 in the
context to which I have analogized above: war. Where ought the leader to be? At
the front always (like Alexander the Great), sometimes (like Wellington), or never
(like the chateau generals)? The Panel and Appellate Body Reports inflict on us a
similar problem. For how long shall we dwell in the trenches of the Bananas War?
For how long shall we contemplate grand strategy?
I readily confess to a fascination with not only the "big picture" problems posed
by the War, but also with its intricate details. An international trade law professor
colleague suggested to me that only the French could have devised such a scheme
for protecting bananas. As an admirer of French language and culture, the
suggestion did not at all offend me (though I dare not speak for mes amisfrancais).
Rather, it titillated my interest in the mechanics of the scheme. Accordingly, I have
tried below to offer a balanced presentation of not only the grand issues and
implications, but also the critical intricacies. A commander without a grasp of
details is as dangerously prone to misjudgment as one consumed by them is to
paralysis. Likewise, I hesitate when law professors or students, lacking familiarity
with (and even scorning) facts, launch into theorizing about issues and implications.
No doubt facts without theory are a morass, but their ruminations are bereft of
credibility. Theory without facts is a refuge for the quixotic mind and a formula for
the marginalization of discourse.
Therefore, in Part I, I explain the facts of the War-the caususbelli, as it were,
of the conflict. In Parts III and IV, I review the key legal issues in controversy-that
is to say, the major battles of the War. I also treat the battle outcomes-that is, the
Panel and Appellate Body holdings, and particularly those on which the course of
the War turned. I confine the discussion in Parts Ell and IV to the two major fronts
of the War: the GAIT and GATS, respectively. To be sure, there was a third front,
procedure, on which a number of important battles were fought. For example, the
United States and EC warred over questions of standing to bring a complaint to the
WTO, and the requirements for sufficiency of a complaint. However, I have written
about these dimensions elsewhere, 8 and hence there is no need to be repetitive.
Obviously, and unfortunately, the Bananas War did not end with the issuance
of the Appellate Body Report. It raged on, indeed fueled in part by the Report. For
only the second time in GATT history, a combatant-here, the United States-was
authorized by the supreme adjudicatory body to retaliate. 9 In Part V, I explain the
bloody aftermath. Finally, in Part VI, I offer my views on four of the most
important lessons we ought to take with us from the War. This last Part, I submit,
cannot be appreciated fully divorced from the factual and legal context, as well as
the aftermath, of the War-hence the necessity of Parts I-V. At the same time, I
7.
8.

See JOHN KEEGAN, THE MASK OF COMMAND (1987).
See Raj Bhala, The PrecedentSetters: De FactoStare Decisis and WVTO Adjudication (PartTwo of a
Trilogy), 9 . TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1999) (discussing these issues in Part II.A.2 and HIB).

9.

See infra Part V.C.
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should hardly claim to have identified all of the lessons from the War. Like any
conflagration, we ought constantly to reappraise its meaning.
All of this, then, is not to say that I am uninterested in providing, or would not

welcome, a more nuanced treatment of the case. Nor would I look askance at the
application of inter- or intra-disciplinary analytic tools.10 It is to say that I distrust
purportedly nuanced treatments, orjargon-loaded analyses, that lack a foundation,
that foundation being (in part) a careful review of what happened and why.
Or, to put the point more bluntly, I would like to avoid a purportedly insightful

analysis that really is a descent into academic jargon that masks a mind still
scrambled by the battles over bananas. My sense, based on a large amount of
anecdotal evidence, is that most trade scholars and practitioners are eager to

consider the normative dimensions and implications of the Bananas War, but agree
they could do so more effectively with an improved understanding of its

complexities. If, then, much of what follows seems rather explanatory, if it does not
seem especially fancy, so be it. I seek to provide an adequate account of the War
that, I hope, can serve as one standard reference, and possibly provoke other efforts

so that we may have several reliable renditions, each with unique features. In turn,
perhaps what follows will stimulate, both in my own work and that of others, more
sophisticated, normative discussions of the greatest war the modem multilateral
trading system has yet endured.1

10. My own previous work bespeaks my affinity for both inter- and intra-disciplinary tools. See, e.g., Raj
Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on UnilateralAction in the World Trading System, 15 BERKELEY 1. INT'L L. 159
(1997) [hereinafter Bhala, Hegelian Reflections] (using Hegelian philosophy); Raj Bhala, MRS. WATU and
InternationalTrade Sanctions, 33 INT'L LAW. 1 (1999) (utilizing conventional analytic tools).
11. Happily, a few pieces have emerged. For a discussion of the bananas dispute in the context of the
constitutional structure and treaty-making powers of the European Union, with an emphasis on relevant cases
decided by the European Court of Justice, see Inger Osterdahl, Bananas and Treaty-Making Powers: Current
Issues in the External Trade Law of the European Union, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 473 (1997). Two student
notes discussing the dispute are Rodrigo Bustamante, The Needfor a GAiT Doctrine ofLocus Standi: Why the
United States CannotStand the EuropeanCommunity's BananaImport Regime, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 533
(1997) (arguing in favor of a practical doctrine of standing in WTO dispute settlement) and Jack J. Chen, Going
Bananas:How the WTO Can Heal the Split in the Global Banana Trade Dispute, 63 FORDHAM. L. REv. 1283
(1995) (concluding that the bananas dispute must be resolved through the WTO). However, none of these fine
pieces provides an in-depth exposition and analysis of all of the major features of the dispute, or a thorough
consideration of its aftermath and ramifications.
For a brief, readable account of the War, see Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the UnitedStates, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 879,901-03 (1999).
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II. CAUSES OF THE BANANAS WAR

You say it is the good cause that hallows even war?
I tell you: it is the good war that hallows every cause.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustrapt. 1,
"Of War and Warriors" (1883-92, 1961 trans.).
A. Originsof the EC BananaImport Regime
On 1 July 1993, the EC introduced a common market organization for all
banana imports, wherever sourced, through Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93
("Regulation 404/93").12 This regulation has been supplemented and amended by

EC legislation, regulations, and administrative measures. The common market
organization replaced the EC's consolidated tariff of 20 percent ad valorem on
banana imports, which had been in effect since 1963. It also replaced a hodgepodge
of banana import regimes of individual EC member states.
Those regimes were bilateral arrangements each member state had made with
developing countries in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (collectively called
"ACP") regions. The individual regimes entailed a combination of quantitative
restrictions and licensing requirements. Some regimes were very strict. Of course,
in keeping with the common market, each member state permitted duty-free entry
from each other member state. But, the particularities of the bilaterally arranged
regimes as regards imports differed significantly.
Spain, for example, maintained a de facto prohibition on imports of bananas,
and had supplied its consumption requirements almost exclusively with domestic
production from the Canary Islands. France relied principally on bananas from its
overseas departments, Guadeloupe and Martinique, and bestowed preferential
access on its former colonies, the ACP countries of Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon.
The United Kingdom imported bananas on preferential terms from its former
colonies in the Caribbean, particularly the ACP countries of Jamaica and the
Windward Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines).
Interestingly, a few EC member states relied on banana imports not from ACP
countries, but rather from Latin American countries-these bananas are the socalled "dollar bananas." These member states included Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Except for Germany, these

12. I draw the discussion contained in this entire Part from two primary sources: the Panel Report, supra
note 1. TI nI.1-11.36, at 15-25 (concerning the factual aspects of the case); and Raj Bhala, Letter Update for

InternationalTradeLaw: Cases and Materials(July 1998) (mailed in 1998 to all international law professors at
American law schools, available from Lexis Law Publishing). The Letter Update is, in turn, based on dozens of
news stories about the case published between November 1995 and July 1998 in the Fimancial7imes, Economist,
and International TradeReporter (BNA).
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states relied on the consolidated 20 percent tariff as the sole protective measure
against banana imports. Germany permitted duty-free imports up to the level of
estimated domestic consumption. The seeds of strain within the EC that would
emerge during the Bananas War thus were apparent. France and the United
Kingdom would prove far more committed to the defense of preferential
arrangements for ACP bananas than would the northern European or Benelux
countries.
The banana import regimes of individual EC member states hardly went
unnoticed by the banana exporting countries denied preferential access. The
assorted bilateral preferential regimes were the subject of a complaint brought by
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela under the GATr's
pre-Uruguay Round dispute resolution procedures. It resulted in a GAIT Panel
Report issued on 3 June 1993. The report, EEC-MembersStates' ImportRegimes
for Bananas (DS32/R), is sometimes called the "first" Banana Panel Report, or
BananasL While the Report recommended various changes to the bilateral import
regimes, it was not adopted by the GAIT Contracting Parties.
The new common market organization regime the EC commenced in 1993
implemented a preferential trading arrangement for Lome Convention countries.
The EC had negotiated this Convention in 1975 with approximately seventy-one
ACP developing countries-the so-called "ACP" or "Lome" countries 1 3 The First
Convention, and each of its subsequent editions, set forth a means for the EC to aid
the ACP countries, partly through a system of trade preferences (e.g., lower tariffs
or duty-free treatment). Many of the Lome countries are former European colonies.
Thirty-nine of the Lome countries are among the world's forty-eight poorest
countries. 4

The Fourth Lome Convention was signed on 15 December 1989 by the EC and
the ACP countries, many of which are now WTO Members. 5 This edition
contained a protocol concerning bananas, implemented fully in 1993. Consuming
about four million tons of bananas annually, the EC is the second largest importer
of bananas in the world, after only the United States. 16 Domestic EC producers
supply only between 645,000 and 750,000 tons of the bananas consumed in the

13. See Lionel Barber, EUAgreesto New Lame Blueprint,FIN.TIMES, June 30, 1998, at 5. In June 1998,
Cuba was granted observer status, with no guarantee of future membership in the absence of substantial progress
on human rights, good governance, and political freedom. See id.; see also Havana Defies EU over Trade Pact
Conditions, FIN. TIMES, July 3, 1998, at 7. In April 2000, Cuba withdrew its application, saying that it was
protesting a U.N. resolution sponsored by the Czech Republic and backed by a majority of the EU member states
that accused Cuba of human rights violations. See Joe Kirwin, CubaDecides to DropACP Application;May Ease
Tensions over Helms-Burton Law, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 705 (May 4,2000).
14. See Lome Crossroads,FIN. TIMES, July 1, 1998, at 19.
15. See African, Caribbean and Pacific States--European Economic Community: Final Act, Minutes and
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, 15 Dec. 1989,29 LL.M. 783 (1990).
16. See Michael Smith, Brussels Farm Ministers Push on with Searchfor Banana Imports Deal, FIN.
TIMES, June 2, 1998, at 5.
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EC.17 Their producing areas are in the Azores and Algarve, Canary Islands, Crete,
Guadeloupe, Lakonia, Madeira, and Martinique.
Obviously, then, the EC has to rely on imports to satisfy the balance of

consumer demand. For example, the EC imports about 2.1 million tons of bananas
from Latin America, particularly Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and
Panama. The EC imports about 727,000 tons from the ACP countries. Among the
ACP supplying countries are Belize, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Colombia,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and St. Lucia.

The EC's preferential trading arrangement for bananas 8 obviously violates
Article 1:1 of GATr-the most-favored nation (MFN) clause-because it treats
bananas from ACP countries, particularly from twelve traditional ACP supplying
countries, more favorably than bananas from other countries of origin. However,
as a general matter, the violation could be excused by virtue of a Waiver from the
EC's Article I:l obligations. 9 The Waiver, requested by the EC, was granted on 9
December 1994 by a decision of the GATT Contracting Parties. It allowed the EC
to deviate from the MFN clause "to the extent necessary... to provide preferential

treatment for products originating in ACP states as required by... the Fourth Lome
Convention, without being required to extend the same preferential treatment to like
products of any other contracting party." 20 On 14 October 1996, the WTO General
Council agreed to extend the Waiver until 29 February 2000.21

17. In 1995, for example, they supplied 658,200 tons.
18. This arrangement is discussed in detail infra Part H.B-C.
19. To be sure, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body excused all aspects of the MFN violation as a
result of the Waiver. As noted below, they did not view the Waiver as broadly as the EC had hoped. See infra
notes 20,45,51.
20. The full text of the key paragraph of the Waiver is as follows:
Subject to the terms and conditions set out hereunder, the provisions of paragraph I of Article I of the
General Agreement [on Tariffs and Trade] [i.e., the most-favored nation clause] shall be waived, until
29 February 2000, to the extent necessary to permit the European Communities to provide preferential
treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by the relevant provisions of the Fourth
Lome Convention, without being required to extend the same preferential treatment to like products
of any other contracting party.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 164, at 77-78.
21. The expiration of the waiver coincides with the expiration of the Fourth Lome Convention in February
2000. The EC favored replacing the trade preference scheme in the Fourth Convention with free trade agreements
between the EC and each ACP region. However, the ACP countries felt threatened by granting duty-free treatment
to EC goods, and were willing to accept the loss in tariff revenues. Hence, they preferred a simple renewal of the
Convention. See Stealingfromathe Poor,ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999, at 70.
In October 1999, a compromise solution was reached, and the deal was finalized in February 2000. The new
"Fiji Convention" was signed in May 2000. It had taken seventeen months of difficult negotiations to achieve,
but the new Convention was set to last for twenty years.
The essence of the compromise embodied in the Fiji Convention is the continuation of non-reciprocal trade
preferences for a limited period of time, in exchange for negotiations toward lrAs with the EC. The EC agreed
to renew for an eight-year period (i.e., until 2008) the trade preferences on 92 percent of the products it imports
from ACP countries. Further, the EC said it would provide duty-free access to substantially all of the products
from the thirty-eight poorest ACP countries, along with exports from all other LDCs, by 2005. Of course, the EC
and the ACP countries would seek a waiver from the WTO for the renewal. The EC also said it would provide the

850

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31

Once again, European preferences for ACP bananas became the subject of
controversy. Once again, the complaining parties were the same as those in the first
Bananas case: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
Employing the pre-Uruguay Round dispute resolution procedures, they objected to
the discriminatory nature of the EC's market organization for bananas. Once again,
they essentially won on the merits.

ACP countries with roughly thirteen billion dollars in aid. In return, the ACP countries pledged to liberalize their
economies and initiate talks in 2002 toward free trade agreements with the EC. Thus, the free trade agreements
would be negotiated during the extended preferences period, and allowance was made for the possibility that they
could be phased in over twelve to fifteen years. Only the most advanced ACP countries are obligated to enter into
these negotiations. Thus, the thirty-eight poorest ACP countries need not do so. But, an assessment is scheduled
for 2004 to determine those ACP countries, other than the least developed ones, that would be capable of entering
into an RTA. See Neil Buckley, Something forEveryone as ACP Lome Delegates Assess Deal, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2000, at 5 [hereinafter Buckley, Somethingfor Everyone];Neil Bucldey, ACP CountriesClose to Dealon Aid
and Trade, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1999, at 9; Neil Buckley, EU-ACP Trade-Aid Deal FacesDeadlock, FIN. TIMES,

Dec. 9, 1999, at 8.
Interestingly, the EC persuaded the ACP countries to accept conditions on the promotion of democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law. Initially, they refused to agree on a condition concerning good governance (to
ensure that EC aid money is not wasted because of corruption), saying that would be difficult to judge. See
Raymond Colitt, ACP CountriesPreparefor New Lome Accord, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at 6; Canute James,
States Agree to Extend Lome Conventionfor Eight Years, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1997, at 7; EU Commission, Lome
CountriesFailto Make Progresson New Trade Pact,16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1329 (Aug. 11,1999); EU Warns
on Corruption,FIN. TIMES, July 30, 1999, at 3. However, by February 2000, the ACP countries agreed to accept
"good governance" as a "fundamental element" of the Fiji Convention. See Neil Buckley, Something for
Everyone, supra.
By February 2000, the EC and ACP agreed the Fiji Convention would be extended for twenty years, which

of course would that cover the eight- year renewal of trade preferences and any twelve to fifteen year phase- in
period for RTAs. The EC had favored a period of 15 years, while the ACP had preferred thirty. Neil Buckley,
CubaHaste to Join Lome Group,FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4,2000, at 8.But, also in February, a potential stumbling block
arose to reaching a final agreement. The EC insisted that ACP countries take back all illegal immigrants. The ACP
countries agreed to take back their own nationals, but the EC wanted the right to deport illegal immigrants back
to the country from which they entered the EC, even if that was not their country of origin. Thus, for example,
if a Tanzanian illegally entered the EC from Rwanda, Rwanda would have to take the immigrant back. The ACP
countries balked at the idea, saying it would impose on them an unfair burden. Accordingly, the EC had to accept
that ACP countries would take back only their own citizens, and instead commence negotiations on a bilateral
basis with each ACP country on dealing with illegal immigrants who are citizens of another ACP country. See
Joseph Kirwin, EU and71 DevelopingNationsAgree to Overhaulof Lome Convention, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
240 (Feb. 10, 2000); Neil Buckley, Immigrants Issue Hinders Talks on Lome Convention, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2000, at 9. Naturally, the EU will require a waiver from the GATr Article I MFN obligation for the preference
scheme created by the Fiji Convention. Obtaining this waiver may not be so easy, as it is being complicated by
the EU's own reluctance to reform its preferential trading arrangement for bananas (as discussed in Part V.D.,
infra). A group of Latin American countries battling against the bananas arrangement are blocking WTO
consideration of the EU's request until a new deal is struck on bananas. The blocking countries include Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. Article IX:3(b) of the Agreement Establishing the WorldTrade
Organization requires consideration of a waiver request by the Council for Trade in Goods within 90 days, but
these countries are refusing to start the 90-day clock. See Daniel Pruzin, Banana ExportersAre Blocking EU
Requestfor ACP PactWaiver, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 808 (May 25,2000).
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A GAIT panel issued its report, EEC-ImportRegimefor Bananas(DS38/R),
on 11 February 1994.' However, the report in this second Bananascase-Bananas
l-was not adopted by the GAIT Contracting Parties. The non-adoption, coupled
with the resistance by the EC to make changes in its ACP preference scheme, may
explain in part why Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Venezuela negotiated the
Banana Framework Agreement (BFA)23 with the EC. But, once again, the
complainants' effort to achieve what they regarded as fair market access-a more
level playing field-was denied.
BananasII,like BananasI, thus was hardly akin to a smoldering ember. To use
that metaphor would suggest a dying fire. These early cases were more akin to
serious border exchanges in a war soon to break out.
B. The EC's Three Import CategoriesandAssociated Tariff-Rate Quota
Treatment
We can think of BananasI and H as pre-war skirmishes. The War itself was
fought over the preferential trading arrangement set forth in Regulation 404/93.
This Regulation established three categories of banana imports:
(1) 'Traditional ACP bananas." These are bananas traditionally imported
by the EC from twelve ACP countries. These countries of origin are
known as the "twelve traditional ACP countries." They are Belize,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica,
Madagascar, Somalia, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Suriname, the so-called "traditional" ACP countries.
(2) "Third-country bananas." These are imports from any third countryi.e., from any non-ACP country. The most prominent examples are
imports from the United States' co-complainants in the WTO action:
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.
(3) "Non-traditional ACP bananas." These bananas are defined to come
from two sources: (a) quantities of bananas in excess of the quantities
traditionally supplied by the twelve traditional ACP countries (i.e., the
country-specific quota allotments for), and (b) quantities supplied by
ACP countries that are not traditional suppliers to the EC (such as the
Dominican Republic, Ghana, and Kenya).

22. See GATr Dispute Settlement Panel Report on the European Economic Community-Import Regime
for Bananas, 18 Jan. 1994,34 IL.M. 177 (1995).
23. Discussed infru Part II.B.2.
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Under its preferential trading arrangement, the EC provided a different tariff
treatment for each category. These categories and related treatments are

summarized in Table One below and discussed in detail thereafter.
TABLE 1: THE THREE IIMPORT CATEGORIES AND ASSOCIATED TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS
EC TREATMENT
PURSUANT TO
COUNCIL
REGULATION 404/93

TRADITIONAL ACP
BANANAS

THIRD-COUNTRY
BANANAS

NON-TRADITIONAL
ACP BANANAS

Definition of

Bananas imported into
the EC from the 12
traditional ACP
supplying countries,
namely:

Bananas imported into
the EC from any nonACP country (e.g., the
United States' cocomplainants,
Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and
Mexico).

Bananas imported into
the EC from any of
the 12 traditional
ACP- supplying
countries in excess of
the traditional quota
allocation of 857,700
tons annually for these

Category

Belize, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Cote

d'Ivoire, Dominica,

countries.

Grenada, Jamaica,
Madagascar, Somalia,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines,
and Suriname.

Also, all bananas
imported into the EC
from any nontraditional ACP
supplying country
(e.g., Dominican
Republic, Ghana,
Kenya).

Tarff-Rate Quota
Amount (in terms of
tons annually,net
weight)

In-quota amount of
857,700 (not bound).

In-quota amount is
known as "basic tariff
quota" (bound). The
EC set it at 2 million
in 1993,2.1 million in
1994, and 2.2 million
in 1995.
The EC increased the
basic tariff quota by
353,000 (unbound) to
accommodate
consumption and
supply needs of three
newly acceded EC
members (Austria,
Finland, and Sweden).

The EC set aside
90,000 (bound) of the
basic tariff quota for
non-traditional ACP
bananas.
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EC TR TMENT
PURSUANT TO

TRADmONAL ACP
BANANAS

THIRD-COUNTRY
BANANAS

NON-TRADITIONAL
ACP BANANAS

The EC allocated the
857,700 in-quota
amount among the 12
traditional ACP
suppliers:

The EC allocated
percentage shares in
the basic tariff quota
(which it originally set
at 2 million, as noted
above, plus an
increase of 353,000
for the three new EC
members) to the four
BFA countries
(Colombia, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela).

The EC allocated
30,000 of the 90,000
of the basic tariff
quota to 3 of the 12
traditional ACP
suppliers for
quantities in excess of
the traditional
amounts they supply:

In addition, the EC
put non-BFA, nonACP countries into an
all "others" category
in which there were
no country-specific
allocations.

The EC allocated the
remaining 60,000 of
the 90,000 to nontraditional ACP
countries:

COUNCIL

REGULATION 404/93
Country-Specific
Allocations, and
"Others" Category
(in terms oftons
annually, net weight;
orpercerdage)

Belize, 40,000;
Cameroon, 155,000;
Cape Verde, 4,800;
Cote d'Ivoire,
155,000;
Dominica, 71,000;
Grenada, 14,000;
Jamaica, 105,000;
Madagascar, 5,900;
Somalia, 60,000;
St. Lucia, 127,000;
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, 82,000;
Suriname, 38,000.

Belize, 15,000;
Cameroon, 7,500;
Cote d'Ivoire, 7,500.

Dominican Republic,
55,000;
Other non-traditional
ACP suppliers (e.g.,
Ghana, Kenya), 5,000.

Thus:
Costa Rica, 23.4 %;
Colombia, 21 %;
Nicaragua, 3 %;
Venezuela, 2 %;
Others, 46.32 %
(in 1994), 46.51 %
(in 1995).

I.

The EC set aside the
remaining share of the
basic tariff quota,
equaling 90,000, for
non-traditional ACP
bananas.

I
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EC TREATMENT
PURSUANT TO
COUNCIL
REGULATION 404/93

TRADITIONAL ACP
BANANAS

TariffApplicable to
Duty-free for in-quota
In-Quotaand Out-of- amount,
Quota Imports (ECU
per ton)
ECU 693 for out-ofquota amount (in
1996-97).

THIRD-COUNTRY
BANANAS

NON-TRADITIONAL

ECU 75 up to basic
tariff quota (applied
on an MFN basis).

Duty-free entry for
non-traditional ACP
bananas up to the
country-specific
allocations of the
90,000 set-aside.

ECU 822 for out-ofquota amount (in
1995), ECU 793 for
out-of-quota amount
(in 1996-97), and
ECU 680 (in 2000)
(bound and applied on
an MFN basis).

ACP BANANAS

ECU 722 for out-ofquota amount (in
1995), and ECU 693
for out-of-quota
amount (in 1996-97).

1. TraditionalACP Bananas
The EC calculated that each year, 857,700 tons of bananas traditionally were
supplied by the twelve ACP countries listed in Table Two. These "traditional"
supplying countries began exporting bananas to the EC before 1991. Accordingly,
the EC granted duty-free entry to up to 857,700 tons24 annually from these
countries. The EC divided the 857,700 limit among the twelve traditional ACP
countries into country-specific quantitative limits. For example, the largest
allocation went to Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire (155,000 tons annually for each
country), while the smallest allocations went to Madagascar (5,900 tons annually)
and Cape Verde (4,800 tons annually). Interestingly, the EC did not bind the
country-specific quantities in its Schedule, and there is no provision in the EC
regulations for an increase in the level of traditional ACP allocations.
2. Third-CountryBananas
The EC excluded bananas from Latin America from the preferential
arrangement for traditional ACP supplying countries. Indeed, the category of "thirdcountry bananas" encompasses banana imports from all non-ACP countries. It
includes major Latin American banana producers such as Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Mexico- the co-complainants of the United States. The EC set forth

24. Tonnage amounts for all tariff-rate quotas referenced herein are in metric tons. One metric ton equals
1,000 kg. A conventional ton is 2,000 pounds, and 1 kilogram equals 2.205 pounds. Therefore, a metric ton equals
2,205 pounds, or 1.1025 conventional tons. See OXFORD DICrIONARY ANDTHESAURUS app. 9, at 1816 (American
ed. 1996).
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in its Schedule a bound tariff-rate quota, known as the "basic tariff quota," for all
third-country bananas. It adjusted the basic tariff quota amount each year on the
basis of a "supply balance," a figure it calculated from production and consumption
forecasts for the upcoming year.
Initially, in 1993, the EC set the basic tariff quota at two million tons (net
weight) of third-country bananas. The EC raised it to 2.1 million tons in 1994, and
to 2.2 million tons in 1995. The EC bound its basic tariff quota in its GATr Article
II Uruguay Round Schedule. Following the accession of Austria, Finland, and
Sweden to the EC on 1 January 1995, the EC increased the in-quota threshold by
353,000 tons to account for the consumption and supply needs of these new
member states. It did not, however, bind this increase.
The EC established an MFN tariff of ECU 75 per ton for in-quota shipmentsi.e., imports of bananas from third countries within the basic tariff quota (e.g., in
1995,2.2 million tons plus 353,000 tons, or 2.535 million tons). As for out-of-quota
shipments, i.e., banana imports in excess of the basic tariff quota (e.g., in 1995,
above 2.535 million tons), the EC applied an MFN tariff of ECU 822 per ton (as of
1 July 1995). Pursuant to its Uruguay Round commitments, the EC reduced this
amount to ECU 792 per ton (effective 1July 1996), still about ten times higher than
for in-quota shipments. At the end of the six-year period for the EC to implement
its Uruguay Round commitments (i.e., in the year 2000), the EC's final bound MFN
rate was ECU 680 per ton.2 The reduction from ECU 822 to ECU 680 may seem
impressive, but the final amount is still almost ten times as high as the tariff for inquota shipments. In other words, it is a major barrier to third-country bananas.
Significantly, four banana-exporting countries in Latin America-Colombia,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Venezuela-realized they could not obtain free market
access to the EC. As mentioned in Part I.A above, the GAIT Panel Report from
the second Bananascase that they (along with Guatemala) had brought against the
EC had neither been adopted by the Contracting Parties nor otherwise forced any
meaningful changes to the EC's preferential trading arrangement. Consequently,
these four dollar banana exporting countries negotiated with the EC for better
treatment than other dollar banana supplying countries. In 1994, they and the EC
entered into a Framework Agreement on Bananas (commonly known as the
"BFA"). The BFA took effect on 1 January 1995, and is set to expire on 31
December 2002.26 To be sure, the BFA countries did not get better-than-average
treatment for free. They surrendered a valuable right: namely, they agreed not to sue
the EC in the WTO before 2002.27
Under the BFA, the EC allocated in its GAIT Article II Schedule to each of the
four exporting countries specific shares of the bound basic tariff quota. That is,

25. The tariff was set to fall to this figure in equal installments.
26. In March 1994, the EC incorporated the BFA into its Uruguay Round Schedule.
27. See Martin Wolf, Going Bananas, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24,1999, at 14.
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these privileged countries were guaranteed a slice of the tariff-rate quota for dollar
bananas. Costa Rica, for instance, was given a 23.4 percent share, Colombia
received a 21 percent share, Nicaragua a 3 percent share, and Venezuela a 2 percent
share.2 In total, the EC reserved for BFA countries a whopping 49.4 percent of its
basic tariff quota.
Non-ACP, non-BFA countries were not so fortunate. The EC put them in an
"others" category. In 1994, this catch-all grouping equaled 46.32 percent of the
overall in-quota amount of the basic tariff quota. In 1995, it was 46.51 percent.
Moreover, whenever the EC raised its basic tariff quota (e.g., from 2.1 million tons
annually to 2.2 million tons annually between 1994 and 1995), it allocated the
increase to BFA countries (including countries in the "others" category) in
accordance with these proportionate shares.
Plainly, because of the BFA, i.e., because of the exclusion of all but four of the
Latin American banana exporting countries, the EC did not treat all third-country
banana producers alike. Indeed, the pattern should now be emerging. The EC gave
country-specific shares in a tariff-rate quota to twelve of its former colonies, and
country-specific shares in its basic tariff quota to four dollar banana exporters. All
other countries were left to fight over the scraps of the basic tariff quota.
3. Non-TraditionalACP Bananas
The third and final category of banana imports created by the EC is an offspring
of the second category. "Non-Traditional ACP Bananas" covers two sub-categories
of banana imports: (1)bananas exported by the twelve traditional ACP countries in
excess of the 857,700-ton allotment already allocated to these countries; and (2) all
bananas exported by non-traditional ACP countries. In other words, this category
embraced all ACP countries, differentiating between historical ACP suppliers, on
the one hand, and countries not traditionally supplying the EC, on the other hand.
Pursuant to the BFA, the EC carved out from the basic tariff quota 90,000 tons
annually. It then divided the 90,000 ton carve-out between these two sub-categories
of non-traditional ACP bananas, and bound this amount in its GATT Article II
Schedule. All 90,000 tons were admitted duty-free.
Why would the BFA countries agree to the reservation of 90,000 tons of the
basic tariff quota for non-traditional ACP countries? After all, the BFA countries
are not ACP countries, and thus any subtraction from the basic tariff quota for the

28. Under certain circumstances, the BFA permitted a variation from these shares. One such circumstance
was force majeure. A BFA country could fulfill all or part of its quota with bananas originating in another BFA

country, and in the following year the deliveries from the two countries would be adjusted accordingly. Another
example of permitted variation involved transferability. A BFA country might have to notify the EC that it would

not be able to deliver the quantity allocated to it. In this event, the shortfall would be reallocated among the other
BFA countries (as well as countries in the "others" category) in accordance with the normal percentage shares for
the countries. Upon the joint request of the remaining countries, the EC would agree to a different allocation.
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ACP countries would come at their expense (unless the EC took the 90,000 tons

only from the "others" category of third-country bananas). One possibility is that
because the EC bound the 90,000-ton figure in its schedule, the BFA countries felt
assured that there would be no more "leakage" of in-quota amounts from them to
the ACP. That is, the EC would not take away any more of the basic tariff quota for
the ACP. To be sure, the fact that the EC bound the 90,000- ton figure meant that
it agreed not to lower the amount. Conceivably, the EC might be more generous to

the ACP, but apparently the BFA felt that scenario was unlikely. A second answer
is that the BFA countries had to accept the 90,000-ton reservation for nontraditional ACP countries as a quid pro quo for the country-specific percentage
share allocations of the basic tariff quota the BFA countries were guaranteed by the
EC.
The EC divided the 90,000-ton limit into country-specific allocations: 15,000
tons to Belize, a traditional ACP supplier; 7,500 tons to Cameroon, a traditional
ACP supplier; 7,500 tons to Cote d'Ivoire, a traditional ACP supplier; 55,000 tons
to the Dominican Republic, a non-traditional ACP supplier; and 5,000 tons to all
"other" non-traditional ACP supplying countries (for example, Ghana and Kenya).
The EC based the allocations to the three traditional ACP suppliers, Belize,
Cameroon, and Cote d'Ivoire, on the best-ever pre-1991 export volumes of these
countries to the EC.
What about out-of-quota shipments? The EC subjected them to a per ton duty
adjusted each year. In 1995, it was ECU 722, fully ECU 100 fewer than the ECU
822 the EC charged to out-of-quota shipments of bananas from third countries. In
1996-97, the EC charged a tariff of ECU 693 per ton on over-quota amounts of
bananas from non-traditional ACP suppliers. This tariff was clearly more
preferential than the ECU 793 per ton rate applicable to out-of-quota shipments
from third countries that took effect on 1 July 1996. The margin of preference, of
course, reflected the distinction between ACP and non-ACP countries. Here, then,
we see one more part of the pattern: discrimination in favor of ACP countries vis-Avis non-ACP countries.
C. The EC's Licensing Requirements
The facts of the Bananas War would be considered difficult, but not excessively
so, if there were no more to recount than what I already have said above. But,
beyond the EC's tripartite categorization, what elevates the factual predicate from
the level of "difficult" to "nearly incomprehensible" is the EC's licensing system.
Trying to grasp it is a bit like perusing Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.2 9
Therefore, I shall not pretend to have understood it all. Still, just like a run at

29.

G.W.F H-FEL, TIE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans., 5th ed. 1977).
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Hegel's Phenomenology is important to his whole system, having a try at the
licensing scheme is needed to comprehend several battles of the War.
The EC subjected bananas from all three of the above categories-traditional

ACP, third-country, and non-traditional suppliers-to licensing procedures. 0 Only
an importing company that held a license was permitted to import bananas into the

EC. To get this cherished authorization, an importer filed an application with the
competent authority in each EC member state into which the importer sought
market access. That authority administered the EC's license allocation procedures

in cooperation with the EC office in the member state.3
For our purposes, the licensing requirements on which we should keep our eye
trained are those applicable to banana imports from third countries and non-

traditional ACP suppliers at the preferential tariff rate for in-quota shipments.
Unfortunately, what we shall see is not the neat, organized, symmetric pattern that
we find in a painting by Mondrian, or even the variegated but recognizable scenes
in a canvas of DuBuffet. We must not expect to see anything pleasing at all. The
EC's rules in this area are as complex and disquieting as some of the works of
twentieth century abstract artists like Francis Bacon and Jackson Pollock. They are
horrendously complex. The EC applies three cumulatively applicable procedures:

(1) operator category rules; (2) activity function rules; and (3) export certificate
requirements for Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. 2 There is no simple, easy

30. As suggested by the discussion in the text, the EC's requirements for licenses to import from traditional
ACP supplying countries differ from those applicable to imports from third countries and non-traditional ACP

suppliers. To be sure, license applications for both must state the quantity and origin from which importers intend
to source their bananas. However, applications to import from a traditional ACP supplier must include an ACP
certificate of origin that testifies to the status of traditional ACP bananas. If applications to import from a
traditional ACP country exceed the traditional quantity for that country, then the EC applies a single reduction
coefficient to all applications that reduces the importers' requested amounts proportionally to the available
volume.
31. Commission Regulation (EEC) 1442/93 specified that banana imports into the EC were to be managed
on a quarterly basis. Accordingly, an importer had to lodge an application within a set period of time to obtain
a license covering the subsequent quarter. Conceptually, assuming the importer sought to do business throughout
the year, it had to file four applications, one per quarter for the forthcoming quarter. (In fact, given the two-round
quarterly license application scheme discussed below, the importer sometimes had to file more than four
applications.) The competent authority would issue a license by the twenty-third day of the last month preceding
the forthcoming quarter, and the license would expire on the seventh day following the end of that quarter.
Likewise, the EC had to calculate the number of licenses, and the volume of imports each license permitted,
quarterly. For each of the first three quarters of a year, the EC established "indicative quantities" based on past
trade patterns, seasonal trends, and the supply-demand balance prevailing in the EC. It used the indicative
quantities to determine the volumes of traditional ACP bananas, third-country bananas, and non-traditional ACP
bananas for which it would issue import licenses for a given quarter. The EC then divided the available import
volumes proportionately among the supplying countries in accordance with the tariff-rate quota allocations
outlined in the text above. As for the fourth quarter of any given year, the EC determined the number of import
licenses available by subtracting the number of licenses issued in the fast three quarters from the total quantity
available for each of the three tariff-rate quota categories.
32. Hurricane license requirements were not the subject of a major battle on the GATr front between the
United States and the EC. Therefore, I have treated these requirements, and the fighting that did take place over
them, in a footnote. See infra note 61.
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way to explain this byzantine scheme, and it is quixotic to believe any one effort at
explaining it can be thorough and entirely accurate. Still, the effort is worth it,
because areasonably rigorous understanding of the scheme puts the legal arguments
of the case into a better-defined context.
1. Step 1: OperatorCategories
First, the EC allocates licenses among "operator categories." There are three
such categories, A, B, and C, which are summarized in Table Two below, and in
which any company seeking to import bananas into the EC is placed. Category C
licenses are not transferable to A or B operators, but Category A or B licenses may
be traded among operators from any category.

I must point out here that I am simplifying matters by omitting a fourth step: namely, the two-round quarterly
license administration rules. I do so because these rules are not relevant to the discussion of the legal battle
discussed infra Parts Il and IV.
In brief, these rules were as follows. By regulation, the EC established two rounds in which companies apply
for import licenses on a quarterly basis. In the first round, companies in operator Categories A and B could request
licenses up to their quarterly entitlement. (Operator categories are explained in Part ILC.1 below.) Category C
operators could apply for their full annual entitlement in any quarter. The operators had to designate in their
application the countries from which they plan to import and the desired volumes of imports. As a consequence
of the export certificate issuances by Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, a Category A or C operator wanting
to import from one of these countries had to attach a special export certificate to its application. (Export
certificates are discussed in Part I.C.4 below.)
Operators submitted their license applications to the competent authority in the EC member states into which
they wanted to import bananas. These authorities forwarded the applications to the EC Commission. If the
applications for any country of origin exceeded the tariff-rate quota amount for that country in the given quarter,
then the Commission applied a country-specific reduction coefficient that decreased the volumes requested in the
applications proportionately. The Commission then issued "first round" licenses by the twenty-third day of the
month preceding the relevant quarter. The licenses were valid until the seventh day of the month following the
end of the quarter.
When the first round was complete, the EC published the sources and quantities of the tariff-rate quota that
had not been exhausted in the fist round. (For example, generally, quantities from the BFA countries and certain
non-traditional ACP countries were not exhausted.) This announcement was the basis for a second-round
allocation of licenses. Operators whose first-round requests were scaled back by a reduction coefficient could
participate in a second round up to the amount of the difference between (1) the import volume they requested
in their original application, and (2) their allocation for one of the countries of origin for which the tariff-rate quota
was not exhausted. Second-round license applications were due within 10 days after the twenty-third day of the
month that precedes the beginning of the quarter.
As in the first round, depending on the number of second-round applications it received, the EC sometimes
had to apply reduction coefficients. In any event, it published the quantities for which licenses could be issued
in the second round. Like first-round licenses, second-round licenses were valid until the seventh day of the month
following the end of the quarter.
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TABLE 2: OPERATOR CATEGORIEs UNDER THE EC's TARIFF-RATE QUOTA FOR
IMPORTED BANANAS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES AND NON-TRADmONAL ACP CoUNTRIES
Operator
Category

Definitionof
Operator
Category

Allocation of Licenses to
Each OperatorCategoryfor
Bananasto be Importedat
In-Quota TariffRates from
Third Countriesand NonTraditionalACP Countries
(Expressedas a Percentageof
Total Import Licenses)

Basisfor Determiningthe
PercentageAllocation of
Licenses Among Operators
within Each Category

Category A

The "old
hands."

66.5 percent

The EC divides the 66.5
percent license allocation
among Category A operators
based on the average
quantities of third-country
and/or non-traditional ACP
bananas that the operator has
imported during the most
recent three-year period for
which data exist. Essentially,
operators that have been
importing larger volumes
receive a more generous
allocation than operators that

Any operator
that has been
marketing
bananas since
before 1992
from third
countries
and/or nontraditional
ACP
countries,

have been handling smaller
volumes.
Category B

The "diversifiers." Any
operator that
has marketed
bananas from
the EC and/or
traditional
ACP
countries
during a
preceding 3year period.

30 percent

The EC divides the 30 percent
license allocation among
Category B operators based on
the average quantities of EC
and/or traditional ACP
bananas the operator has
marketed in the most recent
three-year period for which
data exist. Essentially,
operators that have been
importing larger volumes
receive more generous
allocations than operators that
have been handling smaller
volumes.
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Operator
Category

Definition of
Operator

Allocation of Licenses to
Each Operator Category for

Basisfor Determiningthe
Percentage Allocation of

Category

Bananas to be Imported at
In-QuotaTariff Ratesfrom
Third Countries and NonTraditional ACP Countries
(Expressed as a Percentage of

Licenses Among Operators
within Each Category

Total Import Licenses)
Category C

The "newcomers."

3.5 percent

No data are available because
Category C operators are

newcomers.
Any operator
that started

The EC divides the 3.5 percent

marketing

allocation among applicants

bananas from
other than the
EC and/or
traditional
ACP

on a pro rata basis.

countries in
1992 or after.

Every applicant for a license to import bananas from a third country or a nontraditional ACP country is placed in one of these three categories. The categories
differ from one another according to the past import activities of the applicant,
namely: (1) the countries (if any) from which it has been importing bananas, and
(2) the length of time it has been importing bananas.
Category C operators are newcomers. They started marketing bananas from
origins other than EC or traditional ACP countries in 1992 or after.33 As an
example, an importer that began marketing third-country or non-traditional ACP
bananas in 1993 would be put in Category C. The EC allocates 3.5 percent of the
import licenses available for third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas at inquota rates to Category C operators. Because they are newcomers, there are no data
on the quantities of bananas each Category C operator historically has imported.
Therefore, the EC divides licenses among these operators on a pro rata basis. The
EC derives the 3.5 percent figure by studying the volume of license applications for
the newcomer portion of the in-quota amount of the tariff-rate quota.
Category B operators have not marketed third-country or non-traditional ACP
bananas before, but they have been marketing EC and traditional ACP bananas.
They are trying to add third-country or non-traditional ACP bananas to their

33. As explained next, an importer who had marketed EC or traditional ACP bananas would be in Category
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portfolio of business interests (or perhaps to switch entirely to bananas from other
sources). We might, then, call them the "diversifiers. ' '" The EC gives them 30
percent of the licenses to import third-country and non-ACP bananas at in-quota
rates. Why 30 percent? The EC looked at the average quantity of bananas from the
EC and traditional ACP supplying countries that Category B operators marketed
during the most recent three-year period for which data were available. In other
words, the EC picked the 30 percent figure based on recent import trends. Notice,
then, that it is permissible for an importer with a license to import traditional ACP
bananas to obtain, in addition, a license to import third-country and non-traditional
ACP bananas. That importer would, of course, be placed in Category B. Notice also
that Category B operators are not as favored as Category A operators, discussed
next, who get the largest percentage share of licenses.
Category A operators have been marketing third-country and/or non-traditional
bananas since before 1992. They are-in contrast to the newcomers of Category C
and the diversifiers of Category B-the "old hands." They receive from the EC the
lion's share of the allocation of all import licenses for third-country and nontraditional bananas: 66.5 percent. How did the EC come upon this figure (which,
of course, it considered generous)? The EC used the same basis for determining
entitlement to Category A licenses as for Category B licenses: namely, recent
import data. Specifically, the EC checked the average quantities of bananas from
third-countries and/or non-traditional ACP countries marketed in the three most
recent years for which data were available. It decided that Category A operators
ought to be entitled to receive 66.5 percent of the licenses for importation of
bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries at the in-quota
rates.
In sum, conceptually, the EC does not immediately allocate import licenses
directly to individual operators. First, it allocates them to import operator
categories. Then, as we shall see next, based on activity functions, it allocates
licenses to individual operators within the categories. Regarding its allocation of
licenses to operator categories, the EC grants the vast majority to the operator
category, A, which is populated by companies that have been importing bananas
from third countries and non-traditional ACP supplying countries since before
1992. The category representing companies that have only just begun importing
bananas from outside the EC and traditional ACP countries, i.e., they have done so
only since 1992, get a tiny fraction-3.5 percent-of the licenses. The category
representing companies that have focused their efforts on bananas from the EC and
traditional ACP suppliers are somewhat better off, with a 30 percent allocation.

34. Perhaps this label is a bit euphemistic. As discussed in Part III.D.1, infra, the Panel found, and
Appellate Body agreed, that the reservation of licenses for Category B operators was a key way in which the EC

banana import market was rigged in favor of these operators, which were mostly European companies. This
rigging allowed Category B operators to take business away from American firms.
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Is it fair to say that the "old hands"--those who have historically been
importing-are the "chosen ones" because the EC license allocation scheme favors
importers that have been in that market for a sustained period with a 66.5 percent
allocation? Not necessarily. To be sure, the 66.5 percent figure suggests the scheme
favors the status quo and makes it tough for companies trying to break into the
third-country and non-traditional ACP banana import market to do so. But,
Category B operators are more accurately dubbed the "chosen ones." Consider
exactly who they are. Critics of the EC's preference scheme emphasize the fact that
Category B operators tend to be European (especially British and French)
companies. These licensees get a sizeable chunk-30 percent-of the licenses to
import non-traditional ACP and third-country bananas, even though that market
niche has not been their forte. Consequently, Category B operators have a
significant degree of control over the price paid to producers of dollar bananas and
the EC retail price. The spread between the two prices often is large. It can be as
much as twelve dollars per box of bananas, reflecting a payment of four dollars to
the Latin producer and a resale price of sixteen dollars. 35 Thus, Category B
importers have a significant vested interest in seeing that the way the EC doles out
licenses does not disrupt too severely the status quo.
2. Step 2: Activity Functions
In outlining the operator category rules, I have made use of the term
"marketing" bananas. Still, I have yet to explain what this term means. Nor have I
suggested how the EC determines the amount of bananas an individual operator is
licensed to import- i.e., the "individual operator reference quantities." These two
areas of uncertainty created by the operator category rules are resolved by the socalled "activity function" rules.36 These rules, summarized in Table Three below,
are the second of the cumulatively applicable procedures the EC uses to allocate
licenses to import bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries.

35.

See Daniel Mazuera, A Trade Dispute Gone Bananas,WALL ST. L, Nov. 17,1995, at A19.

36. In addition to satisfying the activity function rules discussed in the text, an importer had to meet two
other activity function criteria in order to be placed in operator Category A or B. The importer had to be
established in the EC, and it had to have traded a minimum of 250 tons of bananas in any one year of the reference
period.
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TABLE 3: AcTIVITY FUNCTIONS UNDER THE EC's TARIFF-RATE QUOTA FOR
IMPORTED BANANAS FROM TH=n COUNTRIES AND NON-TRADMONAL ACP COUNTRIES
Activity
Function

Type of
Activity

Definition of the Activity

Weighting Coefficient
(Reflects the Level of
Commercial Risk Borne by
Operator in Connection with
the Activity, and Is Used to
Determine Each Operator's
Individual Reference
Quantity)

(a)

Primary
Importer

Purchasing green bananas
from producers in third
countries, traditional ACP
countries, or non-traditional
ACP countries, or producing
such bananas in these
countries, and subsequently
selling them in the EC.

57 percent

(b)

Secondary
Importer
(i.e.,
Customs
Clearer)

As an owner, supplying and
selling green bananas with a
view to their subsequent
marketing in the EC, while
bearing the risk of spoilage

15 percent

or loss.

(c)

Ripener

As an owner, ripening green
bananas and marketing them
in the EC.

28 percent

On the basis of activity functions, the EC allocates fixed percentages of the licenses
required for the importation of bananas from these sources at in-quota tariff rates.
Activity function rules pertain only to Category A and B operators, not to the
newcomers of Category C. In order to qualify for Category A or B, an importer

must have performed at least one of the "marketing" activities-(a), (b), or
(c)-during the three-year data period that determines the reference quantities of

bananas. Activity (a) functions are those associated with a "primary importer." An
operator performs activity (a) if it purchases green bananas from producers in third

countries, traditional ACP countries, or non-traditional ACP countries, or if it
produces bananas in these countries and subsequently sells the bananas in the EC.

An operator performs activity (b) if it acts as a "secondary importer" or "customs
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clearer." It does so by, as an owner,37 supplying and releasing green bananas for
free circulation with a view toward the subsequent marketing of the bananas in the
EC, and takes on the risk of spoilage or loss. Finally, an operator performs activity
(c) if it acts as a "ripener": that is, if, as an owner, it ripens and markets green
bananas within the EC.
Associated with each activity is a weighting coefficient. This coefficient is
applied to the average quantity of bananas marketed by an operator in the three
most recent data years. The result of the multiplication is the individual operator's
reference quantity. In turn, the EC uses that quantity to set the individual operator's
annual entitlement to licenses; that is to say, each operator's claim for a license is
based on its individual reference quantity. This quantity depends on the product of
(1) the operator's historical banana import volumes, and (2) the weighting
coefficient for that operator determined by the type of activity in which it has been
engaged.
On what factors are the values of the weighting coefficients based? In a word,
risk. The weighting coefficients differ depending on the level of commercial risk
borne by the operators for the different activities. The idea is greater risk, greater
reward. The EC as licensor is in the business of granting licenses to operators that
have undertaken commercial risk at some point in the marketing chain. It rewards
risk-taking because the amount of bananas from third countries and non-traditional
ACP countries that these licenses authorize an operator to import depends on the
riskiness of the activities the operator has performed. Logically, those firms
engaging in riskier activities should have a larger entitlement to licenses, and the
EC's activity function rules are designed to implement this logic. Primary
importation is seen as the riskiest activity, so it has the highest weighting coefficient,
57 percent. Secondary importation is viewed as the least risky of the three activities,
so its weighting coefficient is 15 percent. In between these two activities in terms of
risk levels is ripening, which carries a 28 percent coefficient. If an operator performs
more than one activity, then it gets the benefit of the weighting coefficients
associated with those activities. An operator performing all three activities would
have a weighting coefficient of 100 percent.
The preceding paragraphs imply that an operator's individual reference quantity
is not necessarily identical in amount with the amount of third-country and ACP
bananas the operator is licensed to import. Rather, the individual reference quantity
is a key figure the EC uses to decide (1) the operator's claim for a license, and (2)
the amount of bananas the license represents. Conceptually, calculation of the
individual reference quantities is the penultimate step. The final step is the
37. I confess it is not altogether clear to me what the "as an owner" qualification used in the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports is meant to connote. Presumably, it excludes brokers. It would make sense that it means
that if the operator temporarily owns the shipment of bananas in question, i.e., in international commercial terms,
the operator is the ultimate consignee of the shipment specified in the bill of lading. Alas, neither the Panel nor
Appellate Body nails down this point.
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translation of these quantities into actual license grants for specific amounts to
individual operators. How the EC performs the final step is not entirely apparent
from either the Panel or Appellate Body Report, and I confess great difficulty in
fathoming its precise details. (I am told, only half-jokingly, that perhaps three or four
people at the EC in Brussels could explain what is going on, though not necessarily
in a satisfactory manner.) However, so far as I am able to discern, understanding
them does not seem to be essential to understanding the legalities of the Bananas
War.
Another way to grasp the importance of the weighting coefficients is to realize
that they represent the percentage of Category A and B licenses to which an importer
engaged in a certain activity has access for the importation of bananas from third
countries and non-traditional ACP countries. Primary importers may obtain access
to "A" and "B" licenses equivalent to 57 percent of their past import volumes
(assuming they do not also perform customs clearance and ripening activities).
Customs clearers are allocated 15 percent of the "A" and "B" licenses, and ripeners
are eligible for 28 percent (again, assuming no additional activities).
3. An Example
A greatly simplified hypothetical example might help clarify how the operator
category and activity function rules work in practice. -8Assume the EC sets the inquota amount-the basic tariff quota-for bananas from third countries and nontraditional ACP supplying countries at two million tons (net weight). Thus, the total
in-quota amount of bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP supplying
countries for which the EC will distribute licenses is two million tons.
As explained above, based on the average quantities ofthird-country and/or nontraditional ACP bananas marketed in the three most recent years for which data are
available, the EC has decided to allocate 66.5 percent of these licenses to Category
A operators. 39 Also as explained above, based on the average quantities of EC and/or
traditional ACP bananas marketed in the three most recent years for which data are

38. 'Three warnings are in order. First, this example does not take into account the application of
provisional or final reduction coefficients. Often, the total of all of the individual reference quantities established

by the EC exceeds the volume of the tariff-rate quota available for distribution among operators. For example,
when summed up, the individual reference quantities for all Category A operators may be 750,000. However, the

tariff-rate quota available for Category A may be just 600,000 (as is hypothesized in the example). In this
situation, the EC has had to apply reduction coefficients to the reference quantities.

Second, this example assumes that licenses have not been traded. In practice, as noted earlier, Category A
and B licenses may be traded to operators in any category. The EC takes these transfers into account when
establishing reference quantities for individual operators.

Third, the example does not adequately explain the relationship between an individual reference quantity,
on the one hand, and an annual entitlement to banana import licenses, on the other hand. Unfortunately, this
relationship is not clarified in the key paragraphs of the Panel Report, supra note 1, that discuss these

concepts-paragraphs 3.21-24.
39.

See supra Part U.C.1.
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available, the EC has determined to allocate 30 percent of the licenses to Category
B operators. 4 Accordingly, the licenses the EC grants to Category A importers to
import bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP suppliers at the inquota tariff will represent 66.5 percent of the two million ton quota, or 1,300,000
tons. Thirty percent of the licenses, representing 600,000 tons, will go to Category
B. Operators in Category C will be authorized to import 100,000 tons in total at the
in-quota tariff rate.
Still, how does the EC determine the amount of bananas permitted to be
imported by an individual operator-i.e., the "individual reference quantity"-of that
operator? The EC has to look to the activity category of that importer. Therefore,
consider three license applicants: Zabars, Well Spring, and Freshfields. Suppose
Zabars has never marketed third-country or non-traditional ACP bananas in the EC.
Therefore, it is placed in Category C. The EC will allocate Zabars a portion of the
3.5 percent of the licenses available for Category C operators. How big will the
allocation be, and thus how many tons of bananas will Zabars be entitled to import
from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries? The answer will depend on
a pro rata allocation of licenses among all Category C applicants.
Suppose Well Spring has marketed traditional ACP bananas. Specifically, it has
ripened and sold these bananas within the EC. Accordingly, it is a Category B
operator, and has been engaging in activity (c). The EC will allocate to Well Spring
a portion of the 30 percent of import licenses for in-quota third-country and nontraditional ACP bananas. Suppose, for the sake of argument, Well Spring has
imported on average 200,000 tons of traditional ACP bananas during the most recent
three-year data period. (Obviously, not all of these imports have been at the in-quota
amount. This figure represents both in-quota and out-of-quota amounts.) What is
Well Spring's individual reference quantity?
The answer-again, in this over-simplified example-is 56,000 tons. This
answer results from the application of the weighting coefficient for activity (c), in
which Well Spring is engaged, to the 200,000-ton average quantity of bananas Well
Spring has marketed. The coefficient is 28 percent, and the product of it and 200,000
tons is 56,000 tons. Given this individual reference quantity, we can say that we
would not expect the EC to grant Well Spring a Category B operator license to
import any more than 56,000 tons of bananas from third countries and nontraditional ACP countries at the in-quota amount. In other words, the 56,000-ton
figure sets an upper boundary.
Precisely what amount of such bananas will the EC authorize Well Spring to
import?4 The answer will be based on Well Spring's individual reference quantity.
Notice, therefore, that the individual reference quantity is a figure that determines
entitlement to import a specified amount of third-country and ACP bananas. But, it

40. See supra PartII.C.l.
41. I would remind the reader of the cautions set forth supra note 38.
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is not necessarily the licensed amount itself. The license, of course, will entitle Well
Spring to receive the benefit of the lower tariff rate on bananas up to the licensed
amount.42 Any bananas from these countries of origin in excess of this individual
reference quantity will be subject to the higher tariff for out-of-quota shipments.
Suppose Well Spring had been engaged in activity (a), primary importing. The
EC deems this to be riskier than ripening, as is evident from the 57 percent weighting
coefficient. Therefore, Well Spring's individual reference quantity would be higher:
114,000 (i.e., the product of the 200,000-ton average quantity of traditional ACP
bananas Well Spring had been marketing and the coefficient). In turn, based on this
quantity, Well Spring is entitled to a Category B license authorizing it to import
more third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas than would be the case if Well
Spring were engaged only in ripening. Here, too, we would expect the individual
reference quantity to serve as an upper limit on the precise tonnage entitlement: i.e.,
the entitlement will not exceed 114,000 tons. What is the logic behind the larger
entitlement Well Spring gets as a primary importer as opposed to a ripener? Again,
greater risk assumed in the past entitles an importer to greater return, in the form of
a more generous import license, for the future. Because Well Spring has been
engaged in the riskier business of primary importation of traditional ACP bananas,
the EC rewards Well Spring with a license to import a larger quantity of thirdcountry and non-traditional ACP bananas than would be the case if Well Spring had
been a mere ripener of traditional ACP bananas.
Finally, consider the position of Freshfields. Suppose it has marketed thirdcountry and/or non-traditional ACP bananas for many years (in particular, since
before 1992), and thus fits into Category A. Assume Freshfields has acted as a
primary importer, i.e., it is engaged in activity (a), so the applicable weighting
coefficient is 57 percent. Suppose further that the average quantity of bananas, both
in- and out-of-quota, that Freshfields imported from third countries and/or nontraditional ACP countries in the most recent three years is 400,000 tons. Therefore,
its individual reference quantity for these imports is 228,000 tons (i.e., the product
of this amount and the coefficient). Given this reference quantity, we would expect
Freshfields to be entitled to a Category A import license authorizing it to bring into
the EC a set amount of bananas, not to exceed 228,000 tons, at the in-quota tariff rate

42. Assuming the individual reference quantities and licensed amounts did correspond exactly, observe
that this individual reference quantity is well within the overall six-hundred thousand ton Category B in-quota

tariff rate volume available for distribution among operators. Suppose that when the individual reference quantities
from all other Category B operators are totaled, the sumn-the total reference quantity-exceeds six-hundred

thousand tons. In that event, conceptually the EC will apply reduction coefficients to each Category B applicant.
In practice, the EC may apply the reduction coefficient beforehand.
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from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries. 43 Any amount in excess of
what the EC authorizes would be subject to the out-of-quota rate.
Here, again, the "greater risk, greater reward" logic can be seen by way of
example. If Freshfields had engaged in only secondary market activities, i.e., if it had
acted only as a customs clearer, then its individual reference quantity would be far
lower-the product of 15 percent and 400,000 tons, or 60,000 tons. In turn, the EC
would set an in-quota amount for Freshfields as regards the importation of thirdcountry and ACP bananas commensurate with this lower reference quantity.
It is possible to supplement the above methodology by including a calculation
for the aggregate amounts of Category A and B licenses the EC would reserve for
each of the activity categories. (Recall that activity categories are not relevant for
Category C.) As explained earlier, in an aggregate sense, of the Category A and B
licenses, the EC reserves 57 percent for primary importers, 15 percent for customs
clearers, and 28 percent for ripeners. Therefore, of the 1,900,000 tons of in-quota
bananas available for the A and B operators (1,300,000 tons and 600,000
respectively), 57 percent-or 1,083,000 million tons-are for primary importers.
The EC will issue licenses to secondary importers representing 15 percent of the
available A and B amounts, or 285,000 tons (the product of 1,900,000 tons and 15
percent). Finally, the EC will reserve 28 percent, or 532,000 tons, for ripeners.
Within these parameters, individual reference quantities can be determined for each
importer, based on the importer's historical import volume and activity category, as
done above. In turn, the EC can render determinations on licenses to import bananas
from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries. Assuming a correspondence
between individual reference quantities and aggregate licensed amounts, clearly, the
56,000 individual reference quantity calculated for Well Spring is within the 532,000
ton amount reserved for ripeners. Similarly, the 228,000 individual reference
quantity for Freshfields is within the 1,083,000-ton amount reserved for primary
importers.
4. Step 3: Export CertificatesIssued by BFA Countries
As I indicated at the outset of Part II.C, allocating licenses to import bananas
from third countries and non-traditional ACP supplying countries involves multiple
steps that the EC undertakes in seriatim. Step One results in the placement of
importers into operator categories A, B, and C, and the assignment of percentage
shares of licenses to those categories. Step Two results in the calculation of

43. Assuming that the individual reference quantities and licensed amounts did correspond exactly, observe
that this individual reference quantity is well within the overall 1,300,000-ton Category A in-quota tariff rate

volume available for distribution among operators. Suppose that when the individual reference quantities from
all other Category A operators are totaled, the sum--the total reference quantity---exceeds 1,300,000 tons. In that
event, conceptually, the EC will apply reduction coefficients to each Category A applicant. In practice, the EC
may apply the reduction coefficient beforehand.
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individual reference quantities, and on the basis thereof, the allocation of licenses for
importation at the in-quota tariff rate to each company in Category A and B. Step
Three, explained here, concerns an additional requirement that must be satisfied in
order to receive an import license for bananas from any one of the three BFA
countries.
In Part II.B.2 above, I mentioned that the EC reserved for BFA countries specific
shares in the basic tariff quota for duty-free imports of bananas from non-traditional
ACP supplying countries and third-country suppliers. Among the four BFA
countries, the EC granted Colombia a 21 percent share in the tariff-rate quota, Costa
Rica a 23.4 percent share in the tariff-rate quota, Nicaragua a 3 percent share, and
Venezuela a 2 percent share. These country-specific reservations are not, however,
the only special treatment BFA provides to these exporting countries. In addition, the
BFA authorizes these four countries to issue special export certificates for up to 70
percent of their country-specific allocations.
The export certificates are a device by which a BFA country can decide which
companies can take advantage of the country-specific shares and export bananas to
the EC. Without an export certificate, exportation is forbidden. Of the four BFA
countries, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua-but not Venezuela--chose to issue
export certificates. In turn, the EC required by regulation a Category A or C (but not
B) operator to obtain a certificate in order to be eligible to receive from the EC a
license to import bananas from Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua.'

I. THE GAIT FRONT
War's a brain-spattering,windpipe-slittingart.
Lord Byron, Don Juan, canto 9, stanza 4.
A. Overview
As I mentioned in Part II.A above, on two pre-Uruguay Round occasions, GAIT
Panels ruled that the ACP preferential trading arrangement for bananas violated
GATT rules, but the EC blocked adoption of each decision.4 5 The origins

44.

Because, as discussed infra Part III.D.3, the Panel found the matching requirement overall to be

inconsistent with GATT Article 1:1, it was unnecessary for it to rule on the rather obvious violation of the MN
rule arising from the exemption of Category B operators. See Panel Report, supra note 1, 7.242, at 363.

45. 1 base the discussion contained in Part In on three primary sources: (1) the Panel Report, supranote
1,

IV.l-IV.739, at 26-252 (concerning the main arguments raised by the United States and the responses by the

EC); (2) Letter Update, supranote 12; and (3) the Appellate Body Report, supranote 1,

159-163, at 75-77 and

U 189-216, at 87-97 (concerning the arguments over GATT Articles 1:1, i1, X:3(a), XIII; the arguments over the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; and the number of banana import regimes).

Occasionally, separate citations to the Appellate Body report are provided below for the convenience of the reader.
My discussion does not recount the arguments raised by third parties (various ACP countries, the BFA
countries, Canada, India, Japan, and the Philippines). These third parties arguments are set forth in the Panel
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Report, supranote 1., V.I-V.139, at 253-90 and in the Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, U 106-128, at 4961.
Likewise, I do not consider all of the arguments raised by the principal disputants. Rather, I have omitted
from the discussion a few, less central, matters. For example, the EC argued the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture permits it to act inconsistently with GATT Article XIII. Both the Panel and Appellate Body rejected
this argument. See Panel Report, supra note 1, H 7.120-7.127, at 332-333; Appellate Body Report, supra note
l, H 153-58, at 72-74.
As another example, the United States challenged the EC's tariff-rate quota reallocation rules for BFA
countries. The United States claimed the EC had disregarded the principles of Article XIII:I when it granted the
BFA countries the exclusive right to increase their access when other BFA countries experienced a shortfall in
the quantity they could supply to the EC. That is, reallocation was permissible only among BFA countries. NonBFA countries could not share in unused portions of the tariff-rate quota of a BFA country. The Appellate Body
agreed with the American claim. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 1 163, at 77.
Still another example of an issue (albeit a procedural one) I do not treat is representation. During the Panel
hearing in September 1996, after objections from the United States, three lawyers for St. Lucia and St. Vincent
were expelled by the Panel because they were not permanent government officials of these Caribbean countries,
As underpre-Uruguay Round dispute resolution rules, under the Uruguay Round Rules andPmceduresGoverning
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), only government officials can attend WTO Panel or Appellate Body
proceedings. Moreover, again as in the pre-Uruguay Round era, participation is limited to complainants,
respondents, and third parties. Accordingly, ACP countries had to rely on the EC to defend their position. (To be
sure, representatives from some Caribbean ACP nations, as well as from Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon, were
admitted as observers and allowed to make one statement. Still, they were not allowed to engage in debate.) These
strict procedures highlighted the problem that many developing countries cannot afford a full-time staff of expert

international trade lawyers, and find it more cost-effective to sub-contract cases to private-sector lawyers. See
Marco CEJ. Bronckers & John H. Jackson, EditorialComment: Outside Counsel in WTO Dispute Processes,2
J. INT'L ECON. L. 155-84 (1999); Gabrielle Marceau, Rules on Ethicsfor the New World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement Mechanism-The Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement ofDisputes,32 J. WoRLD TRADE 57 (June 1998).
I should add that I do not bother much about the scope of the Lome Convention Waiver. The matter is dealt
with in the Panel Report, supranote 1,V IV.28-IV.3 1, at 32-34 (giving an overview of the EC's arguments about
the Lome Waiver), 1 IV.37-IV.86, at 35-51 (providing a detailed rendition of the EC's Lore Waiver arguments),
IV.227-IV.238, at 98-101 (setting forth the responses of the United States and its co-complainants to the EC's
Lome arguments), 9a 7.95-7.110, at 322-27 (finding that the Lome Waiver does waive inconsistencies between
the EC's tariff-rate quota allocation system and Article XIhA, but only to the extent necessary to allow the EC
to allocate quota shares to specific traditional ACP countries in an amount not exceeding their pre-1991 best-ever
export volumes to the EC), 7.196-7.204, at 352-56 (rejecting the EC's argument that the Lome Waiver excused
the inconsistency between the EC's operator category rules and Article 1:1), and 9a 7.220, 7.222, at 359 (rejecting
the EC's argument that the Lome Waiver excused the inconsistency between the EC's activity function rules and
Article 1:1). The scope of the Lome Waiver also is discussed in the Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, l94-95,
at 43-44 (summarizing the American argument that the Lome Convention Waiver embraces only the provisions
of GATT Article 1:1, not those of Article XI), and I 164-188, at 77-87 (holding that the Panel was wrong to
conclude that the Lome Convention Waiver waives the inconsistency with GATT Article XIH:I to the extent
necessary to permit the EC to allocate tariff-rate quota shares to specific traditional ACP supplying countries in
an amount not exceeding their pre-1991 best-ever exports to the EC).
In brief, the EC argued the licensing procedures it applied to third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas
were covered by the Lome Convention Waiver from GATI-WTO rules on non-discrimination, specifically from
the MFN clause of GAIT Article 1:1. The United States countered that the EC had too expansive an interpretation
of the Waiver:.namely, that the Waiver could not excuse the application of operator category and activity function
rules to third-country and non-traditional imports, but not to traditional ACP imports. The Panel agreed that the
differential application of these rules violated Article 1:1 and was not immunized by the Lome Waiver. See Panel
Report, supra note 1, 7.196-7.204, at 352-56. The issue was not raised on appeal.

Rather, the Appellate Body considered two other arguments about the Lome Convention and the Waiver
raised by the EC: whether the Convention required the EC to establish the preferential trading scheme for bananas
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of the move to the WTO as a battleground for what we can dub BananasIII began
with a Section 301 petition to the United States Trade Representative (USTR) from
Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (Chiquita) and the Hawaii Banana Industry
Association. (Interestingly, neither Dole Foods Co. (Dole) nor Del Monte
associated itself with Chiquita's petition.) After receiving this petition, in October
1995 the United States filed a complaint with the WTO about the ACP preference
scheme. The complaint was joined by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico
(though I shall not dwell on the differences among the co-complainants as to legal
argumentation, as they are slight, and instead lump the co-complainants together
with the United States). While the United States supported the EC's zero-tariff
preferences for ACP bananas, it charged that other features of the banana preference
scheme violated three basic GAIT rules. In other words, the United States did not
attack the idea of granting tariff concessions on bananas from traditional ACP
countries. Rather, it took aim at the GATT-consistency of the grant.
The United States and EC fought three bloody battles on the GAT front. First,
regarding tariff issues, the United States claimed the EC's preferential trading
arrangement violated the MFN principle of GAT Article 1:1. Second, concerning
the allocation of tariffrate quotas, the United States argued that the arrangement
violated GAIT Article XIII. Third, the United States alleged that the import
licensing regime violated the MFN principle of GATT Article 1:1 and the national
treatment principle of GAIT Article 111:4. Moreover, the United States said the BFA
licensing system discriminated against third-country (i.e., non-BFA) importers and
distributors in favor of EC licensees. The United States alleged that Chiquita and
Dole were deprived of half of their business (even though Chiquita holds an import
license).47 In each battle, the American attack was met by the EC with one or more
defenses of varying degrees of strength. While the defenses worked with respect to
the tariff battle, they collapsed in the tariff-rate quota allocation and import licensing
struggles. I summarize the battles in Tables Four, Five and Six A-C, respectively,
and discuss them in turn below.

in the manner it had; and whether the Waiver covered violations of GATr Article XII. The Appellate Body
concluded, as had the Panel, that the Convention obligated the EC to provide preferential tariff treatment for nontraditional ACP bananas, but did not compel the EC (1) to allocate tariff-rate quota shares to traditional ACP
countries individually in excess of their pre-1991 best-ever export volumes, or (2) to maintain the import licensing
procedures for third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. In addition, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel
and held that the Waiver did not excuse any inconsistency between GATT Article XIII and the EC's allocation
of tariff-rate quota shares to traditional ACP countries. Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, 1164-188, at 77-87,
J 255(g)-(i), at 113; see also infra note 48
46. See Caroline Southey, ACP States "Need Banana Regime," FIN. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1997, at 4. For a
discussion of Section 301, see RAJ BHALA &KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADELAW ch. 10 (1998).
47. I do not mean to suggest that Chiquita and Dole lost this business merely because of export certificates.
Rather, the lost business was due to the cumulative effect of a reduction in volume of shipments, the operator

category system, the activity function rules, and the export certificate requirement. The latter requirement
essentially cut into their Category A licenses.
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B. The FirstBattle: Tariff-Rate Quotas and MFN Treatment

The highlights of the first battle on the GAIT front is set forth in Table Four. It
was the shortest and least consequential of the three battles fought on this front. It
also was by far the easiest battle to follow. 48
TABLE 4: THE FIRsT BATrLE ON THE GATT FRONT-TAREFFs IN THE EC's TARIFF-RATE QUOTA
SYSTEM

American Attack

EC Defenses

PanelOutcome

Appellate Body
Outcome

Violation of Article
:1.

Differential tariff
treatment is excused
by the Lome
Convention Waiver.

For the EC.

Affirms the Panel
holding.

The tariff-rate quota
system imposes
different tariff rates on
bananas depending on
the country of origin
of the bananas.

The Lome Convention
Waiver excuses the
tariff rate structure.

The gravamen of the American argument under GAT Article I:1 was that the
structure of the EC's tariff-rate quota imposed differential tariff rates.49 The EC
maintained one set of tariff rates for third-country bananas, but imposed another set
of tariff rates for non-traditional ACP bananas. The United States alleged that
applying differential customs duties on the basis of foreign source violated the

fundamental guarantee in Article 1:1 of non-discriminatory tariff treatment.
Specifically, the United States pointed out that within the tariff-rate quota

category for third countries, the EC had reserved 90,000 tons of its basic tariff quota
for non-traditional ACP bananas. These 90,000 tons from the non-traditional ACP

48. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion below of tariff-rate quota share allocations and GATr Article
1:1 is based on Panel Report, supranote 1, 7.131-7.136, at 333-35 and Appellate Body Report, supranote 1,
193-97, at 43-45 and 'M180-88, at 85-87.
49. The famous, though inelegantly drafted, MFN principle is set forth in GATT Article 1:1:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation
or exportation or imposed in the international transfer of payments for imports or exports and with
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rulesandformalities
in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 111, any advantage, favor,privilege or immunity granted by any
contractingparty to any productoriginating in or destinedfor any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionallyto the like productoriginatingin or destinedforthe territoriesofall
othercontractingparties.
GAIT B.I.S.D., vol. IV at 2 (1969), reprinted in RM BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS-DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 1 (1996) (emphasis added). [hereinafter DOCUMNTS SUPPLEMENT].
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countries entered the EC duty free. In contrast, the EC assessed a duty of ECU 75 per
ton on in-quota shipments of third-country bananas. As for over-quota imports, the
United States said the EC assessed on non-traditional ACP bananas a duty that was
ECU 100 per ton below the MFN duty it assessed on third-country (particularly Latin
American) bananas. For example, as indicated in Table One in Part II.B above, in
1995, the EC charged ECU 822 per ton for out-of-quota shipments of bananas from
third countries, whereas it charged ECU 722 per ton for over-quota amounts from
non-traditional ACP countries. In 1996-97, the EC charged ECU 793 per ton for outof-quota shipments of bananas from third countries, whereas it charged ECU 693 per
ton for the out-of-quota amount from non-traditional ACP suppliers. (Presumably,
the fact that the EC intended to lower the final bound rate in the year 2000 to ECU
680 per ton for third-country bananas did not satisfy the United States, as the EC
might reduce the out-of-quota rate for non-traditional ACP bananas below ECU 680
per ton.)
The EC's response to the American argument was simple. The differential
treatment between bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries
was covered by the Lome Convention Waiver.
The Panel held in favor of the EC. It agreed with the United States that the EC's
preferential tariff treatment of non-traditional ACP bananas was inconsistent with
its GATT Article 1:1 obligations. After all, third-country and non-traditional ACP
bananas are like products, and the EC did not provide unconditionally the lower
tariffs on bananas from non-traditional ACP countries to bananas from third
countries. However, the Panel also agreed with the EC's defense that these
obligations were excused by the Lome Convention Waiver.
On appeal, the United States did not dispute the Panel's finding that the Lome
Convention Waiver covered the EC's GATT Article 1: 1 obligations. However, the
United States questioned whether the Lome Convention itself required the EC to
afford duty-free access to ninety thousand tons of non-traditional ACP bananas, and
to provide a margin of tariff preference of ECU 100 for out-of-quota shipments of
non-traditional ACP bananas over third-country bananas. The Appellate Body
carefully examined the relevant provisions of the Convention. It concluded that it did
indeed require both duty-free access to the ninety thousand tons of non-traditional
ACP bananas and the margin of tariff preference of ECU 100 granted to all other
non-traditional ACP bananas. 0

50. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 1165, at 78, 1 173, at 81-82, 1 178, at 84, andI 255(g), (i),
at 113. As discussed in the Report, there were certain features of the EC's preferential scheme that the Appellate
Body concluded the Lome Convention did not require. These features pertained to the EC's (1) allocation of tariff

quota shares to traditional ACP suppliers in excess of their pre-1991 best-ever export volumes, (2) allocation of
tariff-quota shares to non-traditional ACP suppliers, and (3) maintenance of import licensing procedures applied
to third-country and non-traditional ACP suppliers. See id., T 174-78, at 82-84, 1 255(h)-(i), at 113.
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In other words, the United States lost the MFN battle in the War. It was a loss
easily sustained, however. The real battle on the GATI front was to be over GATT
Article XIII, and in it the Americans would triumph.

McGeorgeLaw Review / Vol. 31
C. The Second Battle: Tariff-Rate Quota Allocations, Discrimination,and Trade
Distortion
1. The Two American Lines of Attack

The GAIT does not make for easy reading.5 Article XIII is rather more

51. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion in sub-sections (1), (2), and (3) in the text concerning tariff-rate
quota allocations and GATr Article XIII is based on Panel Report, supranote 1, I 7.64-7.77, at 311-16.
There are five aspects about the GATr Article XIII battle that I do not regard as central, hence I have not
discussed them in the text. The following abbreviated comments and citations about each aspect may be helpful.
(1) The Lome Waiver.
The Panel considered whether any of the inconsistencies between the EC's regime and GAIT Article

XIII were excused by the Lome Convention Waiver. The Panel found that the Lome Waiver waived
inconsistencies with Article XII1:1, but only to the extent necessary to allow the EC to allocate tariff-rate quota
shares to specific traditional ACP countries, and then only up to a certain amount. See Panel Report, supra note
1, TJ 7.95-7.110, at 322-28. The Appellate Body disagreed, and reversed the Panel's conclusion.
The Appellate Body empowered Article XIII, essentially saying it trumped the Lome Waiver. It held
the Lome Waiver does not immunize the EC from Article XIII:I, even to the extent necessary to permit the EC
to allocate shares in a tariff-rate quota to traditional ACP countries. If the Contracting Parties had intended
otherwise, they would have said so in the Lome Waiver. Indeed, in the entire history of GAIT, they had granted
only one waiver from Article XIII, and it was an express grant. See Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, I 17988, at 85-87 andi 255(j), at 113.
(2) he BFA.
The Panel considered whether any of the inconsistencies between the EC's preferential trading
arrangement for bananas and GAIT Article XIII were permitted by the negotiation of the BFA and its inclusion
in the EC's Schedule. The Panel found that the inclusion of the BFA tariff quota shares in the EC's Schedule did
not justify the inconsistencies. See Panel Report, supranote 1, 7.111-7.118, at 328-31. The Appellate Body
did not disturb this finding.
(3) The Agreement on Agriculture.
The EC maintained that the provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture prevailed over
GAIT rules such as Article XIIL The text of the Agreement is published in Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Uruguay Round-FinalTexts of the GATT UruguayRound Agreements Including the Agreement
Establishingthe World Trade Organization43 (Apr. 15, 1994) (Marrakech, Morocco), and in the official WTO
document, WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of MultilateralTrade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (1994).
The Panel rejected the defense. See Panel Report, supra note 1, TI 7.120-7.127, at 332-33.
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel. The logic? Ifthe Uruguay Round negotiators had intended
the Agreement on Agriculture to trump Article XIII, then they would have said so. They did not, i.e., nothing in
the plain language of the Agreement provided a textual basis for the EC's defense. See Appellate Body Report,
supra note 1, U 153-58, at 72-75; 255(d), at 112.
(4) The Agreement on ImportLicensing.
The Panel ruled that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Import Licensing Procedureswas applicable
to licensing procedures for tariff-rate quotas. The text of this Agreement is published in UruguayRound-Final
Texts, supra, at 221. Its key substantive provisions are in Articles 1:2 and 1:3. Article 1:2 of the Agreement
obligates Members to ensure that their administrative procedures for implementing import licensing requirements
conform with the GATT and other Uruguay Round agreements, "with a view to preventing trade distortions that
may arise from an inappropriate operation of those procedures, taking into account the economic development
purposes and financial and trade needs of developing country Members." Id. at 222 (footnote omitted). Article
1:3 says that "[the rules for import licensing procedures shall be neutral in application and administered in a fair
and equitable manner." Id. at 222. The United States raised claims under these two provisions of the Agreement
(as well as under Articles 3:2 and 3:5.)
The EC responded that the Agreement on Import Licensing was inapplicable, relying on Article 1:1,

2000 / The Bananas War
inhospitable than normal.52 It is unpleasant in its length and intricacy, and thus
which defines "import licensing" as "an application or other documentation (other than that required for customs
purposes)... to the relevant administrative body as a prior condition for importation into the customs territory
of the importing Member." Id. at 221. The EC urged that a tariff-rate quota license is not a prior condition for
importation. Rather, it is necessary to gain access at a reduced rate, but not to import bananas per se. In other
words, the EC said, the Agreement applies only to licenses that are prior conditions for importation, not for
licenses that are for importation at a lower duty rate. As indicated, the Panel rejected the EC's position. See Panel
Report, supra note 1, TI 7.145-7.156, at 336-39. The Appellate Body, observing that a careful reading of Article
1:1 led inescapably to the conclusion that the Agreement applies to licensing procedures for tariff-rate quotas even
though it does not expressly say so, upheld the Panel's finding. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 130,
at 16, H 192-95, at 88-89, 255(1), at 113.
The Panel also had held thatArticle 1:3 of theAgreement on ImportLicensing precluded the imposition
of different import licensing systems on like products when imported from different Members. For instance,
issuance of hurricane licenses (discussed infra note 61) exclusively to EC and ACP producers or operators was
inconsistent with Article 1:3. See Panel Report, supra note 1, If 7.260-7.263, at 364-65. The Appellate Body
reversed this finding. Taking a literalist approach to the language of Article 1:3, it said this provision required the
application of import licensing procedures-but not necessarily the rules themselves--to be neutral, fair and
equitable. See Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, H 196-98, at 89-90, 1255(1), at 113.
(5) The TRIMs Agreement.
The United States claimed that the EC's allocation of 30 percent of the tariff-rate quota allocation for
Category B operators was inconsistent with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-RelatedInvestmentMeasures
(TRIMs) Article 2:1. The official text of the TRIMsAgreement is published at UruguayRound-FinalTexts, supra,
at 139, and the TRIMs issues are dealt with at Panel Report, supra note 1, 7.157-7.163, at 339-40, and " 7.1837.187, at 347-48. Article 2:1 of the TRIMs Agreement says that "no Member shall apply any TRIM that is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article I or Article XI" of GATT. Uruguay Round-FinalTexts, supra,at
139. The United States observed the EC allocated 30 percent of the licenses required for importation of thirdcountry and non-traditional ACP bananas based on the marketing of EC and traditional ACP bananas (because
marketing these bananas was what defined Category B operators). This requirement, said the United States, was
an illegal purchasing requirement. Such requirements are covered by the TRIMs Agreement; indeed, they are
mentioned in the Illustrative List annexed to the Agreement. Moreover (and as discussed in the text above),
charged the United States, the EC's allocation violated the GAIT Article I1:4 national treatment rule.
In defense, the EC said there was no breach of the TRIMs Agreement because there was no violation
of Article 11. Reasoning that the crux of the issue concerned GATr Article III, the Panel considered it unnecessary
to make a specific ruling on the TRIMs claim. There were no TRIMs issues presented on appeal.
52. For purposes of the discussion in the text, the key language of Article XmI is as follows:
1. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by an contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importationof the like product
of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly
prohibitedor restricted.
2.
In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution of
trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various
contractingparties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions,and to this
end shall observe the following provisions:
(d)

In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries, the contracting party
applying the restrictions may seek agreementwith respect to the allocation of shares in the
quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the
product concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the
contracting party concerned shall allot to contractingpartieshavinga substantialinterest
in supplying the productshares based upon the proportions,suppliedby such contracting
partiesduring a previous representativeperiod, of the total quantity or value of imports
of the product, due account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or
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is frustrating. But, it is not necessarily ambiguous. In brief, that Article directs that

if a Member uses a permissible quantitative restriction, then it must do so in a nondiscriminatory fashion and in the least trade-distorting manner. Paragraph 2 of the

Article requires a Member to apply import restrictions such as quotas so that the
consequent distribution of trade mimics the shares exporting Members would have
in the absence of quotas. In other words, the import restrictions should aim at a
distribution of trade in the restricted product that as closely as possible approximates
the shares in trade that exporting countries would have if there were no such

restriction-and thereby no artificial distortion of the pattern of trade in the product.
Article XII:5 makes clear that these mandates apply to tariff-rate quotas. Obviously,
the mandates rest on a counterfactual question: what would the shares of trade be but
for the restriction? Nonetheless, they are disciplines, not mere curiosities.

The United States deployed Article XIII to strike at the very heart of the EC's
preferential trading arrangement for bananas. The EC's legal defense of the
arrangement suffered mortal wounds in the ensuing battle, which is summarized in
Table Five below.

may be affecting the trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed
which would prevent any contracting party from utilizing fully the share of any such total
quantity or value which has been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within
any prescribed period to which the quota may relate.
4.

With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2(d) of this Article or under
paragraph 2(c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative period for any product and the
appraisal of any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the
Member applying the restriction; Providedthat such Member shall, upon the request of any other
Member having a substantial interest in supplying that product or upon the request of the
[Contracting Parties], consult promptly with the other Member or the [Contracting Parties]
regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected,
or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions,
formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an
adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization.
5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariffquota instituted or maintainedby any
Member, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend to export
restrictions.
GATE Article XIII, in DocuMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supranote 49, at 26-29 (emphasis added).
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TABLE 5: THE SECOND BATTLE ON THE GATT FRONT-ALLOCATION OF QUOTAS IN THE EC's
TARIFF-RATE QUOTA SYSTEM
American Attacks

ECDefenses

Z
Violation of Article
XIII:2.
First, the EC failed to
allocate shares in the
quota using either of
the required
methodologies
(agreement among all
parties, or pro rata
allocation based on
historical shipments
during a
representative
period).
Second, the EC
allocated countryspecific shares in the
quota to some, but
not all, Members
lacking a substantial
exporting interest, as
well as to some, but
not all, Members
with a substantial
interest.

PanelOutcome

I
There are two banana
import regimes, one
for ACP bananas,
and the other for all
other bananas.
Article XIII is
inapplicable to the
first regime.
Moreover, the United
States confuses nondiscriminatory
allocation of quotas
with market-share
results.

Appellate Body

I_Outcome
For the United States.

Affirms the Panel
holding.

An importing
Member can allocate
shares in a tariff-rate
quota to Members
lacking a substantial
interest. But, it must
do so to all such
Members.
Furthermore, the
importing Member
must utilize the same
allocation
methodology as it
does for Members
that have a
substantial interest.
The EC ran afoul of
Article XI:I and
XMI:2(d) by failing
to these rules.

The United States claimed that the EC's allocation of tariff-rate quota shares for
imports of bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries violated
Article XIII:2. It interpreted Article XIII:2(d) as compelling a choice of one of two
methods to divide the market of an importing Member. First, the importing Member
could allocate shares to all substantially interested parties (i.e., Members that export
the product to the importing Member in sizeable volumes) if it obtained the consent
of each such party. Second, if no agreement is reached with all substantially
interested parties, then the importing Member could assign shares based on historical
shipments during a representative period in which there had been no restrictions.
Significantly, the United States interpreted Article XUI:2(d) to embrace allocations
to countries lacking a substantial supplying interest: i.e., any allocation of shares in
a tariff-rate quota to countries without a substantial supplying interest had to follow
the general Article Xm:2 rule. In effect, the United States urged a broad mandate for
880
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the rule, so that a permissible quantitative restriction would not tilt the competitive
playing field in favor of either major or minor exporting powers.
The United States pointed out that the EC had not chosen either of these
approaches. Rather, as indicated in Table One above, the EC cut up the banana
market into three slices. It gave some, but not all, countries guaranteed shares of
portions of the slices. First, with respect to bananas from twelve traditional ACP
countries, the EC reserved country-specific allocations of its 857,700-ton in-quota
limit for these countries.
Second, regarding bananas from third countries, the EC had not reached an
agreement with many of its suppliers, most notably Ecuador, a principal supplier.
Instead, the EC limited access to its banana market through its basic tariff quota
(originally set at two million tons, as explained in Part ll.B.2 above). For BFA
countries, the EC reserved country-specific share allocations in this bound tariff-rate
quota for bananas. But, the EC did not provide country-specific allocations to nonACP, non-BFA countries. Rather than reserving country-specific allocations for
these countries as well, the EC dumped all of them in an "others" category.
Similarly, with respect to the third slice of the banana market, bananas from nontraditional ACP countries, the EC did not reach an agreement with suppliers. Instead,
it allocated ninety thousand tons of the basic tariff quota among traditional and nontraditional ACP suppliers. Three of the twelve traditional ACP suppliers received
country-specific shares in thirty thousand tons (for quantities in excess of the
traditional amounts they supply). The EC reserved the remaining sixty thousand tons
for non-traditional ACP suppliers, providing fifty-five thousand tons for the
Dominican Republic, but letting all "other" non-traditional ACP suppliers scramble
with one another for the five thousand ton balance.
The United States doubted that the EC's distribution of market access matched
as closely as possible the shares that banana exporting countries would have in the
absence of the preferential trading arrangement. After all, the EC had failed to
employ either of the methods condoned by GATT Article XII:2(d) for allocating
tariff-rate quota shares. But, the United States did more than express doubt. It said
the EC's scheme was quite arbitrary. The EC did not appear to have used
consistently any set of criteria.
Thus, for example, the EC did not require GATT or WTO membership,
awarding allocations to two non-Members, Cape Verde and Somalia, while not
awarding allocations to long-standing, larger banana suppliers that were Members.
Regarding the EC's allocations of its banana market to WTO Members, the United
States claimed that the EC did not consider any particular historical period as being
representative. The United States observed that many of the country-specific
allocations to ACP and BFA countries greatly exceeded the shares of trade these
countries would have had in the absence of a tariff-rate quota scheme.
The statistics on which to base this observation were so powerful that the
American position seemed unassailable. For instance, not a single ACP country
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accounted for 5 percent of the EC's total banana imports in 1989-91, yet the EC
awarded all of these countries a specific share of its market share as either traditional
or non-traditional ACP suppliers. Several ACP countries did not supply even 1
percent of total EC banana imports during 1989-91. Madagascar had shipped an
annual average of just 23 tons of bananas during 1989-91, and 3 tons during 199092, but the EC gave it an annual 5,900 ton allocation. Other examples of ACP
countries with modest historical shipments benefitting from large quota allocations
were Belize (exporting an annual average of just 23,412 tons between 1989-91 and
24,050 tons between 1990-92, but receiving an annual allocation of 55,000 tons),
Cameroon (exporting an annual average of just 83,180 tons between 1989-91 and
101,394 tons between 1990-92, but receiving an annual allocation of 162,500 tons),
Cote d'Ivoire (exporting an annual average ofjust 98,914 tons between 1989-91 and
119,283 tons between 1990-92, but receiving an annual allocation of 162,500 tons),
Dominican Republic (exporting an annual average ofjust 4,994 tons between 198991 and 17,539 tons between 1990-92, but receiving an annual allocation of 55,000
tons), Ghana (exporting an annual average ofjust 817 tons between 1989-91 and 730
tons between 1990-92, but receiving an annual allocation of 5,000 tons), Grenada
(exporting an annual average of 8,214 tons between 1989-91 and 7,463 tons between
1990-92, but receiving an annual allocation of 14,000 tons), and Jamaica (exporting
an annual average of 57,505 tons between 1989-91 and 69,374 tons between 199092, but receiving an annual allocation of 105,000 tons). Similarly, the EC gave
Venezuela, a BFA signatory, a specific share of 44,000 tons annually, even though
Venezuela had supplied an annual average of only 90 tons in 1989-91 and 45 tons
in 1990-92.
These shocking incongruities were only half of the story. The other half was that
many of the non-ACP, non-BFA countries for which the EC did not reserve countryspecific shares of in-quota allocations had historical levels of trade that were higher
than were those of the ACP and BFA countries for which the EC did reserve shares.
Ecuador was a prime example. It was one of the EC's largest suppliers, accounting
for 15.53 percent of EC banana imports in 1989-91 (an annual average of 408,937
tons), and 18.65 percent in 1990-92 (an annual average of 543,324 tons). Guatemala,
Honduras, and Panama furnished other stark examples of supplying large quantities
to the EC yet receiving no country-specific quota allocation. (Between 1989-91, the
EC imported an average annual amount of 28,128 tons, 136,910 tons, and 470,845
tons, respectively, from these three countries. Between 1990-92, the annual averages
were 19,988, 153,223, and 496,916, respectively.)
As mentioned above, the United States eschewed claiming that the EC was
barred by GATr Article XII:2 from providing allocations to countries that did not
meet the substantial interest criterion. Rather, it argued that the EC's allocations to
these smaller players had to be consistent with the basic rule of Article XIII:2. Once
again, the United States did more than cast doubt on the EC's compliance with this
rule. The statistics showed poignantly that the EC had provided country-specific
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shares to many small suppliers, but had not awarded any allocations to other
countries with similar or greater historical shipments. For instance, from 1989 to
1991, Belize and Guatemala had roughly the same average annual volume of exports
(23,412 and 28,128 tons respectively), and Honduras had a much greater volume
(136,910 tons). Yet, the EC gave an allocation to Belize and not Guatemala or
Honduras. Surely, this aspect of the EC's allocation directly contravened Article
XIII:2(d), which does not permit the EC to grant country-specific allocations to some
countries but not others, with disregard for the similarity of the countries' past
shipments.
In sum, the United States had two lines of attack using GATI Article XIII:2: (1)
"how" the EC had done the allocation, and (2) "to whom" it had allocated the shares.
First, the EC failed to allocate its tariff-rate quota using one of the two required
algorithms. This line of attack targeted the incongruities in the allocations because
of the methodology (or lack thereof) that was used. Second, the EC failed to treat big
and small banana exporting countries equally, favoring the latter group. The second
line of attack hit at the incongruous treatment of Members lacking a substantial
interest in comparison with ones having such an interest. Both lines of the American
attack supported a single strategic goal: proving the EC's preferential trading
arrangement distorted trade patterns in the world banana market in contravention of
GATT Article XLI:2.
Lest there be any hesitancy about the existence of these distortions, the United
States deployed impressive data on the sizeable drop in the share of trade held by
non-BFA Latin American countries. From 1989 to 1991, Latin American non-BFA
signatories supplied over 40 percent of the EC's bananas. But, on the basis of the
EC's method of granting allocations, these countries were permitted collectively to
supply the EC with less than 34 percent of total imports. More generally, the EC
gave ACP countries access to 27.8 percent of its market, even though these countries
accounted for just 20 percent of the share between 1989-91 and 19.5 percent of the
share in 1990-92. BFA countries got 37 percent of the share of the EC's market, in
line with the 37.4 percent share they held in 1989-91 and the 36.1 percent share they
held in 1990-92. But, for non-BFA countries (both within and outside Latin
America), the story was very different. They accounted for 42.6 percent of EC
imports in 1989-91 and 44.4 percent in 1990-92. The EC's scheme resulted in an
award to them ofjust 35.2 percent of the EC market.
2. The Two EC Lines of Defense

The EC put up two fortifications against the American claim of trade distortion.
They could scarcely be called a Maginot Line. Like that Line, the EC fortifications
looked impressive on paper. But, they did not deter a spirited American thrust. The
United States not only sent the bulk of its force to attack around the line, but it also

2000 / The Bananas War

felt sufficiently confident to challenge the Line itself. In the end, the EC's quota
allocation system was imperiled on both its flank and head on.
First, said the EC, GATT Article XIII could not be applied to the totality of the
EC market. Rather, as a result of the Lome Convention and the Uruguay Round
negotiations, the EC had created two legally discrete regimes: one for bananas from
traditional ACP countries, and the other for bananas from all other countries of
origin. As for the first regime, the EC said it reached the duty-free allocation of
857,700 tons for this market by adding up the quantities traditionally supplied by
various ACP countries up to and including 1990 according to the "best ever"
criterion. Also in this segment, said the EC, was the 90,000-ton allocation of the
basic tariff quota to non-traditional ACP supplying countries. This allocation, and
the ECU 100 per ton margin of preference for out-of-quota shipments from nontraditional ACP countries, were covered by the Lome Waiver from GATT Article
1:1 obligations. After all, the beneficiaries were ACP countries, and the Waiver was
not limited only to traditional ACP suppliers. Article XIII was essentially irrelevant
to the first regime. To be sure, Article XIII:5 extended the "provisions of this
Article... to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any contracting party."' 3
But, allocation of shares in a preferential regime, like the one for ACP countries, is
subject to its own set of rules and procedures, for example, the ones set forth in the
Lome Convention.
The EC identified its second regime as that covering all other (i.e., non-ACP)
countries. If GATr Article XIII was relevant, it was in the context of this regime.
This regime contained a bound duty rate for banana imports in excess of the basic
tariff quota, as well as a tariff quota allocation. It was a perfectly normal tariff-rate
quota scheme that several Members used for agricultural products. The original two
million ton basic tariff rate quota was based on average yearly imports during 198991. During the Uruguay Round, the EC agreed to increase the figure to 2.2 million
and to apply an in-quota tariff rate of ECU 75 per ton. It also agreed to an initial
bound MFN rate for out-of-quota shipments of ECU 850 per ton, with a final rate for
the year 2000 of ECU 680 per ton.m As for the country-specific allocations of shares
in the in-quota amount of the tariff-rate quota, the EC said they were not arbitrary.
Rather, they were derived from the most recent data available during the Uruguay
Round negotiations for a three-year period of representative trade flows.
The EC's second line of defense was that the Americans confused allocation of
a tariff-rate quota, on the one hand, with market access, on the other hand. The
United States mistakenly believed GAT Article XIII:2(d) applied to allocation of
shares of a market. Were not all of those glittering statistics directly or indirectly
about market share? If the American attacks succeeded, then there would be a

53. See supra note 52.
54. 7Te reductions were to be in six equal annual reduction installments; thus, the 1996 rate was ECU 793
per ton.
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conceptual merger of the EC's two distinct banana import regimes. The consequent
focus on market-share allocation, in turn, would mean managed trade in the EC
banana market.
In fact, said the EC, allocation and market access are quite distinct. "Allocation"
refers to the internal distribution of a tariff-rate quota, i.e., an articulation of tariff
concessions, which the EC had done through the establishment of its two regimes.
"Market access" is a question of permissible import volumes. In no way did the EC
restrict volumes of importation. Third-country suppliers had unrestricted access to
the EC market based on the EC's bound commitments of (1) a basic tariff quota of
2.2 million tons subject to a duty of ECU 75 per ton, and (2) a final duty rate in the
year 2000 of ECU 680 per ton for out-of-quota shipments. In brief, the EC's
allocation of tariff-rate quota shares to ACP countries did not impinge on the market
access of non-ACP countries.
Of course, the United States challenged the EC's defenses. It was right to do so.
Allocation and market access could not possibly be so divorced as the EC would
have it. Allocation of tariff rate quota shares determined the price a banana exporter
had to pay for market access. The American challenge began by highlighting a
glaring contradiction. The EC's own regulation on banana imports, Regulation
404/93, spoke of a single regime, and GAIT Article XII had to be applicable to it.
Even if there were two distinct regimes, the United States intoned that nothing in
Article XIII limits the rules on country allocations to one specific tariff-rate quota
regime without regard to the treatment of all other imports. To the contrary, Article
XIII:2(d) applies to the allocation of shares of a market and mandates that imports
from all sources be similarly restricted. To permit a Member to allocate country
shares under separate discriminatory regimes would be to condone the circumvention
of a fundamental GAIT obligation, namely, the non-discrimination principle of
Article XIII.
As for the "best ever" criterion the EC used to set ACP country shares, the
United States objected that by definition it meant that the shares of any other (i.e.,
non-ACP) country would be reduced below the historical representative percentage
for that country. Moreover, in practice, some of the EC's allocations exceeded "best
ever" shipments. For example, Cameroon's actual "best ever" shipment was 79,596
tons, but the EC allocated 162,500 tons. The United States found the EC's
explanation for these occurrences-that they were designed to take into account
committed investments in banana plantations and banana-related
infrastructure-unconvincing.
The EC had argued these investments would be wasted if it did not overstate
allocations. The United States countered that the same could be said of current or
planned banana investments in Latin American countries. Further, the real waste was
the preference scheme itself: the World Bank said the preferences cost European
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consumers $13.25 for every $1.00 of benefit transferred to ACP suppliers.55 In other
words, the high price paid by European consumers does not, in the main, reach the
intended beneficiaries. It is siphoned off, in the form of super-normal profits, by the
fortunate trading companies that have licenses to import and market bananas within
the EC.5- In brief, the United States intoned that neither it nor any other WTO
Member should have to pay for the EC's budget blunders.
3. The Panel'sHolding
Both American lines of attack proved successful. The Panel quickly rejected the
EC's first defense that there were two separate regimes for bananas, one for bananas
from the twelve traditional ACP countries, which was essentially immune from
GATr Article XIII scrutiny, and one for bananas from third countries and nontraditional ACP sources, which was subject to Article XIII scrutiny. For purposes of
analyzing whether its allocation of tariff-rate quota shares is consistent with the
dictates of Article XIII, the Panel ruled the EC had only one regime for banana
imports. It found no textual support for the EC's position. Article XIII was about
non-discrimination in the application of a tariff-rate quota regime for a product. It
did not matter whether or how that regime might be sub-divided by the importing
Member for administrative or other reasons. The fact that the legal basis for one of
the sub-divisions might be distinct-for instance, the Lome Convention Waiver for
the tariff-rate quota concerning traditional ACP bananas---did not matter either. It
could not be so distinct from the GATr as to be divorced from it.
The Panel also lectured the EC that its defense failed not only for a lack of
textual support, but also for consequentialist reasons. Suppose a Member could subdivide a tariff-rate quota regime by different legal instruments and proceed to argue
that the non-discrimination principles need not animate in one sub-division. Article
XIII would be eviscerated.
In rejecting the EC's second defense, the Panel neatly side-stepped the
metaphysics of tariff-rate quota allocations versus market shares. In other words, it
did an end-run around the EC's defense. Instead, the Panel pronounced judgment on
the clarity of the wording of GAIT Article XIII.
The Panel scrupulously recounted its five inter-related features, and the blackletter law tutorial is worth summarizing. First, said the Panel, if a WTO Member
does employ quantitative restrictions (as a permissible exception to the general ban
on their use set forth in GATT Article XI), then it must do so in the least tradedistorting manner possible.
55.

See Brent Borrell, A Brussels Solution That is Bananas, FN. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1999, at 13 [hereinafter

Borrell, A Brussels Solution]; Wolf, supra note 27. In ECU terms, for every ECU 16 paid for by European
consumers, only ECU 1 reaches the intended beneficiary. See Brent Borrell, Don't Bend the Rules on Bananas,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at 12. This ridiculous anomaly is discussed in greater detail in Part IV.C below.
56. See Borrell, A BrusselsSolution, supra note 55.
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Second, Article XLII:l contains a simple non-discrimination rule for the
administration of quantitative restrictions and tariff-rate quotas: any prohibition or
restriction on the importation of a product from one Member must be applied to the
like product of all third countries. It is forbidden to limit the quantity of imports from
some Members but not others. Further, the limitations must be similar, i.e., it is
impermissible to restrict imports from some Members with one device, and restrict
them from another Member using another means.
Third, the chapeau to Article XII:2 provides a simple verbal formula for
minimizing the impact of a quantitative restriction on trade flows. In applying
quantitative restrictions, a Member must aim at a distribution of trade that as closely
as possible approaches the share of trade that would be expected in the absence of
protection.
Fourth, Article XII:2(d) does not allow a Member to restrict imports through the
combined use of agreements and unilateral allocations of shares in a tariff-rate quota.
Rather, it mandates that a Member allocating a quota to supplying countries should
seek agreement on the allocation of country-specific shares of the quota with all
other Members having a substantial supplying interest in the product concerned. If
this method is not practicable, then the Member must allot country-specific quota
shares pro rata to members with a substantial interest in supplying the product.
Article XII does not define "substantial supplying interest." The Panel did not
concoct a bright-line test. However, a ten percent market share benchmark generally
has been used, and the Panel did not disregard this benchmark. Absent Article
XII:2(d), a Member could allocate shares to some Members with a substantial
interest in supplying the product in question, but not to other Members.
Finally, Article XII:5 is a prophylactic rule on the scope of the above four rules.
It makes clear that the rules of Article XLII apply to any tariff-rate quota a Member
devises.
The Panel found the EC's behavior was inconsistent with the second and fourth
of these black-letter rules. As to the second rule, the Panel held that the EC's tariffrate quota share allocations, by assignment and agreement, to WTO Members not
having a substantial interest in supplying bananas (e.g., Nicaragua, Venezuela, and
some ACP countries), but not to other Members (e.g., Guatemala), violated GATT
Article XIII:1. The Lome Convention Waiver, said the Panel, relieved the EC of its
obligation to comply with Article XII:I with respect to allocating shares to
traditional ACP banana supplying countries in an amount not exceeding their pre1991 best-ever exports to the EC. The Waiver did not extend to allocations to nonACP countries, such as the BFA countries.
Regarding the violation of the fourth rule, the Panel looked askance at the EC's
country-specific allocations. The EC had allocated shares to some Members with far
less than the ten percent market share benchmark (e.g., two BFA countries,
Nicaragua, with a 1.7 percent market share, and Venezuela, with a less than 0.1
percent share), but simultaneously neglected to allocate shares to Members that

2000/ The Bananas War

clearly had a substantial supplying interest (e.g., the co-complainants). In other
words, it was not reasonable for the EC to conclude that at the time it negotiated the
BFA, Nicaragua and Venezuela (both BFA countries) had a "substantial interest,"
in terms of GATT Article XIII:2(d), in supplying bananas to the EC. (The Panel
agreed that Colombia and Costa Rica, the other BFA countries, did have such an
interest, hence there was no need for a finding on whether the allocation of shares
to these two countries satisfied Article XIII:2(d).) If the EC wanted to allocate shares
to Members lacking a substantial supplying interest, then it could not do so by a
combination of unilateral decision and agreement with a cabal (e.g., the BFA
countries). Rather, it must reach agreement with all such suppliers, not merely a
subset thereof. Only in this manner can all Members without a substantial supplying
interest have the chance of gaining one.
In brief, the Panel had framed the GATIT Article XIII issue thusly: whether an
importing Member could allocate country-specific shares in a tariff-rate quota to
exporting Members that do not have a "substantial interest" in supplying the product
in question and, if so, what method of allocation must be used by the importing
Member? Equally clear was the Panel's answer. An importing Member can allocate
country-specific quota shares to Members lacking a "substantial interest." However,
it must allocate them to all of these small players. Moreover, it must call upon the
same allocation method for all the Members lacking a substantial interest. That
method had better be the same one used with respect to Members having a
"substantial interest." The "first choice" method? Agreement.
The Panel rested its conclusion on a plain-meaning approach to GAIT Article
XIII. The first sentence of Article XIII:2(d) refers to the allocation of a quota
"among supplying countries." Read literally, this language does not differentiate
between Members with versus without a "substantial interest." Any allocation must
meet the requirements of Article XIII:I, plus those contained in the chapeau to
Article XIII:2(d). Article XIII:I means an importing Member desiring to allocate
shares to some supplying countries without a substantial interest must allocate shares
to all suppliers without a substantial interest. The Member cannot "cherry pick," as
it were. If it could, then imports would not be similarly restricted, contrary to Article
XIII: 1.Likewise, if the importing Member used one methodology to allocate shares
to Members with a substantial interest, and a different methodology for Members
without a substantial interest, then it would run afoul of Article XIII: 1. As for the
preferred methodology, Article XIII:2(d) makes clear the importing member is to
seek agreement with all Members having a substantial interest in supplying the
product. Thereafter, agreement should be sought with Members lacking a substantial
interest.
The EC, said the Panel, plainly had cherry picked, and used the wrong
methodology to boot. The EC had acted inconsistently with Article XIII:I and
XIII:2(d) by allocating shares in the tariff-rate quota for third-country bananas to
some BFA countries without a "substantial interest" (most notably, Nicaragua and
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Venezuela), but not to other non-BFA, non-ACP countries that lacked this interest.
The EC also had violated Article XII:2(d) by allocating these shares unilaterally,
without agreement, among the supplying countriesY
Interestingly, while it declared that the two American attacks were successful,
the Panel did not condemn the concept or use of an "all others" category. We might
have expected the Panel to do so. Any exporting Member stuck in this category
would seem to have a plausible claim that it was not being treated on par with
Members receiving country-specific allocations. But, a careful review of the Panel's
black-letter law tutorial reveals that GATr Article XIII does not forbid the "all
others" category.
The Panel explained why by positing a hypothetical fact pattern. What if an
agreement between the importing Member and exporting Members having a
"substantial interest" results in the tariff-rate quota being used up? This eventuality
materializes if the demand for shares in the quota among exporting Members
exceeds 100 percent of the quota. Then, the importing Member may have to put all
Members lacking a "substantial interest" into a general "others" category. This
result-country-specific allocations to Members with a "substantial interest," and
placement of Members lacking a "substantial interest" in an "others" category with
no country-specific allocations-is permissible under GATT Article XIII:I. Nor
does the result run afoul of Article XIII:2(d). Rather, the result is consistent with the
general rule in the chapeau to Article XII:2, namely, aiming at a distribution of
trade that as closely as possible approaches the shares that the Members would
expect in the absence of quantitative restrictions. Why? The Panel opined that when
a significant share of a tariff-rate quota is assigned to "others," the import market
will evolve with a minimum amount of distortion. A Member (either an existing
market participant or a new entrant) lacking a "substantial interest" might gain
market share within the confines of the "others" category, and perhaps even achieve
a "substantial interest." If so, then it would be entitled to a country-specific
allocation simply by invoking Article XIII:4. In contrast, if country-specific shares
were allocated to every supplying country, regardless of its interest, then the shares
might ossify. In sum, using an "others" category leaves room for fluidity in the
market.

57. I should observe that the Panel Report is not as clear or carefully drafted on these points as it might
be. At times, it is a bit difficult to connect up specific aspects of the EC's preference regime with provisions of

Article XIII they allegedly violate. See, e.g., Panel Report, supra note 1, 7.85, at 319 and 1 7.90, at 321. Also
at times, it seems the Panel refers to "non-traditional ACP bananas," when it appears it should be referring to third
country bananas, or both of these categories. See, e.g., Panel Report, supranote 1, 7.77, at 315-16.
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4. The Appellate Body's Holding
The EC appealed the Panel's finding that it had violated GATT Article XIII:1
by allocating shares in its tariff-rate quota to some, but not all, Members lacking a
substantial interest in supplying bananas to the EC.58 The American attack on this
point was every bit as effective in the eyes of the Appellate Body as in those of the
Panel. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's holding, thus handing the United
States a victory in arguably the most significant battle of the entire War. Like the
Panel, the Appellate Body showed little patience for the EC's "separate regimes"
argument. It agreed with the Panel's consequentialist rationale. Only slightly rewording the Panel's lecture, the Appellate Body pointed out that if a Member could
choose a different legal basis for imposing import restrictions and thereby avoid the
application of non-discrimination rules to like products, then the object and purpose
of those rules would be defeated. Members cannot so easily skirt these rules. An
5 -9
express waiver would accomplish the EC's goal, but none was issued in this case.
Also like the Panel, the Appellate Body observed that the chapeau to Article
XII:2 requires a Member restricting imports to aim at a distribution of trade that
would exist in the absence of the restriction. It conceded that Article XIII:2(d) sets
forth specific rules for the allocation of shares in a tariff-rate quota among Members
with "a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned," but is not explicit
about allocation to Members not having a substantial interest. However, like the
Panel, the Appellate Body stepped in unhesitatingly to plug the hole: allocation to
Members lacking a substantial interest also must be subject to the basic principle of
non-discrimination. Consequently, it is impermissible to allocate tariff-rate quota
shares to some Members not having a substantial interest, but not to other Members
that also lack this interest. To do so is to violate the simple non-discrimination rule
of Article XLII:l that imports cannot be restricted from one Member unless they are
similarly restricted from all Members.
D. The Third Battle: Import Licensing Requirements, MFN Treatment,
and National Treatment
The American attacks on the EC's banana preference scheme did not stop with
the tariff-rate quota scheme and the discriminatory way in which the EC had
reserved in-quota shares for certain, but not other, Members. The United States'
position on the discriminatory nature of the licensing requirements led to a third

58.

Unless otherwise noted, this discussion of tariff-rate quota allocations and GATr Article XI is based

on Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,93 159-63, at 75-77, 189-91, at 87-88, and I 255(k), at 112.
59. See supranotes 20,45, and 51 (discussing the Lome Convention Waiver).
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battle on the GAIT front. 6 The second battle had fatally wounded the EC's defense
of its preferential trading arrangements by defeating the "nerve center" of that

arrangement, quota allocation. The third battle was decisive, because it knocked out
the licensing system. This system was a "command and control" facility in the
preferential trading arrangement that was second in importance only to quota

allocation.
The American thrusts in the third battle, like those in the first two battles on the
GAT front, made use of the MFN and national treatment weapons stored in GATI"
Articles 1: 1 and 111:4, respectively. At issue was the existence and administration of

rules for obtaining a license to import two types of bananas: third-country bananas
(i.e., bananas from non-ACP, non-BFA countries), and non-traditional bananas (i.e.,
bananas from the twelve traditional ACP countries in excess of their country-specific

in-quota allotments totaling 857,700, and bananas from non-traditional ACP
countries). Because the licensing procedures, described in Part 1.C above, were so

60. The Panel and Appellate Body also considered an issue about the licensing regime involving GATT
Article X. Because I think it is more of a minor skirmish than a key battle, I have elected not to discuss it above.
Perhaps the following abbreviated comments and citations may be helpful.
The United States claimed the EC's licensing procedures violated Article X:3, because they are not
administered "in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner." See GATI Art. X:3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 18-19. Specifically, the rules established operator categories on the basis of the
source of bananas marketed during a preceding three-year period. The EC applied the rules to imports of thirdcountry and non-traditional ACP bananas. But, the EC did not apply these same operator category rules to imports
of traditional ACP bananas.
The Panel agreed the EC's import licensing procedures were "requirements ...on imports" within the
meaning of Article X:I, and thus Article X was applicable. See GAIT Art. X:I, reprintedin DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT, supranote 49, at 18. The Panel also upheld the American claim. After all, observed the Panel, the
fact was that the operator category (and, for that matter, the activity function) rules applied to licensing for the
importation of third country and non-traditional ACP bananas, but not to licensing for the importation of
traditional ACP bananas. As a result, considerably more data had to be maintained by an operator, and submitted
to the EC,to show entitlement for a license to import third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. The
procedures, therefore, hardly were uniform, impartial, or reasonable, as mandated by Article X. See Panel Report,
supranote 1, 117.205-7.212, at 356-58.
The Appellate Body agreed that GATr Article X applied to the EC's licensing regime, but said the Panel
ought to have scrutinized the regime under Article 1:3 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures,because this Agreement was more specific than Article X. (The Agreement is discussed supra note
51.) Had the Panel done so, it would have found there was no need to address the Article X claim. The Appellate
Body was saying the Panel's discussion was dicta.The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that GAIT
Article X:3(a) precluded the imposition of different import licensing systems on like products when imported from
different Members. Why? Because the Panel had not differentiated between rules, on the one hand, and the
administration of rules, on the other hand. Article X does not forbid a rule from being discriminatory. Rather, it
takes aim at discriminatory administration of a rule. If the rule itself is discriminatory, then the proper claim is
under a different GATr provision, such as Article I or Em.Thus, Article X does not bar the use of different import
licensing procedures for a like product based on the origin of that product. It simply bars discriminatory
administration of those procedures. See Appellate Body Report, supranote 1,71199-204, at 91-93, and 255(m),
at 114.
I would suggest the Appellate Body's lecture on the distinction between rules and their administration is
sensible enough, but ill-timed. The Appellate Body gives short shrift to the Panel's discussion, and the underlying
American claim. Both seem to comprehend quite clearly the distinction, and to focus on the administration of the
EC's import licensing rules.
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complicated, so too were the battle lines. The United States attacked all aspects of

the licensing system-the operator category rules, the activity function rules, and the
issuance and matching of export certificate requirements all came under siege. 61 I
have, therefore, partitioned the chronicle accordingly, and summarized the battle
lines and outcomes in Tables Six A, Six B, and Six C.

61. So-called "hurricane licenses" are a final feature of the EC's banana import licensing scheme. Some
operators were adversely affected by the destruction wrought by hurricanes on banana plantations. Indeed, for
temporary periods, it became impossible for these operators to supply the EC with bananas. Accordingly, between
November 1994 and May 1996, the EC issued supplemental hurricane licenses for 281,605 tons of bananas. An
operator could use these licenses to import bananas from any source. The EC added the 281,605 ton allotment to
its basic tariff quota, and subject bananas imported under a hurricane license to a preferential in-quota tariff of
ECU 75 per ton.
In practice, the EC issued hurricane licenses to Category B operators representing EC and ACP producers.
See Panel Report, supra note 1,9N 7.386-7.387, at 398-99. These operators used the licenses to import into the
EC bananas from non-traditional ACP countries, and from third countries. In effect, the licenses allowed these
operators to substitute one source of supply (non-traditional ACP and third countries) for another source (countries
whose plantations were devastated by hurricanes).
In sum, hurricane licenses allowed for additional imports of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas
at the lower in-quota tariff rate. Their purpose was to compensate operators who suffered damage from tropical
storms that wiped out a portion of their banana supply, thus adversely affecting their ability to supply the EC with
bananas. The compensation took the form of quota rents: a hurricane licensee would capture quota rents from the
additional in-quota shipments of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. On the GATI' front, hurricane
licenses were the subject of a rather insignificant skirmish. The skirmish is discussed in Panel Report, supranote
1,17.243, at 363 and Appellate Body Report, supranote 1,U 212-14, at 95-96. The United States raised a claim
concerning Article 1:3 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on ImportLicensing Procedures,which I treated above.
See supranote 51.
The crux of the GATr Article 111:4 national treatment claim was raised by Guatemala, Honduras, and
Mexico. It arose from the discriminatory way in which the EC issued hurricane licenses. It issued them only to
EC and ACP operators. Operators from other WTO Members were ineligible. As a result, an operator had an
artificial incentive to purchase bananas of EC origin for marketing within the EC.By purchasing EC bananas, an
operator might qualify as an EC producer, and thereby become eligible for hurricane licenses. The Panel
concluded, and the Appellate Body agreed, that this incentive meant EC bananas were treated more favorably than
like third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas-a violation of Article 111:4. Unfortunately, the Appellate
Body reasoning on this point is not as clear as it might be. See Appellate Body Report, supranote 1,1I212-13,
at 95-96.
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TABLE 6A: THE THIRD BATTLE ON THE GATT FRONT-APPLICATION OF THE EC's IMPORT
LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: OPERATOR CATEGORY RULES
American Attacks

EC Defenses

I

Violation of Article
I1:4.
The operator category
rules, particularly with
respect to Category B,
create an incentive to
purchase EC bananas
in order to obtain a
license to import thirdcountry and nontraditional ACP
bananas.

First, Article I is
irrelevant. It applies
only to measures
affecting internal sale
or distribution. The
operator category

For the United States.

rules, indeed all of the

internally after

licensing
requirements, are
enforced at the border.

customs clearance.

outright requirement
bananas.
Third, none of the

The operator category
rules lead to more
favorable treatment for
traditional ACP
bananas than for third
country and nontraditional ACP
bananas.

Article I governs
measures applied at
the border, and
measures applied

The operator category

rules favor EC
Second, there is no
to purchase EC

Violation of Article
1:1.

Panel Outcome
I_

licensing requirements
has an effect on the
volume of trade. The
operator category

rules, in particular, do
not favor traditional
ACP bananas.

bananas by
encouraging their
purchase by Category
B operators (which
tend to be European)
in order for these
operators to obtain,
maintain, or increase
the share in import

licenses for thirdcountry and nontraditional ACP

bananas. This
favoritism violates
Articles I:1 and HI.

Because the
burdensome operator
category rules exist
only for third country
and non-traditional
ACP bananas, but not

traditional ACP
bananas, they violate
Article 1:1.

Appellate Body
Outcome
Affirms Panel holding.
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TABLE 61: THE THIRD BATrLE ON THE GATT FRONT-APPLICATION OF THE EC's IhiORT
LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: ACTIVITY FUNCTION RULES
American Attack

EC Defenses

PanelOutcome

Appellate Body
Outcome

Violation of Article
1:1.

First, the activity
function rules have no
direct impact on trade.

For the United States.

Affirms Panel holding.

Activity function
rules, which are
burdensome, are
imposed only on
imports from third
countries and nontraditional ACP

countries,

Second, the rules are
needed to implement
EC competition
policy.

Activity function rules
apply only with
respect to licensing of
imports from third
countries and nontraditional ACP
countries. They
demand significant

data collection and
record keeping.
Therefore, freedom
from these rules is an
advantage under
Article 1:1 accorded to
traditional bananas.
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TABLE 6C: THE THIRD BATTLE ON THE GATT FRONT-APPLICATION OF THE EC's IMPORT
LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: EXPORT CERTIFICATES

American Attack

EC Defenses

Violation of Article
I:l.

First, local suppliers in For the United States.
BFA countries share
in the quota rent.
The matching
requirement associated
Second, operators
with export certificates
make up for the quota confers an advantage
rent they share with
on banana suppliers
BFA suppliers by
from BFA countries in
dealing in non-BFA
the form of an
bananas. These
opportunity to obtain
bananas are more
part of the quota rent.
profitable because
Suppliers in non-BFA
they do not entail
countries do not have
export certificates,
an equivalent
hencr there is no rent- opportunity.
sharing.

The quota rent (the
difference between the
true market price and
the price with the
quota) is distributed
only to suppliers from
BFA countries. It is
distributed by the
issuance of export
certificates to
companies from these
companies, and the
subsequent re-sale of
the certificates to
operators. The EC
licensing system does
not allow for issuance
of export certificates

PanelOutcome

Appellate Body
Outcome
Affirms the Panel
holding.

by non-BFA countries.

1. The Attacks on OperatorCategoryRules

As laid out in Part lI.C above, the EC distributed licenses to import third-country
and non-traditional bananas through a three-step procedure. 62 All three were targets

for an American assault using the MEN or national treatment weapons, or even both
in a pincer-like movement. Undoubtedly, however, the first step stood out as the
most inviting target.63
62. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion below on import licensing requirements and GAIT Article I
is based on Panel Report, supranote 1, 7.171-7.182, at 342-47, and Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,11
33-35, at 17-18, 67, at 31-32, and T 208-11, at 94-95. The discussion on the requirements and GATT Article
I is drawn from Panel Report, supranote 1,Hl 7.188-7.195, at 348-51, and Appellate Body Report, supranote
l, t1205-06, at 93.
63. To recount briefly my treatment of this step in Part II.C.1 above, the EC established three operator
categories based on the country of origin of the bananas marketed by a firm during the preceding three-year
period. The EC put firms marketing third-country and non-traditional bananas in Category A. It earmarked for
these firms 66.5 percent of the license for importing third-country and non-traditional bananas at the lower tariff
rate for in-quota shipments. It put firms marketing bananas from the EC and traditional ACP countries in Category
B. These firms got 30 percent of the licenses. The EC classified new market entrants who had just started
importing third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas into Category C. The EC reserved 3.5 percent of the
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Any neutral observer ought to feel an immediate discomfort with the operator
categories A and B. Category A operators are those firms that historically have been
major players in the market for third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. The
EC seemed either to ignore or limit the effect of history by confining them to only
66.5 percent of the licenses issued for such bananas. Conversely, Category B
operators are firms that historically have not been players in the third-country and
non-traditional banana market. Rather, they source their bananas from within the EC,
or from traditional ACP countries. Yet, the EC reserved a sizeable chunk-30
percent---of the licenses for these operators. Might it be the case, one should ask,
that most of the "A" operators are American firms (notably, Dole and Chiquita),
while most of the "B" operators are European firms (particularly from Britain and
France)? If so, might it then be the case that the EC is trying to re-allocate market
share away from the American firms, in favor of the European firms? In turn, might
it be that the entire Bananas War is not so much about preferences for poor countries,
as the EC would like the public to believe, but rather about entrenched European
interests?
These hunches are exactly what led the United States to attack with both the
MFN and national treatment weapons. In its Report, the Panel drew on its ruling on
the national treatment claim when adjudicating the MFN claim. Therefore, it is
conceptually advantageous to treat the attacks in reverse order, as did the Panel.
Regarding national treatment,6 the United States urged that the operator
category scheme created a requirement, or at least incentive, to purchase bananas
from the EC in order to import third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. After
all, how else did a firm get into Category B, and thereby feast on the 30 percent
import license allocation, other than by marketing EC (and traditional ACP)
bananas? We might properly characterize the point in terms of an offset requirement:
the EC was favoring domestic bananas by mandating their purchase as a precondition for an import license. We might add, as the Appellate Body later would,
that the requirement amounted to a cross-subsidy. A Category B operator could fund
its purchases of domestic bananas by the proceeds from the sale of third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas that the domestic banana purchases made possible.
There was obviously no mirror-image offset requirement to the effect that to market
EC bananas it was necessary to buy third-country or non-traditional bananas. Had
there been, the EC position might not have been so desperate.

licenses for the newcomers.
64. The central national treatment obligation, GATr Article M:4, provides that
[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatmentno lessfavorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offeringfor sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATT Art. 11:4, reprinted in DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 7 (emphasis added).
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Instead, the EC was forced to counter the American attack as best it could with
three defenses. First, the operator category rules-indeed, all of the licensing
rules-were applied at the border, at the moment of importation. They were not
applied after the bananas had cleared customs. Therefore, the Article Ill claim lacked
a foundation, because it addressed internal, not border, measures. Second, nothing
in the operator category rules required a firm to purchase domestic bananas (i.e.,
bananas from within the EC). Rather, the rules were a tool to manage importation of
third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas in accordance with EC consumer
demand. Third, the rules are part of the EC's overall economic strategy, and did not
affect the volume of imports from third countries.
With minimum effort, the Panel rejected all three defenses. Citing a 1958 GAIT
Panel Report, ItalianDiscriminationAgainstImportedAgriculturalMachineryathe
BananasPanel carefully acknowledged that the mere fact that an imported product
faces a tariff plus licensing procedures, whereas a like domestic product does not,
cannot constitute a per se violation of GATI Article 111:4. After all, the intention of
the drafters of GAIT was to treat imported and like domestic products the same way
afterthe imports had cleared customs. But, the Panel also saw the risk of scuttling
Article I by dubbing the requirement to present a license upon importation of a
product, and the EC's rules relating to this licensing requirement, a border measure
that did not affect the internal sale of bananas. To save Article ILI, the Panel had to
find a rationale for applying the "treatment no less favorable" language to a measure,
such as licensing, whether or not an importing Member applied the measure
internally (i.e., after customs clearance) or at the border (i.e., during the customs
clearance process). In other words, the Panel had to find support for an expansive
scope of Article I.
The Panel came up with two persuasive rationales. First, the word "affecting"
in Article 111:4 imparts to the provision a broad coverage, beyond legislation directly
regulating or governing the sale of imported and like domestic products. It suggests,
rightly, the dispositive issue is whether a discriminatory advantage exists that
impacts the sale or distribution of the domestic like product. Indeed, the words "no
less favorable" meant effective equality of opportunities for imported and like
domestic products, and effective equality is to be judged regardless of the actual
impact on trade the measure at issue has caused.
Second, the Interpretative Note Ad Article III makes clear the mere fact an
internal charge is collected, or a regulation is enforced, at the time or point of
importation does not immunize the charge or regulation from Article III scrutiny.6

65. GATr B.LS.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, 11, at 63-64 (adopted 23 Oct. 1958), cited at Panel Report. supra
note 1, 7.174, at 343.
66. The Panel quoted generously from the adopted GATr Panel report in United States-Section 337 to

confirm that its interpretation was consistent with existing jurisprudence. See Panel Report, supranote 1, l7.175,
at 343 (citing United States-Section337 of the TaiffAct of1930, GAT, B.IS.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, 385 [5.10
(adopted 7 Nov. 1989)).
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Put differently, the Interpretative Note deliberately undermines any distinction, made
for the purpose of avoiding Article III scrutiny, between (1) an internal measure
applied after customs clearance (i.e., a measure directly regulating sale or
distribution), and (2) a border measure applied as part of customs clearance that
affects subsequent internal sale or distribution (i.e., a measure whose effect on sale
of distribution is indirect). Both types of measures must be consistent with the
national treatment principle. If only the first type were covered, then Members could
out-flank Article I by re-casting their laws and regulations as border measures.
Having declared a broad scope for GATr Article III, the Panel turned to the
merits of the American national treatment claim. The Panel adopted as its own the
findings in the 1994 Bananas II panel report.67 To be sure, the present Panel was
mindful of the Appellate Body's admonition, set forth in Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages, that an unadopted GATE Panel Report has no legal status in the GATTWTO system precisely because it has not been endorsed through decisions of the
Contracting Parties or WTO Members. 6 But it also knew the Appellate Body, again
in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, countenanced reliance on an unadopted report as
useful guidance.69 Observing that the EC had not modified its operator category rules
since the 1994 Panel Report, the Panel quoted generously from it,70 thereby
guaranteeing the success of the American attack. Indeed, the Panel seemed to be
scolding the EC with the quotations, saying "this has been decided before, nothing
has changed, and you should have known better."
In brief, the Panel, like its GATT predecessor, found the operator category rules
protected EC producers by creating an artificial incentive to buy their bananas. How
so? It was obvious that the operator category rules meant that the amount of bananas
for which an operator could obtain an import license depended on the origin of the
bananas the operator had marketed during the preceding three-year period. The EC
apportioned 30 percent of the licenses for in-quota shipments of third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas to Category B operators that had purchased bananas
from within the EC (or from traditional ACP countries). An operator seeking to
increase its future share of bananas benefitting from the in-quota tariff would have
to increase its current purchases of EC (or traditional) ACP bananas. Therefore, the
operator category rules created a clear incentive to buy bananas from domestic-that
is, European-sources.

67. The earlier Panel report, entitled EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, DS38/R, was issued on 11
February 1994 (not adopted) and is cited at Panel Report, supra note 1, 7.179, at 344 n.735. It is actually the

second unadopted pre-DSU Panel Report on theEC's preferential trading arrangement for bananas. See supranote
22 and accompanying text.

68. See Japan-AlcoholicBeverages, WT/DS8IAB/R, WT/DSlO/AB/R, WT/DSII/AB/R (issued 4 Oct.
1996, adopted 1 Nov. 1996) at 14-15 [hereinafterJapan-AlcoholicBeverages].
69. See id.
70. See Panel Report, supranote 1, 7.179, at 344-46.
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Here, then, was the heart of the violation. The EC effectively required an
operator to purchase a domestic product (EC bananas) in order to qualify for
Category B and, in turn, obtain the right to import a like product (third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas). Because most of the operators in Category B were
European, the de facto purchase requirement was patent favoritism. (For instance,
a typical holder of a Category B license was a producer of bananas from Spain or
Martinique, or a European distributor of such bananas.) If European firms bought
more EC bananas, then they would get licenses to import third-country and nontraditional ACP bananas in ever-greater amounts. The fact this favoritism caused an
increase in the price of the preferred bananas, but did not reduce the volume of
imports of third-country bananas, was irrelevant, because Article m:4 applied
notwithstanding the size of the trade effect of the operator category rules. Even were
this not the rule, because of the stiff tariff on over-quota shipments, in practice thirdcountry bananas were limited to the in-quota amount.
On appeal, the EC did not challenge the Panel's conclusion that its operator
category scheme ran afoul of GAIT Article 111:4. To do so would have been suicidal.
Rather, it resurrected-rather half-heartedly, it appears from reading between the
lines of the Appellate Body Report-its defense that the scope of Article HII did not
embrace the scheme. The EC said its rules concerned the distribution of import
licenses among eligible operators with a place of business in the EC. Because the
distribution of an import license is not the adjustment at the border of an internal
measure, but rather a post-customs clearance event, the distribution rules do not fall
within Article H:4.
Not so, said the Appellate Body in a crisp reply. The EC's operator category
rules, as well as its activity function rules (treated below), went far beyond what was
necessary to administer a tariff-rate quota for third-country and non-traditional ACP
bananas. By reserving a 30 percent chunk of the in-quota amount for Category B
operators, and by creating an incentive among operators to purchase EC bananas, the
operator category rules effectively cross-subsidized distributors of EC and traditional
ACP bananas. By buying these bananas, an operator could help itself to a slice of the
third-country and non-traditional ACP market. The operator could, moreover, rest
assured that it could pay for the domestic banana purchases with the revenues it
would earn from sales of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. Likewise
(as discussed below), the activity function rules helped ensure that EC banana
ripeners obtained a share of the quota rents.
The United States was equally successful in its use of the MFN weapon. No
doubt the EC's operator category rules were, in the language of GATT Article 1: 1,
"rules and formalities in connection with importation." 71 The EC's defense was
nothing more than a mere assertion to the contrary. The Panel had little trouble
finding two unassailable reasons to agree with the Americans that the operator

71.

See supra note 49.
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category rules in particular discriminated in favor of bananas from traditional ACP
countries. The Appellate Body did not disturb the Panel's rationales or conclusion.
Indeed, the matter seems not to have been a point of contention on appeal. 7
First, operator category rules existed only for imports of third-country and nontraditional ACP bananas. Bananas from traditional ACP countries were exempt from
these rules. The difference in application translated into a significant burden on
operators seeking to import from third-countries or from non-traditional ACP
countries. Put in Article 1:1 terms, the far less complex licensing procedures that
apply to imports of traditional ACP bananas were an "advantage" that the EC fails
to accord to all other bananas. The advantage created an incentive to purchase
bananas from traditional ACP countries rather than elsewhere.
What exactly was the difference in burden that created the advantage? The Panel
observed that to import bananas from traditional ACP countries, essentially all an
operator had to do was obtain a special certificate of origin from the issuing
authority in the relevant ACP country. In contrast, as a pre-requisite to obtaining a
license to import third-country or non-traditional ACP bananas, an operator had to
request calculation of an individual reference quantity. The operator did so by
sending to the relevant competent authority details of banana volumes it had
marketed during a preceding three-year period. The details included information on
the countries of origin of the bananas, the import volumes from each country, the
types of economic activities in which the operator had been engaged, and any
supporting documentation the competent authority may request.
Second, the EC's operator category rules accorded an advantage to traditional
ACP bananas with respect to matters covered by GAIT Article 111:4, the national
treatment provision. As I pointed out earlier, the EC allocated to Category B
operators 30 percent of the licenses for importation within the tariff-rate quota of
third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. An operator wanting to obtain,
maintain, or increase its share of licenses at in-quota tariff rates would have to
increase its marketing of EC and traditional ACP bananas. Why? Because to qualify
for Category B in the first place, an operator had to market EC and traditional ACP
bananas during a preceding three-year period. But, said the Panel, requiring an
operator to purchase a product from one country (e.g., EC and traditional ACP
bananas) in order to obtain the right to import a product from another country (e.g.,
third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas) at a lower duty rate is exactly the
sort of measure anticipated and frowned on by Articles 1:1 and II1:4. The measure
is inconsistent with Article 1:1, because it imparts an advantage on a matter referred
to in Article 1n:4 to traditional ACP bananas. The same advantage is not accorded
to bananas from other Members.

72. See Appellate Body Report, supranote 1,U 37-39, at 19 and i68-69, at 32-33 (stating the arguments
of the EC and United States under GATr Article 1:1, which focus on activity function rules, not operator
categories).
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2. The Attack on Activity FunctionRules

The EC's activity function rules 73 proved to be nearly as vulnerable a target for
the Americans as the operator category rules.74 The United States claimed that the
activity function rules were inconsistent with the MFN obligation of GATT Article
I: 1.75 The argument was straightforward and redolent of the use of the MFN weapon
against the operator category rules. On the one hand, the EC's system for issuing
licenses for imports of traditional ACP bananas did not utilize activity functions as
a criterion. On the other hand, its system for issuing licenses for imports of thirdcountry and non-traditional bananas did contain this criterion. Therefore, traditional
ACP bananas were accorded more favorable treatment than third-country or nontraditional ACP bananas.
The EC's defenses? First, the use of activity functions did not have any direct
impact on the imports of bananas from any source. Second, if the EC did not issue
licenses on the basis of activity functions, then certain operators in the supply chain
would have extraordinary bargaining power arising from the lion's share of the
licenses they would get. In other words, the activity function rules were justified by
EC competition policy.
The Panel sided with the United States. Indeed, given its holding concerning the
EC's operator category rules, the result of the American attack on the activity
function rules was a foregone conclusion. Like the operator category rules, the
activity function rules were "rules and formalities in connection with importation"
in the meaning of Article 1: 1, and thus were subject to the MFN obligation. Like the
operator category rules, the activity function rules were procedural and
administrative requirements for imports of third-country and non-traditional ACP
bananas that differed from, and went significantly beyond, the requirements for
traditional ACP bananas. The activity function rules demanded that operators
seeking to import third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas had to maintain
reams of data to show entitlement to a license. Operators interested in traditional
ACP bananas faced no such burden. The operator category rules meant that to get a
license for third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas, operators had to break

73. As I mentioned in Part II.C above, the EC's activity function rules applied to both Category A and B
operators. They defined three categories of economic activities, primary importation, secondary importation (i.e.,
customs clearance), and ripening. The EC assigned weighting coefficients of 57 percent, 15 percent, and 28
percent, respectively, to these activities, which the EC claimed reflected the level of commercial risk entailed by
each activity. In turn, using the weighting coefficients, the EC reserved fixed percentages of licenses required for
importing bananas from third-countries and non-traditional ACP sources at the lower duty rates associated with
the tariff.rate quota.
74. The discussion below is based on Panel Report, supra note 1, TI 7.214-7.215, at 358, 1 7.220-7.221,
at 359, and Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,(f 205-06, at 93.
75. See supra note 49. Two of the co-complainants, Guatemala and Honduras, challenged the activity
function rules under the national treatment provision of GATT Article 111:4. Along with Ecuador and Mexico,
these complainants also challenged the rules under Article X:3.
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down the past history of their banana business not only by country of origin and
operator category. The activity function rules added to their burden: the operators
also had to breakdown this history by activity function.
The Panel held that the end result was an "advantage," as this word is used in
GATI Article 1:1,76 to operators interested in traditional ACP bananas, and a
disadvantage to all other operators. Put differently, traditional ACP countries were
favored, whereas third countries and non-traditional ACP countries were victims of
discrimination. The less favorable treatment was a violation-one buried in the
details of the EC's licensing rules, but one that could be neither ignored nor
excused-of the MFN clause. The Appellate Body agreed. The activity function
rules were an advantage the EC had granted to some Members, but not others, and
the rules could not be legitimized by EC competition policy.

3. The Attack on Export Certificates
The third battle line created by the American attack on the EC's licensing system
was drawn around export certificates.77 The United States found the EC's matching
requirement regarding export certificates vulnerable to the MEN weapon. 78 That is,

to the Americans, the requirement was nearly as corrosive to basic trade principles
as the operator category and activity function rules. Once again, the Panel agreed
with the United States. Once again, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's findings
in all respects. The "bottom line" was that export certificate requirement gave

banana suppliers from three BFA countries, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua,

76. The Panel and Appellate Body cited to the adopted GATr Panel Report in UnitedStates-Non-Rubber
Footwearcase to support the proposition that "advantage" is to be defined broadly. See Panel Report, supra note
1, 7.221, at 359 n.763 and Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, 1206, at 93 n. 116, citing United States-Denial
of MFN Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwearfrom Brazil, GATT, B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 128, 1 6.8-6.14
(adopted 19 June 1992).
77. This discussion is based on Panel Report, supranote 1, U 7.223-7.241, at 360-63 and Appellate Body
Report, supranote 1, [ 207, at 93-94.
It is interesting to observe that the European Court of Justice (ECI) had, in two decisions rendered on 10
March 1998, already annulled the requirement of obtaining an export license in order to get an import license. The
ECJ found that the exemption of Category B operators from this formality gave them the zdvantage of buying
BFA bananas at a price 33 percent lower than Category A and C operators. The ECJ considered the differential
treatment among operator categories to be a breach of the general principle of non-discrimination between
producers and consumers. See Case C-122/95, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union,
1998 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5869 (10 Mar. 1998); Joined Cases T-364/95 and T-365-95, T Port GmbH & Co. v.
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 1998 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5875 (10 March 1998). Also of interest: in the ECJ case
presented on request of a German court, the German had court found Regulation 404/93 to be contrary to GATT
Article XIII, because the general system of dividing up quotas did not take account of previous imports. The ECJ
found it unnecessary to rule on this issue. See T. Port GmbH, supra.
78. To summarize my discussion in Part II.C.3, operators in Category A and C (but not B) seeking to
import bananas into the EC from a BFA country that chooses to issue an export certificate must obtain this
certificate. Three of the BFA countries, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, opted to issue the certificates, so
operators were required to present an export certificate issued by the relevant country. Absent this certificate, the
EC would not grant an import license, i.e., a license had to be matched with a certificate.
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preferential bargaining leverage. It was, then, a clean sweep for the United States:
none of the features of the EC's licensing system had been defended successfully.
How was this lop-sided result obtained and justified? Suppliers from Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Nicaragua were the initial holders of export certificates. In other
words, they were companies engaged in growing bananas in these BFA countries to
which the governments of these countries first issued the certificates. The suppliers,
in turn, sold the certificates to Category A and C operators, which needed them to
satisfy the matching requirement in order to get an EC license. The price the
suppliers charged the-operators for the certificate was based on what they anticipated
the quota rent to be, i.e., the expected difference between (1) the (lower) true market
value of bananas, and (2) the (higher) value of bananas resulting from the EC's
tariff-rate quota and attendant scarcity. After all, the quota rent is what the suppliers
would have earned if they had held onto the certificates and obtained an import
license for themselves. Stated differently, the suppliers naturally wanted to capture
at least a portion of the quota rent. But for the matching requirement, the entire quota
rent would have gone to Category A or C operators. The requirement transferred part
of that rent to the initial holders of export certificates.
Indeed, that transfer seemed to be the raison d'etre for the certificates. Operators
tended to be European or American companies. Many of the suppliers in Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Nicaragua apparently were local companies. By issuing export
certificates to the latter group, and allowing a secondary market in the certificates
to flourish, the Colombian, Costa Rican, and Nicaraguan governments ensured that
their companies could partake in the quota rents. The certificates, while making the
EC's licensing scheme all the more horridly complex, thus had its own perverse
logic and constituency.
The United States struck hard in its attack on export certificates. It said the
bargaining leverage, and consequent ability to capture part of the quota rent, was a
"privilege' within the meaning of GATT Article 1:1. However, this commercial
benefit was available only to BFA countries. The EC did not give the same option
to issue export certificates to any other WTO Member. In particular, the matching
requirement spelled less favorable treatment, and hence a competitive disadvantage,
for Latin American countries outside the BFA. The discriminatory distribution of
quota rents engineered by the matching requirement could not be justified, as the EC
tried to do, as a device to help local companies in BFA countries share in the
economic benefits of the tariff-rate quota for bananas from these countries.
The EC never had the high ground. The United States had pitched the battle as
one of "good" against "evil": the global interest in non-discriminatory trade versus
special interests (albeit Third World ones). The EC could not produce data on the
number of initial export certificate holders that were BFA suppliers, i.e., actually
engaged in banana production. Nor could the EC confirm, in cases where an initial
holder was not a supplier, the extent to which the holder passed on the benefits of the
quota rent it had captured to the supplier. Consequently, the EC's justification was
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nothing more than a defense plan incapable of being put into practice. The EC
simply had no way of telling whether BFA banana producers actually benefitted
from the matching requirement in the way the EC intended.
Even if the EC defense had been something more than a pigeon-holed plan, it
would not have mattered. The fact was that the possibility of getting at least part of
the quota rent existed for BFA suppliers. It did not exist for non-BFA suppliers.
Therefore, the matching requirement affected the competitive relationship between
bananas originating in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, versus bananas
originating in a non-BFA third country.
The Panel and Appellate Body rejected the EC's second defense of the matching
requirement. 79 The EC urged that any discrimination against non-BFA third country
bananas was offset by more favorable treatment given to these bananas in another
respect. Because there was no need to share the quota rent associated with non-BFA
third country bananas, a Category A or C operator would find dealing in these
bananas to be more profitable than dealing in BFA bananas. Indeed, the demand for
EC import licenses for non-BFA third country bananas (and Category B licenses)
usually exceeded the supply of these licenses in the first round of the quarterly
license allocation procedure80 In contrast, Category A and C licenses rarely were
over-subscribed, and were exhausted only in the second round of the procedure. 8' No
matter, said the adjudicators. GATr Article I: 1 does not permit a balancing of more
favorable treatment under one procedure against less favorable treatment under
another procedure. 82 The mandate for equality is absolute.
IV. THE GATS FRONT

The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it.
George Orwell, "Second Thoughts on James Burnham",
in Polemic (May 1946), reprinted in Shooting an Elephant (1950).
A. Overview
The battles fought on the GATS front were every bit as bloody as the battles on
the GATT front. The GATS front was, however, a bit smaller in dimension. The two
battles involved only the licensing requirements of the EC's preferential trading
arrangement for bananas. There were no GATS battles over tariff rates or quota

79.

Still another EC argument was that the GATT regulated tariff-rate quotas, but was silent about the

distribution among Members of rents arising therefrom. While they did not address the point directly, neither the
Panel nor the Appellate Body were impressed by it.

80. See supra notes 31-32.
81. See supra notes 31-32.
82. The Panel again cited the 1992 adopted GAIT Panel Report in UnitedStates-Non-RubberFootwear.
See Panel Report, supranote 1, 7.239, at 362 n.768.
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allocations, nor could there have been. The scope of the GATS, limited to trade in
services, would not allow for such a wide front. In the end, the United States
succeeded in persuading the Panel that the EC licensing requirements concerning
trade in bananas were discriminatory, specifically, they violated Articles II and XVII
of the GATS. 3
How the Americans did so is the subject of the discussion below. Why they
chose to attempt to do so is a matter of speculation. Obviously, had the United States
known in advance of the stunning success it would have in attacking the licensing
system on the GAT front, it probably would not have opened a second front. But,
victory in war is never certain.
We can posit that the United States raised GATS arguments in the first place as,
at a minimum, a fall-back position. If the EC's defenses on the GATr front held,
then the United States could pour resources into the GATS front, argue that a service
was at stake, and that the licensing regime violated the GATS. Naturally, the United
States could also make the converse argument if need be. Thus, by raising a GATS
argument, the United States had both the world of goods and of services covered,
and the EC would be faced with a conflict on two fronts.
However, set against this hypothesis about the reason for raising GATS
arguments is a plausible alternative. The United States feared that even if it prevailed
on the GATT front, it might not be able to obtain an award for damages in the GAT
area. That is, it might not be able to retaliate in a significant way, because it would
have some difficulty proving its companies had incurred a large amount of damages
on this front. If the United States opened and prevailed on a second front-the
GATS-it would increase the chances of winning a big damage claim and retaliating
in that amount.
Whatever the motivation, the American strategy worked. The EC could not
outlast the American attacks on the second front any better than they could on the
first front. The GATS battles, then, brought the Bananas War to an end--or so it
seemed, anyway.
B. The FirstBattle: The Scope of the GATS
American attacks on the GATS front could not be sustained unless a broad scope
for the GATS itself was secured." The American attempt to secure this position-a
beach head, as it were-led to the first battle on the front, which I summarize in
Table Seven.

83.

See Appellate Body Report, supranote 1,1 80-83, at 38-39, 1 240, at 106; see also id. I 255(v)-(w),

at 115.
84. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the battle over the scope of the GATS is drawn from Panel
Report, supranote 1,

7.274-7.308, at 367-80, and Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, [ 217-21, at 97-99.
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TABLE 7: THE FIRST BATTLE ON THE GATS FRONT-THE SCOPE OF THE GATS
American Attacks

EC Defenses

SI
Distributors of

bananas engage in a
wholesale trade
service, and thus are
subject to GATS
disciplines.

The GAIT and GATS
are mutually
exclusive.

The American
complaint is about
trade in a good, not a
service. GATS is
During the Uruguay
inapplicable to trade in
Round, the EC
goods, and to
scheduled
measures relating to
commitments on
national treatment in
trade in goods that
this sector. Hence, the indirectly affect the
EC defense contradicts supply of services.

its own GATS
schedule.

Only the distribution
of ripened bananas,
not the distribution of
unripened bananas or
the ripening of
bananas, is a bonafide
wholesale trade
service. The licensing
system concerns the
importation of
unripened bananas,
which involves trade
in goods and,
therefore, is immune
from GATS scrutiny.

PanelOutcome

Appellate Body

IOutcome

I
For the United States.

Affirms Panel holding.

The GAIT and OATS
are not mutually
exclusive. Rather,
their single or joint
application is to be
decided on a case-bycase basis.
First, there is no
textual basis for
believing otherwise.
Second, adverse
consequences to the
integrity of both
GA7T and GATS
could follow if they
were treated as
exclusive. A Member
could adopt a measure
lawful under one
agreement that
indirectly undermined
the other one.
Third, the EC's own
Uruguay Round
services schedule did
not suggest any
distinction between
ripened and unripened
bananas.

The United States argued that distributors of bananas were suppliers of
"wholesale trade services," a service sector in which the EC had undertaken in its
Uruguay Round Schedule a commitment on national treatment. 85 After all, if the

85. Also essential to the American argument was that distributors of non-traditional ACP and Latin
American bananas supplied a "like" service in comparison with distributors of EC and traditional ACP bananas.
The term "like" is used in GATS Article XVH.
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distributors were not supplying a wholesale trade service, then the GATS was
inapplicable. Article 1:1 of the GATS, which concerns scope, makes plain that the
'8 6
Agreement "applies to measures by Members affecting trade in services."
(Likewise, GATS Article XXVIII(c) defines "measures ... affecting trade in
services,"87 and provides a non-exclusive list of examples.) While an exception from
the GATS exists in Article I:3(b) for government-supplied services, there is no
express exception for "wholesale" trade services.
The EC struck back by characterizing the American complaint as one involving
trade in goods, not trade in services. Plainly the GATS does not govern trade in
goods, nor does it, argued the EC, govern measures relating to trade in goods that
indirectly affect the supply of services. Rather, to say that a measure "affects" trade
in services means the measure is "in respect of" a service. (The EC noted that the
chapeau to GATS Article XXVIII(c) defined "'measures... affecting trade in
services' to include measures in respect of. . . ," and emphasized the words "in
respect of" rather than the word "include.") More generally, the EC contended that
a measure cannot be covered by both the GATT and GATS. The agreements are
intended to be mutually exclusive in scope. Thus, whereas the United States wanted
to open a second front in the War and treat it in an integrated fashion with the GATI
front, the EC was quite understandably determined to avoid the menace of a twofront war.
The key weakness in the EC defense was its implication. The EC urged the Panel
to accept a peculiar definition of "wholesale" services (at least of "wholesale"
banana services) that would free the EC's banana import licensing regime from
scrutiny under the GATS. The EC argued that, at best, only the distribution of
ripened (i.e., yellow) bananas qualified as a "wholesale trade service." Accordingly,
only this activity potentially could come within the ambit of the GATS. Importing
unripened (i.e., green) bananas was a transaction in goods, and thus exempt from
GATS coverage. In other words, wholesale trading-which, said the EC, ordinarily
means distributing goods in a form ready for consumption with a view to selling the
goods to the consumer-starts only after bananas are ripe. Any activity prior to
ripening is not wholesaling, but rather production.
In turn, said the EC, "wholesalers" should be defined as companies that trade in
yellow bananas, not as operators within the meaning of the EC licensing system.
Indeed, in that system, the EC gives import licenses only for green bananas, not
yellow ones. Thus, because the American complaint focused on these import
licenses, and because importing unripened bananas was not a "wholesale" trade
service but rather a transaction in goods, the EC urged the applicable law should be
the GATT, not the GATS. Put conversely, only if the distribution of ripened bananas

86. GATS Art. 1:l, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
87. See id. (emphasis added).

SUPPLEMENT,

supranote 49, at 325 (emphasis added).
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to consumers in the EC were at issue would the GATS be relevant, because only that
activity is a "service."
The Panel saw through the peculiarity, and the self-serving nature, of the EC's
definition. The EC sought to define the "wholesale" trade stage as not at issue based
on a distinction between dealings in unripened versus ripened bananas. If the Panel
accepted this distinction, then the EC's licensing regime would be immune from
GATS scrutiny, because the activity licensed was defined by the EC to involve trade
in goods, not trade in services. Not surprisingly, on three grounds, the Panel rejected
the EC's effort to circumscribe the scope of the GATS.
First, the Panel found no legal basis for an a priori exclusion of measures within
the EC's banana import licensing regime from the scope of the GATS. The Panel
looked to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
therefore considered the ordinary meaning of the word "affecting" and the
preparatory work of the GATS.88 The EC, said the Panel, would have the word
"affecting" in GATS Articles I:l and XXVIII(c) to mean "in respect of," and that is
too narrow.
Second, the Panel offered its own consequentialist reasoning. If the GATI and
GATS were mutually exclusive, then the value of the Members' obligations would
be undermined, and the object of both agreements could be frustrated. It would be
possible for a Member to adopt a measure under one agreement with indirect effects
on trade covered by the other agreement, with no legal recourse. Accordingly, the
Panel found that the two agreements were not mutually exclusive, that they could
overlap in application to a particular measure, and that they both governed the EC's
banana import licensing procedures.
Third, the Panel pointed out the hypocrisy of the EC's definition of "wholesale
trade services." During the Uruguay Round, participants agreed to follow a set of
guidelines to schedule specific GATS commitments. To classify services for this
purpose, the guidelines encouraged participants to use a "Services Sectoral
Classification List" (SSCL) developed during the Round. This list, in turn, was based
on a United Nations Central Product Classification (CPC) System. While use of the
SSCL was not mandatory, most Members, including the EC, adopted it. Moreover,
the EC incorporated item 622 of the CPC into its schedule of services commitments.
This item refers to "wholesale trade services," expressly includes bananas as a
covered product, and expressly identifies re-selling merchandise and other related
subordinate activities to facilitate re-selling (e.g., maintaining inventories, sorting
and grading, break bulk, refrigeration, and delivery) as a "wholesale trade service."
Of great significance was the fact that nothing in item 622 remotely suggested a
distinction between unripened and ripened bananas. Thus, the Panel found the
88. Vienna Convention U.N. Doc. AICONF. 3927 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). The
Convention was completed at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980. Although the
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it has stated on numerous occasions before international
tribunals that it regards these articles of the Convention as reflecting customary international law.
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distribution of bananas-whether yellow or green-to be a "wholesale trade service"
subject to the GATS. In other words, the EC's licensing procedures were subject to
GATS scrutiny.
Given the EC's entirely legitimate defense strategy-avoidance of a second front
in the War-it had no choice but to appeal the Panel ruling. On appeal, two familiar
battle lines were drawn: whether the GATS applies to the EC's import licensing
procedures; and whether the GATS overlaps with GATT, or if the two agreements
are mutually exclusive. The Americans marched to the beat of the same drum: the
GATS was applicable to those procedures, and the two agreements were not
mutually exclusive. On the first battle line, the EC formed the same position that it
had at the Panel stage: the GATS was inapplicable to its banana import licensing
procedures because these procedures were not measures "affecting trade in services"
within the meaning of GATS Article 1:1. Rather, the procedures concerned buying
and importing bananas. If a wholesale trade services supplier buys and imports
bananas, it is a buyer and importer, and not subject to the GATS, but rather the
GAIT, because it is not providing any re-selling services.
Like the Panel, the Appellate Body rejected the EC's defense. The Appellate
Body relied on item 622 of the CPC, observing that it defined "wholesale trade
services" to embrace not only re-selling, but other related subordinate activities.
Further, said the Appellate Body, no wholesaler could re-sell merchandise if it did
not also import or otherwise purchase the merchandise. In other words, to re-sell
goods, a wholesaler must first obtain them. Hence, the EC's narrow definition of
"wholesale trade services" to exclude activities attendant to re-selling not only was
inconsistent with the CPC, but also downright illogical. In addition, the Appellate
Body rejected the EC's position on the ground that the word "affecting" in GATS
Article I:1 is wide in scope, and cited a 1958 GAT Panel Report, Italian
Discriminationof Imported AgriculturalMachinery, for support. 89 The Appellate
Body also relied on the expansive definition of "services" in GATS Article 1:3(b),
which includes "any service in any sector" except for government services. °
Similarly, noted the Appellate Body, GATS Article XXVII:(b) specifically
mentioned "production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery of a service" as
within the meaning of "supply of a service."'9'

89. WT/DS271ABIR, 220, at 98 n.127. The Italian AgriculturalMachinery case is published at GAFT
B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60 (adopted 23 Oct. 1958). The Panel also had cited to this report to support its conclusion,

discussed below, that the phrase"treatment no less favorable" in the GATS most-favored nation provision (Article
11:1) and national treatment provision (Article XVII:I) should be interpreted in the same manner. See Panel

Report, supranote 1,1 7.302, at 378 n. 795. See also id 7.327, at 384 n.808 (relying on the ItalianAgricultural
Machinery case to interpret GATS Article XVII:3 in accordance with GATI Article 11:4: namely, that both
demand not simply formal non-discrimination, but also forbid an adverse modification of the conditions of

competition).
90. See GATS Art. 1:3(b), reprintedin DocumErrTrs SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 326.

91. See GATS Art. XXVIII:(b), reprintedin DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 344.

2000 / The Bananas War

As to the battle line over the GATT-GATS relationship, the Appellate Body
readily agreed that the GATS was intended to deal with trade in services, and
provides, inter alia, MFN and national treatment strictures for this trade. It was,
therefore, not intended to deal with the same subject matter covered by GATr.92 A
measure affecting a service as a service, said the Appellate Body, obviously was
governed exclusively by the GATS. Conversely, a measure affecting a good as a
good would be covered only by the GAIT. But, thundered the Appellate Body, this
hardly was the end of the story.
Coverage of the agreements could be co-extensive with respect to a third
possibility, namely, the provision of a service relating to (or provided in conjunction
with) a good. In this scenario, both Agreements would apply, but the focus of the
inquiry under each would differ. Under the GATS, the question would be how the
measure affects the supply of the service, whereas under the GAIT it would be how
the measure affects the supply of the good. In sum, the Panel had gotten it right:
whether a measure affecting the supply of a service relating to a good should be
scrutinized under GATS, GATT, or both could be determined only on a case-by-case
basis. Indeed, said the Appellate Body, the Panel really had just followed its earlier
precedent. The Appellate Body had reached the same conclusion about the GATTGATS nexus in its report in Canada-CertainMeasures ConcerningPeriodicals."
The failed effort of the EC to prevent a GATS front in the War was dramatic.
The Panel and Appellate Body had breathed a tremendous amount of vigor into the
GATS. It was not a weak second cousin of the GAT. It was not a document out of
which WTO Members could easily squirm with narrow definitions of what a
"service" is, or self-interested circumlocutions about mutual exclusivity. Rather, the
GATS worked in tandem with its older partner to attack protectionism at various
points in the chain of commerce.
C. The Second Battle: The GATS MFN and National Treatment Provisions
With a second front in the War now open, the United States and EC clashed over
whether the EC's licensing system had violated any substantive GATS disciplines.
Tables Eight A, Eight B, and Eight C summarize the three areas of conflict in this
major battle, all of which focused on the strategically important operator rules. As
the Tables reveal, the United States deployed a new generation of the MFN and
national treatment weapons, namely, those housed in the GATS arsenal.

92.

See GATS Arts. IN: (concerning a general obligation to provide MFN treatment) and XVII:1

(concerning a specific commitment to provide national treatment in sectors listed in a Member's Schedule),
reprintedin DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 326, 339.
93. WT/DS31/AB/R (issued 30 June 1997, adopted 30 July 1997).
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TABLE 8A: THE SECOND BATTLE ON THE GATS FRoNT-CoNFLIcr OVER THE MEANING OF
"TREATMENT No LESS FAVORABLE"
American Attacks

EC Defenses

PanelOutcome

Appellate Body
Outcome

"Treatment no less
favorable" means
substantive as well as
formal equality,

'Treatment no less
favorable" means
only formal equality
of treatment is
required.

For the United States.

Affirms the Panel
holding.

Article XVII:2-3,
which discusses
equality of
competitive
conditions through
formally identical or
different measures,
informs Article 11:1.

There are no
provisions in Article
11 akin to Article
XVII:2-3, hence the
latter cannot be used
to aid the
interpretation of the
former.

If "treatment no less
favorable" means
only formal equality,
then the low
threshold will be
abused. A member
will provide prima
facie equality of
treatment, but in fact
will discriminate.

2000 / The Bananas War
TABLE 8B: THE SECOND BATTLE ON TH GATS FRONT-CONFLCr OVER MFN AND THE EC'S
OPERATOR CATEGORY RULES

American Attacks

I

Violation of Article
11:1.
The operator category
rules discriminate
against like services
and suppliers from
different Members.

IEC Defenses
The operator category
rules were pure in
their aim and effect.

Panel Outcome
For the United States.

Article I:1 is violated
if the respondent (1)
has adopted a measure
Their aim was to
integrate the national covered by GATS and
markets of the EC
not excepted it in the
respondent's schedule,
member states, and
and (2) the respondent
harmonize the
different situations of treats services from
banana traders in these the complainant less
favorably than those
states.
from another Member.
Their effect was to
leave commercial
The operator category
choice in the hands of rules were such a
the operators.
measure. Because
Category A and B
these rules reserved
operators can trade
just 66.5 percent of the
licenses, and
licenses to import noneventually shift
traditional ACP and
categories.
third-country bananas
for Category A firms
(the very firms
specializing in this
segment), and because
these companies
tended to be
American, the rules
were discriminatory.

IOutcome
Appellate

Body

Affirms the Panel
holding.
Article II covers both
dejure and defacto
discrimination.
Neither the aims nor
effects of a measure is
relevant under Article
II.
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TABLE 8C: THE SECOND BATTLE ON THE GATS FRONT-CONFLICT OVER NATIONAL TREATMENT
AND THE EC's OPERATOR CATEGORY RULEs
American Attacks
I

Violation of Article
XVII.

EC Defenses

Panel Outcome

Same defense as used
in the MFN conflict:
the operator category
rules were pure in
their aim and effect.

For the United States.

I

Article XVII is
violated if the
respondent (1)
undertakes a services
commitment, (2)
adopts a measure
affecting that service,
member states, and
and (3) the measure
harmonize the
accords less favorable
different situations of
treatment to services
banana traders in these from any other
states.
Member than to those
of the respondent.
Their effect was to
All three elements
leave commercial
choice in the hands of exist. As to the third,
the operators.
the operator category
Category A and B
rules reserved for
operators can trade
Category B operators
licenses, and
(which are mostly
eventually shift
European) 30 percent
categories.
of the licenses to
import non-traditional
ACP and third-country
bananas. Thus, they
took Latin American
banana business away
from American
suppliers and gave it
to EC firms, which
then gained a crosssubsidy.

The operator category
rules discriminate
against services and
service suppliers from Their aim was to
third countries in favor integrate the national
of those from the EC. markets of the EC

Appellate Body
IOutcome
Affirms the Panel
holding.
Neither the aims nor
effects of a measure is
relevant under Article
XVII.

Not unlike the 1947-era weapon in GATr Article 1:1, GATS Article 11:1 calls

for MFN treatment with respect to services and service suppliers.94 Clearly, the MFN
94. The GATS MFN provision states that
[wlith respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatmentno less favorablethan
that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.
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obligation established in the Uruguay Round through the GATS is one designed to
prohibit discrimination against services and service suppliers from one Member in
favor of like services and service suppliers from another Member.
The inevitability of the earlier battle over the scope of the GATS and definition

of "wholesale trade services" is evident from the phrase "any measure covered by
this Agreement" used in Article 11:1. This phrase refers to measures falling within
the scope of the GATS. A measure not within the scope of the GATS-as the EC

unsuccessfully had urged for its licensing scheme-obviously would not be subject
to the Article II:1 MFN obligation. Had the EC prevailed, it would have got out from
under what the Panel observed-correctly-to be a general obligation, one applying
across-the-board to every Member and service sector, not just sectors in which a

Member has undertaken a specific commitment. The only exception the GATS
provides to the MFN obligation is set forth in Article 11:2, which affords a Member
the opportunity to exclude a specific measure. 95 Significantly, the EC did not list any

exceptions in the Annex for measures relating to "wholesale trade services." Hence,
the Europeans had no choice but to defend their view of what this term meant against
the American onslaught, however dubious their posture might have seemed.
GATS Article XVII contains the national treatment discipline for services and

service suppliers. 96 Its clear thrust, not unlike the first-generation weapon in GATr

GATS Art. 11:1, reprintedin DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supranote 49, at 326 (emphasis added).
95. The exception states that "[a] Member may maintain a measure inconsistent with paragraph 1 provided
that such a measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, the Annex on Article II exemptions." GATS Art. II:2,
reprintedin DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 326.
96. GATS Article XVII provides:
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers
of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment
no lessfavourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
2.
A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and
service suppliers of any other Member, eitherformally identical treatment or formally
different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3.
Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less
favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other
Member.
GATS Art. XVII, reprintedin DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 339 (footnote omitted) (emphasis

added).
Interestingly, as the Panel observed, the MFN and national treatment provisions of GAIT, Articles 1:1 and
111:4, respectively, use a different phraseology. For example, GATT Article 1:1 refers to "any advantage, favor,
privilege or immunity." DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 1. while GATr Article 111:4 speaks of
"treatment no less favorable," unlike its GATS cousin it does not define this in terms of the modification of
competitive conditions. See id, at 7. However, the Panel opined that the "treatment no less favorable" language
of GATS derives from the GATT standard, and in the GAT" context the language has been interpreted to refer
to conditions of competition between like domestic and imported products on internal markets. The Panel cited
the 1958 report on Italian Discriminationof ImportedAgriculturalMachinery as evidence of this interpretation,
and implied it was not much ofa stretch to interpret the GATS national treatment provision as targeted at equality
of competitive conditions for services and service providers. See supranote 65.
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Article I,is to bar discrimination against foreign services and service suppliers to
the advantage of like services and service suppliers of national origin. The national
treatment obligation, in contrast to the MFN obligation, is a "specific" commitment.
It binds a Member only in services sectors that the Member has listed in its schedule,
and then only to the extent the Member says so in its schedule.
Here again, the inevitability of the earlier battle about the scope of the GATS is
evident. Had the EC not scheduled any commitments for "wholesale trade services,"
it would have been immune from a GATS national treatment attack. Yet, it had made
specific commitments during the Uruguay Round for these services. So, it was
compelled to argue for a narrow definition of them that excluded the activities that
were the subject of its contentious licensing procedures-namely, buying and
importing unripened, or green, bananas. The EC had no choice but to say they were
transactions in goods, not services, and thus exempt from the GATS. As indicated
above, the Panel rebuffed this narrow definition. The EC received a stem reminder
of its full commitment on national treatment in "wholesale trade services" with
respect to supply through a "commercial presence."
1. Conflict over the Meaning of "TreatmentNo Less Favorable" in the
MFN Clause
The United States claimed that the EC had breached both the MFN and national
treatment obligations. 97 The EC's licensing rules, intoned the United States,
discriminated in favor of distributors of bananas from the EC and traditional ACP
countries, and against distributors of bananas from non-traditional ACP countries
and Latin America. The EC, of course, disputed the charge, first-as discussed
above-by arguing that the GATS was inapplicable, and second, by urging that the
United States was wrong on the merits.
The clash on the merits resembled the first GATS battle in one harrowing
respect: there was an initial round of trench warfare over the meaning of precious
few, but terribly salient words. At the Panel stage, the United States and EC engaged
over the meaning of "treatment no less favorable" in GATS Article 1:1. 98 The
United States fired that the same phraseology is used in the national treatment
provision of GATS, Article XVII: 1.99 That provision, observed the United States, is
followed by two paragraphs that amplify the "treatment no less favorable"
phraseology by discussing formally identical and formally different conditions of
competition."

97. Unless otherwise note, the discussion below of the scope of the GATS is drawn from Panel Report,
supranote 1,1 7.277-7.306, at 368-79, and Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 79, at 37-38, if 231-34, at
102-03.
98. See supranote 94.
99. See supra note 96.
100. See supranote 96.
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What the Americans were saying was that Article XVII:2-3 explained Article
]1: 1 to provide for "no less favorable" conditions of competition as between domestic
and foreign services and service suppliers, regardless of whether these conditions are
achieved through the application of formally identical or formally different
measures. The United States urged that these two paragraphs did not add any
substantive rules, but rather provided guidance. The entirely reasonable conclusion
the Americans drew was that Article 11: 1 should be interpreted in the same manner
as Article XVII:. The upshot of the American salvo was that the EC violated the
MFN obligation even if its banana import regime did not discriminate, as a formal
matter, among foreign service suppliers. All that the United States had to show was
that the scheme created an un-level competitive playing field: depending on their
country of origin, some service suppliers were in a better competitive position than
others.
The EC's counter-strike also seemed tough but reasonable. If the drafters of the
GATS intended the meaning of "treatment no less favorable" in Article II: I to be the
same as that in Article XVII: 1, then they would have added the same two paragraphs
to Article II that exist in Article XVII. Because they did not, the EC inferred that
"treatment no less favorable" referred to the modification of competitive conditions
under the national treatment provision, but not under the MFN provision. What the
EC was saying was that the phrase "treatment no less favorable" in GATS Article
111: outlawed only measures embodying de jure discrimination, whereas the
Americans argued the licensing scheme constituted an instance of de facto
discrimination. In turn, the EC said, for the United States to prove the EC's banana
import preference scheme violated the MFN obligation, it would have to demonstrate
formal discriminatory treatment as among foreign service suppliers. Because the
scheme did not formally discriminate among suppliers based on their country of
origin, the EC said it had not breached its MFN obligation.
The Panel accepted the American interpretation of "treatment no less favorable,"
holding that it meant not just formal equality, but also equality of competitive
conditions. Applying Article 31:1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,'' the Panel did not find the absence of additional paragraphs in Article II: 1
to clarify the meaning of "treatment no less favorable" to be a justification for
departing from the ordinary meaning of the phrase, or for giving it one meaning
under Article 11:1 and a different meaning under Article XVII:I.L'0 Had the Panel
stopped here, its choice between two plausible arguments might have seemed
arbitrary. Aware of this trap, it reinforced its position.

101. Supranote 88.

102. The Panel went on to conclude that the EC's licensing scheme affected trade in wholesale trade
services. This conclusion was based on the complainants' argument that in the EC, trade in wholesale services for

bananas was affected through the EC's banana import licensing regime. See Appellate Body Report, supranote
1, 79, at 37-38. Consequently, the regime regulated the access of banana wholesalers to the item they needed
to provide wholesale trade services, namely, bananas. See id.
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It pointed out that the phraseology of Article II was unqualified and thus applied
to all forms of less favorable treatment. Moreover, the Panel foretold dreadful
consequences if the EC's narrow interpretation of national treatment, that Article
XVII:I demands only formal equality, were accepted. It could be abused to
circumvent the spirit of the obligation. A Member could implement regulatory
measures that prima facie afford identical treatment to domestic and foreign service
suppliers, but in effect discriminate against the latter group. Though the Appellate
Body criticized the Panel for not differentiating in its reasoning sufficiently between
MFN and national treatment, the Body agreed the Article covers both dejure and de
facto discrimination. Indeed, it added that "[w]e should make it clear that we do not
limit our conclusion to this case."' 3
Here again, we must take notice of the drama of the Panel and Appellate Body
holdings on the interpretation of critical GATS terminology. Like the holdings on
the scope of the GATS, they breathe a tremendous amount of vigor into the GATS.
It is not a document that stands for formal equality alone, and respondents will not
be permitted to stand behind the fig leaf of formalism. The GATS is about a
meaningful leveling of the competitive playing field.
Z Conflict over Discriminationunder the MFN Clause
What of the American attacks on the EC licensing rules?1° The United States
claimed discrimination in favor of distributors of bananas from the EC and
traditional ACP countries, and against distributors of bananas from non-traditional
ACP countries and Latin America. The focus of its attack was on the operator
category rules.
Regarding the GATS MFN obligation, the United States argued that the EC's
allocation of licenses to import bananas from third countries on the basis of operator
categories and eligibility criteria for Category B operators discriminated against like
service suppliers from different countries. Specifically, the allocation accorded more
favorable treatment to like services suppliers of ACP origin than to service suppliers
from non-ACP origin. Regarding the GATS national treatment obligation, the United
States charged that the EC's allocation of licenses to import bananas from third
countries on the basis of operator categories and eligibility criteria for Category B
operators discriminated against service suppliers from third countries, and in favor
of services suppliers from the EC.Specifically, the EC accorded more favorable
treatment to Category B operators, which are largely owned and controlled by
European entities, than to Category A operators, which are largely owned and
controlled by Americans (or interests from the co-complainant Members).
103. Id., supranote 1,1 234 at 103.
104. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion below of the MFN issue ;oncerning the EC's operator category
rules is drawn from Panel Report, supranote 1,

1,1 58, at 27, 71240-44, at 106-07.

7.342-7.353, at 389-91, and Appellate Body Report, supranote
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The EC fought back, offering essentially the same rebuttal to the charges that it
had violated its MFN and national treatment obligations. The overall aim of the
operator category system was to integrate the national markets of the EC member
states, and harmonize the different situations of banana traders in these states. The
United States ignored this point. Similarly, the United States misunderstood the basic
three-part design of the system.
First, the system divided the tariff-rate quota among different categories of
traders. Allocating licenses on the basis of operator categories did not, however,
automatically translate into doling out market shares to Category B operators.
Licenses are freely tradeable, said the EC, so just because an operator gets a license
does not mean it will actually carry out the physical importation the license
authorizes. The EC challenged the United States to prove that market shares and
quota rents had been reallocated at the expense of companies from third countries.
Second, said the EC, the operator category system encouraged operators dealing
in EC and traditional ACP bananas to obtain supplies of third-country bananas, and
conversely encouraged importers of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas
to distribute EC and traditional ACP bananas. Under the system, import licenses
were distributed based on statistics about past marketing of EC and traditional ACP
bananas, or of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. As a result, allocation
of Category A and B licenses was not mutually exclusive. Some companies
(especially large ones) were operators in both categories, and thus obtained Category
A and B licenses. Companies in both categories obviously could distribute bananas
from any source-a result the EC implied it was more than happy to endorse.
Accordingly, for the United States to equate Category B with firms of EC origin, and
Category A with firms of non-EC origin, was misleading. In essence, the EC was
saying that it was difficult to categorize companies based on nationality as either A
or B operators.
Third, the EC noted that the operator category system distributed quota rents
among the various operators in the market. While GATr-WTO rules help define
whether a tariff-rate quota scheme is legitimate, they do not regulate the sharing of
quota rents generated by a legitimate tariff-rate quota. Hence, the EC had full
discretion to allocate quota rents among banana producers from the EC, ACP, and
third countries. Put differently, the gravamen of the American argument concerned
the allocation of tariff-rate quota rents, and that issue is not dealt with by the GATS.
Little wonder why the Panel rejected the EC's defense. I have struggled mightily
in the above description of the operator category scheme to make the EC's design
of it not seem like alchemy. But, alchemy it was, and the Panel said so in its
discussion of the MFN issue. The Panel identified two essential elements to prove
a violation of GATS Article 11: 1: (1) the respondent has adopted a measure covered
by GATS and not excepted in the respondent's list of Article II exemptions; and (2)
the respondent accords to services or service suppliers from the complainant
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treatment less favorable than it accords to like services or services suppliers of any
other WTO Member. Both elements existed.
It was obvious that the EC had not only adopted a measure governed by the
GATS-the licensing scheme, and specifically, the operator category rules-but also
that the EC had failed to list any MFN exemptions. Nor did it take a microscope to
see that the EC accorded less favorable treatment to American (and co-complainant)
wholesale trade service suppliers than to service suppliers from ACP countries, such
as Jamaica Producers (from Jamaica) and Winban/Wibdeco (from the Windward
Islands). To be sure, the operator category rules did not formally accord treatment
less favorable to service suppliers from the United States (and its co-complainants).
After all, placement of firms in an operator category depended on the behavior of the
firm in a previous three-year period. If a firm had marketed EC and traditional ACP
bananas, then it was an "B" operator. If it had imported into the EC bananas from
Latin America and non-traditional ACP countries, then it was a "A" operator. The
classification rules applied to all services and service suppliers regardless of their
country of origin, nationality, ownership, or control. Further, a firm that had
traditionally supplied wholesale trade services only with respect to third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas was not legally barred from supplying these services
for EC and traditional ACP bananas. Nevertheless, said the Panel, the formally
identical operator category rules still created less favorable conditions of
competition: they treated American (and co-complainant) companies less favorably
than ACP companies.
How so? The Panel relied on the rationale (set forth below) it used to appraise
the strength of the American national treatment attack. In brief, the heart of the MFN
violation was that the EC reserved for Category B operators 30 percent of the
licenses to import in-quota amounts of bananas from third countries and nontraditional ACP countries at the reduced in-quota duty. It mattered not at all whether
Category B operators had previously traded in bananas from these sources. The
stunning incongruity was that Category A operators got only 66.5 percent of the
licenses for third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas, even though these
operators historically specialized in trading bananas from these countries.
This reservation might have been more of a curiosity than an incongruity had it
not been for the fact that most Category B operators were European, while most
Category A operators were from the United States (or one of the co-complainants).
The American companies were, therefore, forced to buy licenses from their European
competitors. The Europeans benefitted handsomely from tariff-quotarents by pricing
the licenses so as to recoup the rents they would forego once they parted with the
licenses. In other words, the initial licensees (European firms, i.e., Category B
operators) had a greater opportunity to benefit from tariff quota rents than license
transferees (American, i.e., Category A operators). To add to the unfairness of it all,
said the Panel, the European firms used profits from their guaranteed share of thirdcountry (principally Latin American) banana import licenses to cross-subsidize their
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high costs of production in ACP countries, and to strengthen their competitive
position in relation to American firms.
On appeal, the EC fought against the Panel's holding with the tenacity of
Alexander battling atop the walls at Multan.10 5 But, it fared no better in result than
the Macedonian, and like him, did grave injury to itself. The EC argued its licensing
system was not discriminatory under GATS Article II (or, as discussed below, under
Article XVII). The operator category rules (as well as the activity function and
export certificate rules, discussed below) pursued entirely legitimate policies that
were not inherently discriminatory in design or effect. In other words, the EC
thrusted with an "aims or effects" test: so long as its scheme was pure in its aims and
effects, then it satisfied the GATS.
The operator category rules fulfilled two related specific aims. First, they
established machinery for dividing the tariff-rate quota among the different
categories of banana traders. Second, they distributed quota rents among the various
operators in the bananas market. These two aims, said the EC, were consistent with
the EC's general policy goal of integrating the various European national markets
for bananas, and simultaneously taking into account the different situations of
banana traders in the various EC Member states. As for the effect of the operator
category rules, the EC urged that the rules left commercial choice in the hand of the
operators. Not only did the EC emphasize that Category A and B operators could
trade licenses among themselves, but also it seemed to imply that these operators
could, in the long run, move among categories by varying their pattern of trade.
The EC's aims or effects thrust was as foolish as Alexander's unprotected ascent
up the fortress wall. Any reader of the Appellate Body Report knew it was doomed
as soon as the Appellate Body intoned that "[w]e see no specific authority either in
Article II or in Article XVII of the GATS for the proposition that the 'aims and
effects' of a measure are in any way relevant in determining whether that measure
is inconsistent with those provisions."' 6 Lest there be any doubt, soon thereafter the
Appellate Body declared that it did "not agree with the European Communities that
the aims and effects of the operator category system are relevant in determining
whether or not that system modifies the conditions of competition between service
suppliers of EC origin and service suppliers of third-country origin."' 0 7
The Appellate Body found that an "aims and effects" test could be supported, if
at all, in the GATE Article II:1 "language that internal taxes or charges, or other
regulations 'should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.. ' ... Yet, the Appellate Body quickly cut down
this hope with the sword of its own precedent. In the 1996 Japan-Alcoholic
105.
106.
107.
108.

SUPPLE

See KEEGAN, supranote 7, at 62-64.
Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, %241, at 106.
Id.,1243, at 107.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 1241 at 106, quoting GAIT Art. 111:1, reprintedin DOCupiENTS

NT, supranote 49, at 5.
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Beverages case,'0 9 the Appellate Body rejected the "aims and effects" test with
respect to GATr Article 111:2. What the Appellate Body was saying was that the year
before it had ruled that no such test exists with respect to a closely related provision,
and it hardly was prepared to overturn that de facto precedent." ° Indeed, the
Appellate Body chided the EC for disregarding this de facto precedent and instead
citing a 1994 unadopted GATr Panel Report dealing with GAT Article III (United
States-Taxes 112
on Automobiles"') as support for its "aims and effects" test in the
GATS context.
To be sure, it was more thanjust the power of the past that swayed the Appellate
Body. It acknowledged that the Panel had concluded that most of the suppliers of
wholesale trade services in bananas of EC or ACP origin were in Category B, while
most of the suppliers from the United States (or the co-complainants) were in
Category A. The Appellate Body found no reason to go behind this factual
conclusion. Once it had said that, the Appellate Body's agreement with the Panel's
substantive conclusion was automatic. The EC's allocation of 30 percent of the
licenses for the importation of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas at inquota tariff rates created less favorable conditions of competition for American
service suppliers than for service suppliers from the ACP-a violation of GATS
Article II.
Here too, the dramatic repercussions of the battle ought not to be lost in its heat.
The EC was arguing to the Appellate Body that it had acted with a pure heart, though
perhaps an empty head. The EC had in no way intended its operator category rules
to be discriminatory, and in practice the rules had a laissez-faire flair to them. Not
good enough, said the Appellate Body. They needed savoir-faire. If the GATS
obligations are to mean anything, then they cannot be overridden by the intent
behind them, nor can they be palliated by one non-discriminatory effect in the face
of another discriminatory effect. Here, in the admittedly arcane and subtle language
of WTO tribunals, was the Appellate Body attempting to safeguard the robustness
of the GATS.

109. Supra note 68. The case is cited in Appellate Body, supranote 1, 241, at 106 n.151.
110. I have elsewhere elaborated my theory of the distinction between de facto stare decisis, which I believe

exists in WTO adjudication, and de jure stare decisis, which I believe ought to exisL See Raj Bhala, The Myth
About StareDecisisandInternationalTrade Law (PartOne ofa Trilogy), 14 AM. UNIV. INT'LL. REV. 845 (1999);

Raj Bhala, The PrecedentSetters: De FactoStare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 L
TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 1 (1999); 159 (1997); Raj Bhala, The Powerofthe Past: TowardsDe Jure Stare Decisis
in WTO Adjudication (Part Three ofa Trilogy), GEO.WASH.. INT'LL &ECON. (2000) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
111. DS31R. 11 (Oct. 1994, unadopted), cited in Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, 241, at 106 n.152.
112. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 241, at 106.
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3. Conflict over DiscriminationUnder the National Treatment Clause
The Panel found the EC's defense of its operator category scheme insufficient
to withstand the American national treatment argument."' How did it reach this
finding? In the same surgical manner the Panel had assumed to rule against those
defenses during the MFN attack. As in that attack, in the national treatment conflict
the Panel began by identifying clearly the essential elements a complainant had to
prove to show the respondent was guilty. Thus, the Panel defined three elements
necessary for a violation of GATS Article XVII: (1) the respondent has undertaken
a commitment in the service sector and mode of supply at issue; (2) the respondent
has adopted a measure affecting the supply of services in that sector and mode of
supply; and (3) the measure accords treatment less favorable to service suppliers
from any other WTO Member than to the respondent's own like service suppliers.
The Panel's MFN and national treatment adjudications were alike in another
respect. In both instances, the Panel seemed to have very little trouble finding that
the United States had used the weapon with lethal effect. The Panel's discussion of
the national treatment issue was, however, far more deliberate than in the MFN
theater. It had to be, because the Panel used it to quiet both conflicts.
As to the first element, the Panel pointed out that the EC had bound its
commitment, without qualifications, on wholesale trade services in bananas provided
through a commercial presence or across borders. Second, it had adopted a licensing
scheme as part of its preference regime, and the operator category rules of that
system affected-defined broadly-these services. Finally, the system indeed was
discriminatory.
Everything, of course, hinged on this final element. In finding the system to be
discriminatory, the Panel distinguished between formal discrimination, on the one
hand, and uneven competitive conditions, on the other hand-i.e., between de jure
and de facto discrimination. The Panel gave ground to the EC: the operator category
rules did not formally discriminate against wholesale service suppliers from the
United States (or the co-complainant countries), thus satisfying GATS Article
XVII:2 by providing formally identical treatment. The Panel recalled that
categorization as a B operator was based on whether a firm had, during a previous
three-year period, marketed EC and traditional ACP bananas. Categorization as an
A operator was based on whether a firm had, during a previous three-year period,
marketed third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas. The operator category

113. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion below of the national treatment problems created by the EC's
operator category rules is drawn from Panel Report, supranote 1,117.312-7.341, at 380-89, and Appellate Body
Report, supranote 1,TI 240-44, at 106-07.

McGeorge Law Review/ Vol. 31

rules applied to service suppliers regardless of their nationality, origin, or control.
Service suppliers of EC and non-EC origin were equally subject to the rules. 14

But, the concessions the Panel made to the EC were of no strategic value. What
mattered, and the point on which the Panel would not budge, was that in practice the
operator category system created an un-level playing field. The EC violated GATS
Article XVII:3 because its formally identical treatment modified the conditions of

competition, favoring wholesale trade service suppliers of EC origin at the expense
of service suppliers from third countries. The essential cause of the violation was the
EC's allocation to Category B operators of 30 percent of the licenses for importation

of bananas
from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries at in-quota tariff
15
rates.
Three inter-related empirical facts formed the basis for the Panel's conclusion
that the formal conditions of equality still meant less favorable treatment for non-EC

firms and their subsidiaries. First, before the introduction of the EC's banana
preference scheme, companies from the United States (along with those from cocomplainant Members) held a market share of over 95 percent of the imports of

Latin American bananas into the EC. Companies owned by EC and ACP interests
had a market share of less than 5 percent of imports of Latin American bananas. As
for the EC market for bananas from the EC and ACP, before the preference scheme
the three large banana companies-Chiquita, Dole, and Del Monte-held 6 percent,
and the share held by all non-ACP foreign-owned
companies in the EC/ACP market
16
segment was less than 10 percent.'

Second, most of the suppliers from the United States (and its co-complainants)
were placed in Category A because of their past marketing of bananas. For instance,
the operators classified in Category A, based on historic trade volume, were: Banacol

(Colombia), Chiquita (United States), Del Monte (Mexico), Dole (United States),
Noboa (Ecuador), Del Monte (Mexico), Uniban (Colombia). In contrast, most of the

114. For example, an American firm that had supplied wholesale trade services for only third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas was not legally barred from supplying these services with respect to EC and
traditional ACP bananas. As another example, a service supplier need not be European in order to be considered

a Category B operator and thereby be eligible for the allocation of 30 percent of the in-quota licenses required for
third-country and non-traditional ACP imports that is earmarked for Category B operators.
115. To reach this finding, the Panel first had to determine that there were a number of non-EC owned or
controlled wholesale service suppliers that provided wholesale trade services in bananas in and to the EC. In this
regard, the EC did not make it easy for the Panel: the EC stated it did not have records of actual ownership of
companies registered to receive licenses. The Panel turned to evidence submitted by the United States (and its cocomplainants) that there were firms of American origin (or whose origin was in another co-complainant) that
controlled subsidiaries established in the EC that supplied wholesale trade services in bananas in and to the EC.
That was all the Panel needed to declare that (1) Chiquita and Dole were American companies, (2) Del Monte was
a Mexican company, (3) Noboa was an Ecuadorian company, and (4) these non-EC firms controlled subsidiaries
which supplied wholesale trade services in bananas and were commercially present in the EC.
116. The EC disputed these statistics, and presented counter-evidence that in the EC market between 1991
and 1994, Dole's share rose from I1 to 15 percent, Del Monte's share rose from 7.5 to 8 percent, and Chiquita's
share fell from 25 to 18.5 percent due to a poor business strategy. In other words, said the EC, the share of the EC
market held by these foreign powerhouses hardly changed. The Panel was not impressed.
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suppliers from the EC or ACP were placed in Category B, given the vast majority
of their past marketing of bananas. Operators in this Category, based on historic
trade volume, were, for example, Bargosa (Spain), CBD/Durand (France),
Compagnie Fruitiere (France), Coplaca (Spain), Fyffes (Ireland), Geest (United
Kingdom), Gipam (France), and Pomona (France).
Given the way the EC defined the operator categories, this bifurcation was not
a surprise. To be in Category A, a company had to have marketed third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas. Who else would have specialized in this market
segment but American (along with Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Mexican)
companies? To be in Category B, a company had to have marketed EC and
traditional ACP bananas. Who would have been better positioned in this market
segment than companies from the former European colonial powers? In brief, the
EC's method of constructing the categories ensured segregation of firms by
nationality.
Third, under the EC's operator category rules, Category B operators were
eligible for 30 percent of the licenses required for importation of third-country (in
effect, Latin American) and non-traditional ACP bananas at lower in-quota duty
rates. Still, an operator qualified for Category B because of its marketing during a
preceding three-year period of EC and (or)traditionalACPbananas, not because of
its marketing of third-country and (or) non-traditional ACP bananas. In other words,
the EC reserved 30 percent of the licenses to import Latin American and nontraditional bananas for Category B operators which, by definition, had been
specializing in EC and traditional ACP bananas. Conversely, Category A operators,
which by definition historically specialized in trade in third-country and nontraditional ACP bananas, got only 66.5 percent of the licenses for in-quota shipments
of bananas from these sources. Yet, the EC did not allocate to Category A operators
a share in the EC and traditionalACP markets-even though the EC did give
Category B operators a 30 percent block of the licenses to import third-country and
non-traditional bananas. In other words, the EC's operator category system hardly
provided mirror image treatment. Category B operators were assured a 30 percent
chunk of the licenses to import bananas from sources they had not traditionally
specialized in trading, but Category A operators were denied an allocation for
bananas that they had not traditionally specialized in trading.
When the Panel linked this incongruity with the first and second empirical facts,
the EC's position was revealed to be indefensible. Most of the Category B operators
were European, whereas most of the Category A operators were non-European, and
two of the biggest (Chiquita and Dole) were American. The EC was holding for its
own operators a third of the licenses in the market segment in which American
operators had specialized, a guarantee well above the European operators' traditional
market share of less than 5 percent. The EC thus cut into the Americans' business,
giving Category A operators just two-thirds of a market segment in which they had
previously held a 95 percent stake (Latin American bananas), but not giving them
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any stake in the segment in which the European operators had specialized (bananas
from the EC and traditional ACP countries).
In essence, the effect of the operator category rules was to take some of the Latin
American banana business away from American companies and give it to European
companies, but not give any of the European companies' EC and ACP banana
business to American companies. The Panel could well have
remarked-sardonically-that this sort of regulation must have been the brainchild
of unreconstructed Euro-communists from the 1970s who had found posts in
Brussels in the 1990s. The Panel did state that this effect alone was more than
sufficient to hold the EC in violation of GATS Article XVII. But, to its credit, it
pressed on and buttressed the holding with a neat microeconomic point.
The Panel observed that tariff-quota rents that European companies earned from
importing Latin American bananas cross-subsidized the higher-cost operations of
those companies in traditional ACP countries. The Panel quoted from an
incriminating 1993 EC Council written observation made to the European Court of
Justice that the cross-subsidy was intended to strengthen the competitive position of
operators that have previously marketed ACP bananas vis-A-vis operators that have
previously marketed Latin American bananas. In other words, the cross-subsidy took
aim at the giant American food companies.
What about the EC defense that allocation of shares for import licenses in a
tariff-rate quota did not translate automatically into market shares because the
licenses were tradeable? The Panel agreed that a Category A operator wishing to
maintain its previous market share could buy a license from a Category B operators,
and indeed large numbers of licenses were traded. But, the initial license holder in
Category A that sells the license still reaps tariff quota rents, whereas a license
purchaser in Category B has to pay a price up to the amount of the tariff quota rent.
After all, the Category B seller will want to recoup at least some of the rent it will
forego after parting with the license, and price the license accordingly. The Category
A purchaser does not, therefore, have the chance to benefit from tariff quota rents in
a way equivalent to that which accrues to an initial license holder. The Panel relied
on the same logic in rejecting the EC's counter-evidence that the shares of Chiquita,
Dole, and Del Monte in the EC market had not changed much after the EC
introduced the preference scheme. The foreign companies had to preserve market
share by buying licenses. Therefore, it was wrong to infer that competitive
conditions had not changed significantly just from the fact that market shares were
largely unchanged.
The Appellate Body took the same view of the course of the GATS national
treatment conflict as it in the MFN conflict. The EC tried the same "aims and
effects" maneuver in the national treatment context as it had in the MFN context. By
this point, the EC's behavior was as frenzied as Alexander's on the Multan wall:
anything that might stave off defeat was to be tried. But, unlike Alexander, the EC
had no help from comrades-in-arms. The Appellate Body responded in precisely the
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same way as it had before, easily turning back the thrust and re-focusing attention
on the Panel's factual findings of discrimination against service suppliers from the
United States and in favor of like providers from the EC. As in the MFN clash, in
this national treatment conflict we see the Appellate Body desiring a GATS whose
obligations cannot be circumvented by a pure heart and an empty head.
For all intents and purposes, the EC's GATS cause was now lost. The loss
marked defeat in a two-front war on both fronts. Save for the first GATT battle,
fought over the MEN principle, the EC had lost every major battle on both fronts.
Had the United States stopped here, its victories would have been quite enough for
most trade lawyers. It did not, nor should it have. It pressed on, not to humiliate the
Europeans, but to erase every target in the hated preferential trading scheme for
bananas. Once the smoke had cleared from the ashes of the conflicts over the
operator category rules, two more targets-albeit minor ones--came into sight. Only
when these were eliminated did the American trade guns fall silent.
4. Other Conflicts Under the National Treatment Clause:Activity
Function Rules and Export Certificates
a. The Opening Confrontationover Activity FunctionRules
The United States attacked the EC's allocation of third-country tariff rate quota
licenses based on activity functions, again deploying the national treatment weapon
of GATS Article XVI.117 The pattern the confrontation took was predictable, maybe
even inevitable. The United States decried the fact that most of the secondary
importers (i.e., customs clearers) and ripeners were EC firms. By reserving 15
percent of the licenses for secondary importers and 28 percent for ripeners, the EC
in effect re-allocated market shares from third-country firms to EC firms, thereby
modifying the conditions of competition in favor of like services suppliers of EC
origin. The EC countered it created activity functions to avoid the concentration of
economic bargaining power, which would result from the allocation of import
licenses, in the hands of a few privileged recipients at a specific stage in the supply
chain.
The Americans were successful. The Panel held that the activity function rules
did indeed run afoul of GATS Article XVII. Here again, there was formal equality
of treatment accorded to all wholesale service suppliers regardless of origin,
nationality, ownership, or control, but there were unequal conditions of competition
in favor of service suppliers from the EC. In particular, the EC's allocation to
ripeners of 28 percent of the Category A and B licenses for the importation of thirdcountry and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates created less

117. Unless otherwise noted, this discussion of the activity function conflict is drawn from Panel Report,
supranote 1, H 7.354-7.368, at 391-95.
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favorable conditions of competition for like service suppliers from the United States
(and other co-complainants). The Panel examined the American argument by
reviewing the three elements necessary under the GATS national treatment
provision: proof the respondent made a commitment in a relevant service sector and
supply mode; proof the respondent adopted a measure affecting the supply of
services in that sector or mode of supply; and proof the measure accorded to service
suppliers of any other Member treatment less favorable than it accords to the
respondent's own like service suppliers. The Panel said the United States had
demonstrated the existence of all three elements.
First, the EC had made a commitment on wholesale trade services for bananas
with respect to cross-border and commercial presence operations. Second, the EC's
activity function rules constituted a measure affecting trade in services. Third, the
EC's activity function rules applied to all service suppliers, regardless of their
nationality, ownership, or control. Yes, it was true that companies of EC origin
supplying wholesale services with respect to third-country and non-traditional ACP
bananas were equally subject to activity function rules as suppliers from the United
States that provided wholesale services with respect to third-country and nontraditional ACP bananas. Moreover, EC companies were treated in the same way by
the activity function rules when they sold or marketed EC or traditional ACP
bananas as were American suppliers that dealt in EC or traditional ACP bananas.
Thus, the Panel conceded that the EC's activity function rules did not discriminate
in a formal sense under GATS Article XVII:2 against service suppliers from another
Member.
No matter. Applying the same logic as it had in the context of operator
categories, the Panel distinguished between the application of formally identical
activity function rules, on the one hand, and a tilt in the conditions of competition,
on the other hand. The Panel was stirred by the American point that in 1992, about
83 percent of bananas imported or marketed in the EC were ripened by EC-owned
or controlled ripeners. The EC's counter was weak, protesting that the true figure
was 74 to 80 percent. Either way, the vast majority of the ripening capacity in the EC
was owned or controlled by EC companies, and most of the bananas produced in, or
imported to, the EC were ripened in an EC-owned or controlled ripening facility: or,
to put the point conversely, most of the service suppliers from the United States were
able to claim individual reference quantities only for primary importation and
customs clearance, not for ripening activities. How ironic, because the EC extolled
the activity function rules as necessary to prevent a concentration of economic
bargaining power in the hands of large multinational corporations like Chiquita,
Dole, and Del Monte. Concentration-in European hands-had been the (intended?)
result.
Did this bias extend to the other two activity categories? Not necessarily, said
the Panel. It appeared that service suppliers from the EC and the United States
enjoyed comparable opportunities to file claims as to primary and secondary
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importation activities. The real inequality in competitive opportunities lay in
ripening activities: EC companies had a greater chance to make claims for reference
quantities for these activities.
As it had in the context of its discussion of the EC's operator category rules, the
Panel, in the context of ruling on the activity function rules, pointed out an inequity
arising from the trading oflicenses. Indeed, the Panel's reasoning was essentially the
same in both contexts.
The Panel observed that allocation of fixed percentages of licenses through the
application of weighting coefficients to operators performing various activity
functions did not automatically determine the distribution of import shares among
operators performing different activities in the supply chain. After all, the
licenses--once granted---could be, and indeed were, traded. To maintain their
previous market share, primary importers typically had to supplement their annual
license entitlement by purchasing licenses from ripeners. The ripeners that initially
held and then sold their licenses to primary importers reaped tariff quota rents,
because the primary importers purchased the licenses for a price up to the tariff
quota rent. How else would a ripener set a price for a license other than the expected
tariff quota rent that it would forego by parting with the license?
Consequently, said the Panel, primary importers did not have the opportunity to
benefit from tariff quota rents in an equivalent way as the initial license holders, the
ripeners. Given that these ripeners were overwhelmingly European companies, the
conditions of competition were more favorable to domestic (i.e., EC) wholesale
service suppliers than to American service suppliers (or, for that matter, service
suppliers from other complainant countries). Here, then, was a violation of GATS
Article X-II:3.
The Panel opined that this inequity was aggravated by the interaction of the
operator category and activity function rules. Primary importers classified in
operator Category A were eligible for 66.5 percent of the licenses allowing
importation of bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries at inquota tariff rates. But, the activity function rules reduced the entitlement of operators
who were primary importers to 57 percent of the bananas marketed during a
preceding three-year period (unless the operators also engaged in customs clearance
or ripening). In contrast, primary importers in Category B were assured access to 30
percent of the licenses for third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota
rates (regardless of whether they had traded previously in this market segment).
Therefore, the Panel said it believed the primary importers most likely to be
shopping for an extra import license would be Category A operators. Those operators
were, of course, non-European.
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b. Pounding of Export Certificates
Like the seemingly endless artillery bombardment at the Somme, the American

attack with the GATS national treatment weapon continued.118 In addition to striking
118. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the conflict over export certificates is drawn from Panel
Report, supra note 1, 7.373-7.385, at 396-98, and Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 1244, at 107.
I should mention that, as on the GATT front, on the GATS front the EC's hurricane license requirements
came under fire. See Panel Report, supranote 1, 9ff 7.386-7.397, at 398-401; Appellate Body Report, supra note
1, W 247-48, at 108-09. Like the clash on the GAIT front, the skirmish on the GATS front over hurricane license
was a sideshow, so I omit it from the text. In brief, the United States pointed out that the EC had issued hurricane
licenses exclusively to Category B operators, which of course meant the licenses went to companies of European
or ACP origin. The result was less favorable treatment to third country service suppliers vis-t-vis ACP suppliers,
in violation of the GATS Article H:I MFN provision, and vis-h-vis EC suppliers, in violation of the GATS Article
XVII national treatment provision. The EC's defense? Issuing hurricane licenses was required by the Lome
Convention. Moreover, these licenses were directly linked to trade in goods and, therefore, not subject to GATS
rules.
Ruling on the MFN claim, the Panel recited the formula for success under GATS Article II: (1) proof the
respondent adopted a measure covered by GATS; and (2) proof the measure accords to service suppliers from the
complainant treatment less favorable (whether in a formal sense, or in the sense of creating less favorable
conditions of competition) than it accords to service suppliers of another WTO Member. The United States, said
the Panel, had satisfied the formula. The EC adopted a measure, the hurricane license rules, that affected the
provision of services-defined broadly to include production, distribution, marketing, sale, and delivery-through
cross-border supply or a commercial presence. The measure accorded less favorable treatment to American service
suppliers than to service suppliers of ACP origin. The vast majority of service suppliers in Category B were from
the ACP (or EC), and the EC granted hurricane licenses only to Category B operators. Thus, ACP (and EC) service
suppliers benefitted exclusively. The benefit took the form of an allowance for an importation of third-country
and non-traditional ACP bananas at an in-quota tariff rate. This allowance was in addition to the allocation to
Category B operators of 30 percent of the licenses for importation of third-country and non-traditional ACP
bananas at in-quota rates. In other words, by getting hurricane licenses, the ACP operators in Category B received
the opportunity to obtain tariff-rate quota rents above and beyond the rents generated by the normal allocation of
30 percent of the in-quota import licenses to them. Clearly, the conditions of competition were less favorable for
service suppliers from the United States (and the other co-complainants) than for ACP producers.
With regard to the national treatment claim, the Panel began with the familiar recitation of the criteria for
success under GATS Article XVII: (1) proof of a commitment in the relevant service sector and mode of supply;
(2) proof of adoption of a measure that affects that sector or supply mode; and (3) proof the measure accords less
favorable treatment (whether in a formal sense, or in the sense of creating less favorable conditions of competition)
to foreign service suppliers than it accords to domestic like service suppliers. The Panel had no trouble finding
these criteria were satisfied, thus again siding with the United States. The third criteria, of course, was the key one,
and on this the Panel began by noting that only operators that were or directly represented EC (or ACP) producers
were eligible for hurricane licenses. The Panel then applied exactly the same logic as it had with respect to the
MFN claim. Because the EC issued the licenses solely to Category B operators, European (as well as ACP)
companies benefitted exclusively. The benefit took the form of an allowance for importation of third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas at an in-quota tariff rate, in addition to the 30 percent license allocation reserved for
Category B operators. The benefit translated into a bigger portion of the rents from the tariff-rate quotas for thirdcountry and ACP banana imports. Again, clearly, competitive conditions were less favorable for service suppliers
from the United States (and the other co-complainants) than for EC producers.
The EC appealed, but the Appellate Body had little trouble upholding the Panel's finding. The EC urged that
the purpose of the hurricane licenses was to compensate those suffering damage caused by tropical storms. It said
there was no de facto discrimination in violation of GATS Article II, because non-ACP operators could own or
represent ACP producers on the same basis as EC and ACP operators. It said that the hurricane licensing rules did

not skew competitive conditions between EC operators and operators from the United States (and its cocomplainants). The Appellate Body saw the EC's defense as, once again, an effort to justify discriminatory rules
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the EC's operator category and activity function rules, the United States claimed the
rules on export certificates ran afoul of GATS Article XVII. Under the EC's rules,"1 9
a company seeking to import bananas into the EC had to match its EC import license
with a BFA export certificate. This matching requirement, of course, assumed the
company sought to import bananas from a BFA country, and that the BFA country
had issued export certificates. Three of the four BFA countries--Colombia, Costa
Rica, and Nicaragua, but not Venezuela-had issued these certificates. Thus, a
company to which the EC had granted a license to import bananas from one of these
countries had to produce an export certificate from the country.
The problem was that the EC applied the matching requirement only to Category
A and C operators, exempting Category B operators. The United States claimed the
exemption accorded less favorable treatment to service suppliers from third countries
than to service suppliers from the EC, in violation of the national treatment provision
in GATS Article XVII. The United States added that the exemption discriminated
against third-country service suppliers, and in favor of service suppliers of ACP
origin, in violation of the MFN provision in GATS Article II.
The EC responded with a call to the noble purpose of requiring its import
licenses to be matched with BFA export certificates: the transference of part of the
tariff-rate quota rent to companies from poor countries. Specifically, the rent would
be shifted from the initial EC import license holder to suppliers from Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, to which BFA export certificates had been issued,
because the EC import licensees would have to buy the certificates from the Latin
suppliers. In effect, the Colombian, Costa Rican, and Nicaraguan governments
issued the certificates to companies from their countries, which then could sell the
certificates to EC import licensees needing to satisfy the matching requirement. The
EC urged that nothing in GATS Article XVI constrained the allocation or
distribution of quota rents that are generated by legitimate tariff-rate quotas.
The Panel saw through the high-minded defense. It reiterated its mantra, the
standard three-part criteria for proper firing of the GATS Article XVII weapon: (1)
undertaking a service sector commitment; (2) adopting a measure affecting that
sector; and (3) according less favorable treatment as a result of that measure to
foreign service suppliers than domestic ones. The Panel relied on its findings that the
first two criteria were met, and that most of the American service suppliers (and
those from the co-complainant countries) had been slotted in Category A, whereas
Category B was populated with European companies. The Panel then observed that
the exemption from the matching requirement meant Category B operators that were

based on their aims and effects. The Appellate Body hardly was inclined to disturb the Panel's findings of fact:
(1) that only operators who included or directly represented EC or ACP producers affected by a tropical storm
were eligible for hurricane licenses; and (2) that this situation resulted in European and ACP operators getting
hurricane licenses, because the vast majority of operators that included or directly represented EC and ACP

producers were service suppliers from the EC and ACP
119. See supraPart II.C.4.
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initial holders of EC import licenses did not have to share part of their tariff-rate
quota rents with initial holders of BFA certificates. In contrast, Category A and C
operators had to obtain BFA export certificates from initial holders, and thus had to
share part of their quota rent. Plainly, said the Panel, the exemption violated Article
XVII:3 by creating less favorable conditions for service suppliers from the United
States (and its co-complainants) than for EC suppliers.
As for the American MFN argument regarding the exemption, the Panel
reiterated its GATS Article II mantra-that to use this weapon successfully, a
complainant must show (1) the adoption of a measure covered by the GATS, which
(2) accords to service suppliers from the complainant less favorable treatment than
it accords to service suppliers from another country. The Panel again relied on earlier
findings that the first element undoubtedly was satisfied. It also recalled its finding
that the EC had classified most service suppliers of ACP origin in Category B.
Consequently, American and other third-country service suppliers were
competitively disadvantaged by the exemption, because they had to transfer part of
their tariff-rate quota rents to initial holders of BFA export certificates, whereas the
ACP-origin companies did not. Wisely, the EC did not even attempt to re-fight the
issue in front of the Appellate Body.
c. The FinalShowdown over Activity FunctionRules
Given the EC's decision not to appeal the Panel's findings on export certificates,
it is somewhat surprising the EC did not also exercise the same care and drop any
notion of continuing the showdown over activity function rules.1 20 The EC's better
judgment did not transfer over, and it suffered the consequences. The EC opted to
appeal the Panel holdings on the activity function rules, offering a two-pronged
defense. Again, the pattern of what would follow could have been predicted. Again,
the EC lost on both counts.
The EC said the rules were designed to pursue entirely legitimate policies. It
admitted rather proudly that they were aimed at protecting banana ripeners from a
concentration of economic bargaining power in the hands of the primary importers
as a result of the tariff-rate quota. In other words, the EC said its policy objective
was to correct the position of all ripeners, regardless of their nationality, vis-t-vis all
banana suppliers.
Second, said the EC, the rules were not inherently discriminatory in effect. Here,
the EC's example was a bit cryptic: it contended that primary importers could
mitigate the effect of the activity function rules. If they have previously supplied
wholesale trade services in bananas that had come under the quota rules, then they
could extend their services to the EC market segment and thereby avoid or reduce

120. Unless otherwise noted, this discussion of the activity function conflict is drawn from Appellate Body
Report, supra note 1, H 245-46, at 107-08.
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the extent to which they were subject to the activity function rules. What, exactly,
the EC had in mind here was not clear. It was clear, however, that the EC did not
really challenge the Panel's factual findings. It could not, under the provisions on
appeal contained in the Uruguay Round Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes(DSU)-andthe Appellate Body, of course, did not question
these findings.
The Appellate Body saw that the EC was reincarnating the "aims and effects"
theory, and rejected it out of hand. Notwithstanding the aims and effects of a
measure, what mattered was whether a measure such as activity function rules
created less favorable conditions of competition. Further, EC and ACP service
suppliers in Category B were afforded protection. After all, service suppliers from
the United States (and its co-complainants) were overwhelmingly represented in
Category A, and by the EC's own reckoning, between 74 and 80 percent of the
ripeners were EC controlled.
Thus, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel's legal conclusion that the EC
violated GATS Article II by allocating to Category B operators 30 percent of the
licenses for importing third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota
tariff rates. This allocation led to a preference of ACP operators over operators from
the United States (and the co-complainants). Likewise, the Appellate Body upheld
the Panel's conclusion that the 30 percent license allocation to Category B violated
GATS Article XVII. This allocation caused like service suppliers from the United
States (and the co-complainants) to be treated less favorably than European Category
B suppliers. As the Panel had observed, service suppliers from the United States (and
co-complainants) could claim reference quantities only for primary importation, but
not usually for ripening or customs clearance activities. With this, the EC had been
roundly defeated in every theater of the GATS front. Would it finally sue for peace?
V. THE BLOODY AFIERMATH

It isfar easierto make war than to make peace.
Georges Clemenceau, Speech at Verdun, France (14 July 1919),
reprintedin THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 970 (Robert
Andrews ed. 1993).
The truth of Clemenceau's observation was demonstrated after the guns fell
silent on the GATr and GATS fronts. It was time to make peace. But, it seemed that
not even the legal, moral, not to mention literal, weight of the Panel and Appellate
Body Reports could bring the United States and EC together. They soon began to
quibble about when and how the EC would comply with the Appellate Body's
recommendations. The quibble became a quarrel, the quarrel a skirmish, the skirmish
a battle. The two sides were at the threshold of another war. It was as if their leaders
were ignoring Santayana's observation-not the famous dictum about being
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condemned to repeat history as a punishment for not studying it, but rather his
statement that "[tlo delight in war is a merit in the
soldier, a dangerous quality in the
21

captain, and a positive crime in the statesman."'

A. The UnitedStates Rejects the EC's FirstProposedReform

How did this debacle happen? Essentially, both sides seemed to believe they
knew exactly what the Panel and Appellate Body expected. But, there was no

common ground in their beliefs.'2 The United States hailed the Panel Report as an
important precedent.' 23 The EC, of course, appealed it in June 1997.'2' In September
1997, when the Appellate Body upheld the Panel Report (with minor modifications),

the United States again dubbed the ruling an important precedent for agricultural
trade and the GATS.125 The United States announced it would not accept

compensation from the EC.1' The EC accepted the ruling, but six EC members
(including the United Kingdom, France, and Spain)--enough to form a blocking

minority-stated they opposed any change in the scheme.127
Changing tack in October 1997, the EC announced it would modify the regime
in accordance with the Appellate Body report. 28 However, the EC declined to say
121. George Santayana, Reason in Society, in THE LIFE OF REASON ch. 3 (1905-06). See also Robert B.

Lee's comment to General James Longstreet at the Battle of Fredericksburg: "It is well the war is terrible-we
should grow too fond of it!", quoted in JAMES M. McPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM 572 (1988).
122. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, European Union Calls U.S. Rejection of BananaProposal "Hasty," "IllConsidered," 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 186 (Feb. 4,1998) (explaining the United States believed the Appellate
Body had ruled against separate tariff-rate quota regimes, whereas the EC did not read the Report in this manner).
123. See Barshefsky Hails PrecedentialValue of WTO PanelReport on EU Bananas, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 952 (May 28, 1997); Neil Buckley, WTO'Attacks EU BananaLicensing Arrangements, FIN. TIMES, May
24-25, 1997, at 4; USTR Hails FinalReport Upholding U.S. Complaint on EU Banana Scheme, 14 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 810 (May 7, 1997).
124. See EUAppeals WTO Decisionon BananaImport Regime, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1071 (June 18,
1997); Frances Williams, EU Appeals Against WTO BananaRuling, FIN.TIMES, June 12, 1997, at 8.
125. See Rossella Brevetti, WTO Appellate Body Affirms U.S. Victory in BananaDispute with EU, 14 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1518 (Sept. 10, 1997).
126. See U.S. Wants EU to ChangeBananaQuota,Not Offer Compensation,in WTO Dispute, 14 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1564 (Sept. 17, 1997); Emma Tucker, Firm U.S. Line on Banana Trade,FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1997,
at 3. In theory, compensation could take the form of reduced tariffs on specified American imports into the EC.
127. See Frances Williams, EU Accepts Ruling on BananaRegime, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at 4.
128. See EU Offers Vague Pledge to Implement WTO Ruling on BananaImportRegime, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA)1835 (Oct. 22, 1997); Frances Williams, EU to ConsiderBanana Options, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at
7.
Technically, the EC did implement modifications, effective 1 January 1999, which it had agreed to in July
1998. However, they were so minor (in brief, enlarging the quotas for non-ACP bananas, and changing the license
allocation system) that it is not too inaccurate to say they amounted to no change at all, and quite reasonable to
contend they were not in compliance with the Appellate Body's Report. See The U.S. and EU Go Bananas,FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1998, at 13. Indeed, all of the informed media sources-principally, the FinancialTunes and
InternationalTrade Reporter(BNA)--dismiss the modifications in passing, rarely bothering to provide significant
details. See, e.g., Michael Smith, EU Defies U.S. on Banana Imports,FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at 7. Perhaps the
best (or at least, most accessible) source on this topic is the USTR's invitation for comments on whether the EC
had implemented the Appellate Body's recommendations. In this Federal Register notice, the USTR compares

2000 / The Bananas War

how, and other than asking for the customary fifteen month "reasonable period" for
implementation, it did not specify a timetable. In addition, senior British government
officials called for a consumer buying campaign to favor ACP over dollar bananas,
and possibly even a boycott of dollar bananas. 129 In December 1997, after talks
among the EC, United States, and the co-complainants failed, an arbitrator was
appointed to resolve the timetable issue. The arbitrator rejected the American
argument in favor of compliance by July 1998, and gave the EC fifteen months, i.e.,
until 1 January 1999, to comply. 3 °
In January 1998, the United States rejected the EC's first set of proposals for
compliance. With respect to dollar bananas, the EC pledged to (1) maintain its
current tariff-rate quota of 2.2 million tons for Latin American bananas, (2) create
another so-called "autonomous" tariff-rate quota of 353,000 tons at a higher rate of
duty to account for the enlargement of the EC in 1995 to include Austria, Finland,
and Sweden, (3) abolish the licensing system and create a new "Banana Management
Committee," and (4) grant a share of the tariff-rate quotas to all suppliers with a
substantial interest (those with more than 10 percent of the EC import market).'
With respect to ACP bananas, the EC agreed to (1)retain the same 857,700-ton dutyfree quota for ACP bananas, and (2) not allocate individual country shares within the
total allocation for ACP countries. To be sure, the ACP countries would have
preferred to have guaranteed country shares and not have to compete among
themselves to fill the 857,700-ton quota, but they expressed overall satisfaction with
the proposals. 32 Finally, because ACP countries had received a cross-subsidy from
the dollar banana licensing system, and because that system would be abolished, the

the extant regime with the proposed changes. See 63 Fed. Reg. 56,687 (Oct. 22, 1998); USTR Requests Comments
on EU Banana Regime, Possible U.S. Response, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1782, 1783 (Oct. 28, 1998).
Not surprisingly, therefore, the continued howls of the USTR about the "changes" were provoked by the
same problems in the EC's banana preference regime that had always existed. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, EU Lashes
Out at U.S. Proposal to Retaliate Against EU over Banana, Beef Trade Policies, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1781,
1782 (Oct. 28, 1998); Daniel Pruzin, Battle Continues at WTO over EU Banana Import Rules, 15 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1570 (Sept. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Pruzin, Battle Continues at WTO]; Frances Williams, U.S. to Seek WTO
Ruling on EU Banana Plans, FIN. TIMES, July 24, 1998, at 6.
Accordingly, the discussion below proceeds on the basis that the preferential trading arrangement for
bananas was, for all legal and practical purposes, unchanged. Ofcourse, I have chronicled below the modifications
the EC first suggested in response to the Appellate Body Report, and explained the American rejection of the
proposal. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
129. See Michael A. Samuels, Financial Times, Bananas and a Great British Tradition, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
24, 1997, at 14 (letter from Michael A. Samuel to the Financial Tunes).
130. See WTO Gives EU Until 1999 to Revise Banana Import System, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 39 (Jan.
14, 1998).
131. See U.S., Latin Americans Criticize EU Move on Bananas, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 147 (Jan. 28,
1998); Frances Williams, EU Banana Proposals Rejected, FiN. TIMES, Jan. 23,1998, at 6; Gary G. Yerkey, U.S.
Rejects EU Plan to Comply with WTO Banana Ruling, U.S. Official Says, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 78 (Jan. 21,
1998); Banana Fudge by Brussels, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16,1998, at 13; Emma Tucker &Daniel Dombey, EU Banana
Quota Proposals Run into U.S. Criticism, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1998, at 14.
132. See Canute James, Producers Welcome Planned New Rules on Market Access, FIN. TIMES, July 8,
1998, at 3.
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awarding $578 million of aid to ACP countries across a ten-year
EC considered
33
period.1
Ecuador initially indicated it could live with this proposal if it were allocated a
market share that reflected the money it had spent previously on licenses." 3 But, in
February 1998 the United States and its co-complainants, including Ecuador, warned
that the EC still would be able to allocate shares to individual countries in a
discriminatory manner, and thus rejected the EC's proposal. 135 Why? The heart of
the problem with the proposal, said the United States, was the maintenance of two
tariff-rate quotas, one for ACP countries and the other for Latin America. 36 The
ACP quota of 857,700 tons greatly exceeded historical shipments, while the Latin
American quota of 2.2 million tons greatly restricted market access based on
historical shipments and growth rates. Thus, concluded the United States, the twoquota system discriminated against efficient non-ACP countries. Worse yet, ACP
countries could take shares of the 2.2 million-ton quota, but dollar banana countries
could not take any part of the 857,700-ton quota.
The United States called for an abolition of the dual tariff-rate quota scheme.
'Why not simply use a preferential tariff for ACP bananas?' the United States
queried. In other words, the United States suggested a transparent single-quota
system with duty-free treatment for ACP bananas, and a flat tariff for dollar bananas.
Worried that the Banana Management Council might perpetuate the licensing system
in a different form, the United States urged the EC to agree not to allocate shares on
the basis of historic market share. The United States also accused the EC of erecting
a new protectionist barrier by assigning a higher tariff rate to the 353,000-ton quota
for the new EC members.
The EC brushed aside these concerns. It said the Appellate Body had not ruled
against separate tariff-rate quotas, but merely concluded that the non-discrimination
provisions of GAIT Articles I and XIII apply to one or more separate regimes for
banana imports. 37 It also said that the higher tariff was less than the relevant boundout quota rate.
B. The Battle over DSU Articles 21:5-6 and 22 and the American Parallel
Track Strategy
The result of the divergent views was inevitable. The United States and EC
brawled over the proper procedure to determine whether the EC's proposals were,
in fact, consistent with the recommendations contained in the Appellate Body report.

133. See Daniel Dombey, Brussels Weighs ECU 530m Aid for Bananas,FIN.TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at 6.
134. See EcuadorSet to Drop Case, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1998, at 7.
135. See U.S., Latin American Nations Reject in WTO the EUBananaImportRevisions, 15 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 266 (Feb. 18, 1998).

136. See id.
137. See supranote 122.
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During much of 1998, the two sides offered various suggestions concerning the use
of a WTO panel or arbitral body. But, they could not agree on any one mechanism.
Their disagreement overprocedure deepened when, in March 1998, the United States
threatened to impose 100 percent retaliatory tariffs-effective 1 February 1999 if the
EC did not comply by 1 January-on $520 million worth of products ranging from
Italian pecorino cheese to Scottish cashmere sweaters.' Indeed, on 10 November
1998, the United States went one step further. It published in the Federal Register a
list of European goods that might be subject to retaliation,139 and promised to publish
the final list on 15 December."
The United States then moved to pursue a parallel track. In addition to threatened
retaliation, it would agree to WTO panel consideration of the EC's compliance or
lack thereof. In November 1998, the USTR announced it would be willing to submit
to the original WTO panel the question of whether the EC's proposals complied with
the recommendations contained in the Appellate Body Report.141 This parallel track
amounted to a significant concession. To be sure, the USTR demanded a ruling by
15 January 1999, five days before it would be entitled to ask the DSB for
retaliation.142 But, it was an olive branch of sorts because the United States had
maintained it was entitled to retaliate without such a ruling. It claimed only the need
for DSB authorization. The EC had countered that retaliation would be unlawful
without a specific ruling that its proposal was not in compliance with the Appellate
Body report.
Here, then, was yet another highly significant battle in the Bananas War. 43 At
stake was the proper procedure for challenging implementation of an adopted panel
or Appellate Body report: in advance of retaliation, was it necessary to re-submit a
dispute about compliance to the original panel, or could the winning Member
proceed directly to obtain authorization to retaliate from the DSB? The question was

138. See Frances Williams, EcuadorRaps U.S. andEUfor "Exploiting" BananaDispute, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
3, 1999, at 9.
139. See Daniel Pruzin, EU, U.S. Discuss Accelerated ProcessWithin VITO in BananaImport Showdown,
15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1996 (Dec. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Pruzin, EU, U.S. Discuss Accelerated Process];
Stephen Fidler & Neil Buckley, U.S. Threatens 100% Tax on EU Exportsin BananaTrade War, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
11, 1998, at I; Chad Bowman, U.S. Closerto TariffRetaliationAgainst EU OverBananaTrade BarriersStricken
by WTO, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1861 (Nov. 11, 1998). The actual list is found at 63 Fed. Reg. 63,099 (Nov.
10,1998).
140. See Guy de Jonquieres, Brussels Set to Soften Line on Bananas,FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at 4; Guy
deonquieres, U.S. Set to Announce PlansforEUSanctions,FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1998, at 1.
141. See Neil Buckley & Stephen Fidler, EU and U.S. Negotiators Squabble over 71metable for Banana
Talks, FIN.TIMES, Dec. 4,1998, at 6; Chad Bowman &Joe Kirwin, EU WillAgree to WTO BananaPolicyReview
Only If U.S. Drops UnilateralSanction Threat, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1964 (Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter
Bowman & Kirwin, EU Will Agree]; Frances Williams, EU and U.S. Locked in Negotiations,FIN. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1998, at 7.
142. Because the reasonable period for compliance was set to expire on 1 January 1999, the United States
had to pay attention to the twenty day period set forth in DSU Article 22:2, quoted in the text below. Applying

that time period meant that on 20 January 1999, the United States could request authorization to retaliate.
143. See also supraPart VI.B, where the implications of the battle are treated.
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critical, because it went to the heart of compliance, enforcement-indeed, the
international rule of law. Yet, on this critical question, the draftspersons of the DSU
had failed. They did not catch a serious inconsistency between DSU Articles 21:5-6
and 22:2. The United States claimed the right to go straight for DSB authorization
under DSU Article 22:2.'44 After all, that provision stated:
If the Member concerned [i.e., the losing Member] fails to bring the
measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance
therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within
the reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article
21 [i.e., a period accepted by the DSB, agreed to by the parties or, set by an
arbitrator], such Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry
of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party
having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing
mutually acceptable compensation. Ifno satisfactorycompensationhas been
agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonableperiod of
time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may
request authorizationfrom the DSB to suspend the application to the
Member concerned
of concessions or other obligationsunder the covered
45
agreements.1
The EC scoffed,' 46 citing DSU Article 21:5-6:
5. Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with
a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through
recourseto these disputesettlementprocedures,includingwhereverpossible
resort to the originalpanel. The panel shall circulate its report within 90
days after the date of referral of the matter to it. When the panel considers
that it cannot provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the
DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the
period within which it will submit its report.
6. The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of
adopted recommendations or rulings.The issue of implementation of the
recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any Member at
any time following their adoption. Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the

144. See Daniel Pruzin, Official Says WTO Members Still Disagree on Reform of Dispute Resolution
Procedure, 16 Int'lTrade Rep. (BNA) 1784,1785 (Nov. 3,1999) [hereinafter Pruzin, Official Says WTO Members
Still Disagree];Pruzin, EU, U.S. Discuss AcceleratedProcess,supranote 139.
145. DOCuMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 49, at 414 (emphasis added).
146. See Pruzin, Official Says WTO Members Still Disagree,supra note 144; Pruzin, EU, U.S. Discuss
AcceleratedProcess,supranote 139.
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issue of implementation of the recommendationsor rulingsshall be placed
on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following the date of
establishment of the reasonable period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and
shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved....147
In other words, argued the EC, it was impossible to read Article 22:2 without first
observing the clear mandate of Article 21:5-6, which was to submit a dispute about
compliance to a panel and await a ruling. The United States was trying to avoid a key
check against unilateral action, namely, to start the dispute settlement process from
scratch before retaliating against a losing Member's plan for implementing Appellate
Body recommendations. 148 After all, how could a winning Member be allowed to
judge compliance? 149 Surely, that was the province of a panel.
A number of WTO Members, including Hungary, Indonesia, India, Japan, Korea,
Switzerland, and six Central European states, sided with the EC's exegesis of the
DSU.I5° No WTO Member openly sided with the United States. The pro-EC
positions probably reflected more than genuine scholarly agreement. Many of the
countries aligning themselves with the EC must have feared the day when they
would incur the wrath of America's trade warriors. On that day, they would want the
protection of an Article 21:5 panel hearing.
Unfortunately, their self-interest blinded them to the kernel of logic in the
American position. Why should compliance by a losing Member be presumed unless
and until a panel decides otherwise? That would put the loser in the position of
judging its own compliance, with no swift corrective action available to the winner.
The loser could delay indefinitely real implementation, by tinkering with its trade
regime, submitting to a compliance hearing, making a few more minor adjustments
in response to the outcome of the hearing, submitting to another compliance hearing,
making a few more minor changes in response, and so on ad infinitum. With
inmates-the losing Members-in charge of the asylum, the WTO would be as
toothless in the enforcement of international law as the International Court of Justice.
I do not mean to suggest by the specter of a horrible endless loop that events
would go on forever without retaliation. Possibly at worst (from the American

147. DocumENTs SUPPLEmENT, supranote 49, at 413-14 (emphasis added).
148. See Guy de Jonquieres, Bananasand Beef Take Trade Conflict to the Brink, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998,
at 5; Frances Williams, U.S. Steps Up Banana Battle with EU, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1998, at 5.
149. See ParliamentDeploresU.S. Action on Bananas,but Endorses TEP, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1968

(Nov. 25, 1998) (quoting EC Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan as saying "[n]o WTO member has the right
unilaterally to judge the compliance of another, nor to be judge and jury in its own cause").

Perhaps it is ironic the EC chose to cite DSU Article 21:6. Recourse to this provision is purely facultative.
It is an option available to a winning or losing Member. Thus, the United States could raise the issue of
implementation before the DSB, but so too could the EC, under Article 21:6.

150. See Frances Williams, IslandGrowers Spike U.S. Sanctions Move, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26,1999, at 4; Guy
de Jonquieres & Frances Williams, U.S. Nears Truce with Europe Over Bananas, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23-24, 1999,

at 1; Prazin, EU, U.S. Discuss AcceleratedProcess,supranote 139.
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perspective), under a close reading of DSU Articles 21:5 and 22:6 sympathetic to the
EC position (i.e., the necessity of going through an Article 21:5 proceeding before
retaliating), the winning Member is free to retaliate after the first iteration, i.e., after
the original panel has met and found the first minor adjustment to be non-compliant,
and after the reasonable period for compliance defined in Article 21:3 has expired.
At that juncture, there ought not to be any doubt about the right to retaliate under
Article 22:6. However, even though the very right to retaliate has been established,
and even with retaliation after the first iteration, good faith implementation by the
losing Member is not assured. The losing Member still could protest that it is making
necessary modifications, and that the retaliation is unjust, or at least excessive.
Indeed, it could stress that retaliation is occurring against an offending measure-the
original measure as modified the first time-that no longer exists, because that
measure was altered after the Article 21:5 proceeding. Here, then, would be a
potentially endless loop with retaliation triggered after the first round of the battle
over compliance. Whether the prospect materializes will depend very much on the
persuasiveness of the retaliation.
In any event, at the core of the American position was not only substantive logic,
but also procedural fairness. Suppose a panel had to be called under DSU Article
21:5 to adjudicate an issue of compliance. Why should a winning Member have to
endure the normal dispute resolution procedures, particularly the sixty-day
consultation period prior to the establishment of a panel, yet again?15 1 In all
likelihood, more consultations simply advantaged the losing Member: it could delay,
still further, compliance. Instead, the original panel ought to be reconvened
immediately, it ought to be permitted to rule on a compliance plan that has not yet
taken effect,15 2 and the decision ought to be issued expeditiously (e.g., within ninety
days, as required by DSU Article 21:5, which is half the usual time given for
issuance of a panel report). 53 Otherwise, any hope the winner might have of
enforcing the initial judgment would be dashed in meaningless negotiations and
endless delays.
The American position also had an implication for the allocation of the burden
of proof in a DSU Article 21:5 hearing. Doubtless, the United States would contend
(in the Bananas context, anyway, if an Article 21:5 hearing were necessary) that a
losing Member that pleads compliance for a measure that has been modified more
than once ought to have the burden of proof that the measure indeed is in
compliance, just as the winning Member has the initial burden of proof that the first
modification to the measure is not compliant. In other words, it would be for the
winning Member to prove the offending measure as modified initially by the losing
Member still is insufficient to satisfy the relevant Panel or Appellate Body

151. See Pruzin, Battle Continues at WTO, supra note 128, at 1571.
152. See Frances Williams, U.S. and EU Clashat WTO Meeting, FIN. TimS, Sept. 23, 1998, at 7.
153. See Frances Williams, Brusselsand Washingtonin UnchartedLand,FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1998, at 12.
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recommendations. At that point, retaliation under DSU Article 22:6 is permissible.
Assuming the losing Member makes further modifications in response to the

retaliation, it will be for that Member to prove these modifications are enough and
justify an end to the sanctions.
Initially, the EC was not at all pacified by the American parallel track strategy.

Seeing it as pressure thinly veiled by a disingenuous fidelity to DSU obligations, the
EC announced in November 1998 that it would not participate in any proceeding
unless the United States suspended its threat of retaliation."5 The EC added that any
panel proceeding should focus on interpreting DSU Article 21:5, not conduct a full-

scale review of the EC's banana import rules. 55 (There is, of course, no basis in the
DSU for a Member to establish unilaterally the terms of reference of a panel, and

supposedly only the Ministerial Conference or General Council can render
interpretations of the DSU-points made by the United States.) t56 Upping the ante
still further, the EC launched a WTO challenge to Section 301, the American statute
authorizing retaliation.' 57 (In December 1999, a WTO panel essentially rejected the
EC's claims that Section 301 was inconsistent with GATI-WTO obligations.)

58But,

in December 1998, the EC reversed course and agreed to submit to an arbitration
panel the question of whether its proposals for reform of the banana preference
scheme complied with the Appellate Body's recommendations. 59 The three-person

panel began its work, considering not only the question of European compliance, but
also the level of proposed American retaliation t6°
154. See Bowman & Kirwin, EU Will Agree, supranote 141; Neil Buckley, EU Will Accept Peace Offer
ifU.S. Drops Threat,FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, at 4 [hereinafter Buckley, EU Will Accept PeaceOffer].
155. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Rejects EUInitiativeforPanelon BananaDispute, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
2091, 2092 (Dec. 16, 1998).
156. Guy de Jonquieres, Brussels Seeks to Block U.S. BananaExportSanctions, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999,
at 24.
157. See Buckley, EU WillAccept Peace Offer,supranote 154, at 4. Regarding Section 301, see supranote
46.
158. See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Panel Says Section 301 Provisions Compatible with
MultilateralTrade Rules, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 6 (Jan. 6,2000); Neil Buckley & Mark Suzman, WTO Backs
U.S. SanctionsLaw, FIN. TIM ES, Dec. 23, 1999, at 2.
159. See Neil Buckley & Guy de Jonquieres, EU Changes Tack in BananaDispute, FiN. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1998, at 11.
160. The case arose through two distinct procedures. As regards the question of compliance with Appellate
Body recommendations, Ecuador brought a complaint under DSU Article 21:5 that the EC's modifications to its
preferential trading arrangement from bananas were inadequate. See Gary Yerkey &Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Informs
WTO of Plansto Retaliate Against EU Over BananaImport Regime, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 76, 77-78 (Jan.
20,1999) [hereinafter Yerkey & Pruzin, U.S. Informs WTO of Plansto Retaliate];Frances Williams, WTO Orders
Review but Failsto Cool Tempers, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1999, at 6; EcuadorSeeks New WTO Consultationswith
EUoverltsBananaImport Regime, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1919 (Nov. 18, 1998); Frances Williams, U.S. Set
to Step Backfrom Confrontation,FIN. TbMES, Nov. 17, 1998, at 7. The United States did not reserve its third-party
rights in this action. See Yerkey & Pruzin, U.S. Informs WTO of Plans to Retaliate,supra, at 78. As regards the
question of remedy, the EC charged under DSU Article 22 that the United States was engaging in excessive
retaliation. See U.S., Latin American Nations Criticize EU for DraggingIts Feet on Banana Reforms, 16 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1241 (July 28, 1999) [hereinafter U.S., Latin American Nations Criticize EU]; Panel to
Condemn EU Regime, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999, at 4. The idea of the re-convened panel (involving, of course,
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For its part, the United States stuck to its parallel track strategy. After delaying
for a week as a courtesy to the EC Trade Commissioner, who met with United States
President William Clinton in mid-December 1998,161 the United States published on
21 December the final list of products subject to 100 percent retaliatory tariffs.'62
The courtesy barely masked the Clinton Administration's determination to force a
radical change in the EC's banana import preference scheme. So upset was the
Administration that trade officials had even considered suspending the landing rights
of European airlines-a move that certainly would have wreaked havoc in world
aviation.163 They stuck to the somewhat less dramatic, but nonetheless tried and
trusted strategy, of imposing a 100 percent penalty.'" Because a 100 percent tariff
doubles the price of an article, consumers almost invariably look for a substitute
item.'6 Hence, the article is effectively shut out of the American market. Indeed, on
only one occasion has this strategy failed to work-in 1992, during a trade dispute
with Canada, when the United States put a 100 percent duty on Canadian beer."
Americans kept buying the beer until the duty was raised to 120 percent.167

Trade Rep. (BNA) 1241 (July 28, 1999) [hereinafter U.S., Latin American Nations Criticize EU]; Panel to
Condemn EU Regime, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999. at 4. The idea of the re-convened panel (involving, of course,
the same three individual panelists) adjudicating both issues was suggested by WTO Director-General Renato
Ruggiero. See Daniel Pruzin & Mark Felsenthal, U.S. Requests WTO Meeting to ConsiderBananaRetaliation,
16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 331, 332 (Feb. 24, 1999); Frances Williams, U.S. Postpones Sanctions on EU Over
Bananas,FN. TIMEs, Jan. 30-31, 1999, at 4; Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU Agree to Hold Talks in
Effort to Reach BananaCompromise, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 160, 161 (Jan. 27, 1999).
A key issue between the United States and EC was the deadline by which the panel would have to complete
its work. The United States insisted on a ruling as to the appropriate level of retaliation by midnight of 1 March
1999-a time driven by the arbitrator's 1January 1999 date for EC compliance, DSUrules on retaliation, and also
relevant deadlines in Section 301. The EC said a ruling on retaliation could not logically come before a ruling on
whether its proposed modifications to the banana preference scheme complied with the Appellate Body's
recommendations. Essentially, the United States won the argument, as its DSU Article 22 case was allowed to
move forward. The parties agreed a ruling on the level of retaliation would be due before 2 March, and a ruling
on compliance would come by 12 April. However, the United States agreed to suspend a request it had made to
the DSB on 25 January 1999 for authorization to retaliate until the ruling on retaliation was issued. See Gary G.
Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Issues FinalLirt of EuropeanImports to be Hit with HigherDuties in BananaRow,
16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 621,623 (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Yerkey & Pruzin, U.S. Issues Final List]; EU's
Brittan UpsAnte in BananaDispute, ThreatensRetaliationAgainst UnitedStates, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 279,
280 (Feb. 17, 1999); Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU Head OffShowdown on Bananas as Europe
Agrees to New ProceduralTwist, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 189, 190 (Feb. 3, 1999). As explained below, the
panel was unable to issue its ruling on retaliation until 6 April, on which date it issued its compliance ruling, a
few days ahead of schedule. See infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
161. See Guy deJonquieres & Frances Williams, U.S. Holds ItsFire in BananaBattle, FIN.TIMEs, Dec. 16,

1998, at 10.
162. See How the Dispute Unfolded, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 8. 1999, at 4.

163. See Helene Cooper, Why Does U.S. Pickon Pecorinoin Flap with EU on Bananas?,WALL ST. J., Mar.
1, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Cooper, Why Does U.S. Pickon Pecorino].
164. Il
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 1&
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Thus, the "Smoot-Banana Tariffs," as the Wall Street Journaldubbed them, 6 '
were set to be staggering in size and scope. They would affect $520 million of goods
annually from thirteen EC countries, with the biggest impact on (in order) the United
Kingdom, Italy, France, and Germany. 69 (The $520 million figure was the USTR's
estimate of the annual damage done to the American economy by the EC's banana
import regime.) 70 Only Denmark and Holland would be spared. 17' Among the
principal imports, and their countries of origin, would be: plastic goods (e.g., nonadhesive plates, sheets, film, foil, polymer strips, and propylene strips), exported
mainly by France and Germany; biscuits, exported by every target country except
Finland and Luxembourg; cashmere sweaters, exported almost entirely by the United
Kingdom; handbags, exported by France, Germany, and Italy; lead-acid batteries,
exported mainly by Italy and the United Kingdom; greeting cards, exported
overwhelmingly by the United Kingdom; bed linen, exported mainly by Portugal and
Spain; light fittings, exported by France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.' Small wonder
why the Italian government-and behind the scenes, probably others too-began
urging the EC to retreat and settle the dispute once and for all.'73 European
businesses were complaining loudly about the cross-sectoral retaliation. The chief
executive of one Italian company whose light fitting manufactured products would
be hit with the 100 percent tariff called the sanctions "a return to the Middle
Ages." 74 The director of an Italian cheese cooperative lamented "Why us? The
enemy is France. Italy doesn't have any colonies."' 75
By early March 1999, the panel still had not completed its work, and the United
States continued with the other of its parallel tracks. On 3 March, it took another
arguably aggressive move designed to force more than cosmetic changes in the EC's
banana import preference scheme. The United States ordered importers of targeted
products to post with the Customs Service a bond of 100 percent of the value of the
duties that would be imposed on those products if the WTO panel ruled in its

168. See The Smoot-Banana Tariffs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1999, at A14.
169. See Kevin Brown, Sanctions Threat Starts to Tell [hereinafter Brown, Sanctions Threat], FIN. TIMES,

Jan. 27, 1999, at 6; Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Unveils Final List of EU Imports to be Hit with Punitive Tariffs in
Banana Dispute, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2131 (Dec. 23, 1998); Guy de Jonquieres et al., U.S. Unveils "Hit
List" in EU Trade Dispute, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1998, at 1.
170. See Yerkey & Pruzin, U.S. Informs WTO of Plansto Retaliate,supranote 160, at 77.
171. See Brown, Sanctions Threat,supra note 169.
172. Id.; see also Helene Cooper, U.S. Starts its ThreatenedBanana Fightwith Europe, WALL ST. J., Mar.
4, 1999, at A2.
173. See James Blitz & Frances Williams, ItaliansUrge EUtoRetreatin BananaDisputewith the U.S., FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at 6.
174. Quoted in ExportersApoplectic at Being Placedin BananasFiringLine, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999,
at 7.
175. See Cooper, Why Does U.S. Pick on Pecorino, supra note 163, at Al (quoting an Italian business
executive).
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favor.' 76 Not unreasonably, the EC growled that the United States had "fanned the

flames ofthe dispute:"' even conditional sanctions were unlawful, because they had
not been authorized by the DSB. 75
C. Vindicationfor the United States

The long-awaited arbitral panel ruling came on 6 April 1999.179 For the fifth time
in six years, the GATT-WTO published a ruling condemning the EC's preferential
trading arrangement for bananas. 80 The latest decision was a near-complete

vindication for the United States. The arbitral panel agreed that the EC's
modifications to its banana import regime fell short of satisfying the Appellate

176. See Gary G. Yerkey, Euro-AmericanBusiness Group Urges Presidentto Intervene in BananaDispute,
16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 546 (Mar.31, 1999); Frances Williams, WTO Urges Brussels and US. to Resolve
BananaStand-off,FIN.TIMEs, Mar. 9,1999, at 18 [hereinafter Williams, WTO UrgesBrusselsand U.S. to Resolve
Banana Stand-oft]; Guy de Jonquieres & Nancy Dunn, A Partnershipin Peril,FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at 15;
Canute James & George Parker, U.S. Faces CaribbeanThreat to Quit Drugs Treaty, FIN. TIMES, Mar.8, 1999,
at 1 [hereinafter James & Parker, U.S. Faces CaribbeanThreat];Frances Williams, WTO Summons Emergency
Meeting over BananaDispute, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 6-7, 1999, at 3; Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Imposes
Customs Liabilityfor Sanctions Against EU in Banana Dispute, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 348 (Mar. 3,1999).
It appears that in some instances, a bond of only 3 percent was required. See Guy de Jonquieres et al., Trade War
Escalates as EU Fights U.S. Sanctions Move, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at 1.
The customs law aspects of how this process works are worth noting. In a normal import transaction, the
importer of an article files entry documents with the United States Customs Service and pays estimated duties.
Estimated duties are based on the tariff category of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) in which the article
falls. After several months, the Customs Service determines the final duty owed. The importer pays, or receives,
as the case may be, any difference between the estimated and final duty. At that point, the entry of the article is
liquidated. "Liquidation" means the final duty has been paid, and all attendant paperwork completed.
In the Bananas War, an importer of a targeted article became obligated not only to pay the estimated duty
on that article, but also to post a bond with the Customs Service. The bond was a surety bond supplied by a surety
company approved by the Customs Service, and its face value equaled the import value of the article. (Usually,
the import value of an article is the invoice value.) Liquidation of the entry of the targeted article was suspended
until final WTO adjudication of the retaliation issue. In practice, this meant liquidation was suspended for nearly
a year. See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, ImportersMay Delay Payment, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 6-7, 1999, at 3.
177. See Guy de Jonquieres & Gerard Baker, U.S. Begins Sanctions as EU Banana Dispute Deepens, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at 12 (quoting EC Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan).
178. See Williams, WTO UrgesBrussels and U.S. to Resolve Banana Stand-off,supra note 176, at 18.
179. See EU Changes to BananaImportRegime Will Take More Tme,Brittan Cautions,16 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 776 (May 5, 1999); Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Says EU Banana Regime Violates World Trade Rules, US. to
Impose Sanctions, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 566 (Apr. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Yerkey, WTO Says]. Technically,
two rulings were issued. See supra note 160. In the first, Ecuador was victorious in proving the EC's proposed
modifications did not comply with the Appellate Body's recommendations. In the second, the EC was able to
persuade the panel to reduce the appropriate level of retaliation. Ecuador later asked for DSB authorization to
retaliate against the EC. See infra note 234.
180. The Bananas l and HIreports were issued by GATT panels on 3 June 1993 and I1 February 1994,
respectively. See supraPart Hl.A and note 22. The WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports were issued on 22 May
and 9 September 1997, respectively. See supranote 1.The arbitral decision on retaliation was adopted by the DSB
on 19 April, and the decision on compliance on 6 May 1999. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Formally Adopts EU
BananaRuling; Ecuadorto Seek Compensationfor Damages, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 798 (May 12, 1998);
At Daggers Drawn, ECONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at 17.
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Body's recommendations.'18 In fact, they amounted to nothing more than a rewriting of the old rules in the hopes of avoiding compliance. Consequently, the
Panel said, the United States was justified in retaliating against the EC.183 The only
consolation for the EC was that the panel trimmed the amount of appropriate
retaliation, from $520 million down to $191.4 million.'"
The battle rhetoric from Washington, D.C. was splendidly vindictive. Said the
USTR's negotiator, Peter Scher. "We have been patient as the EU tried to deflect
guilt with cries of U.S. unilateralism. Now the EU will pay the price."'185 Following
its rhetoric with action, the USTR published on 9 April a revised schedule of targeted
products, one based largely on the December 1998 list, albeit trimmed considerably
to conform with the arbitral ruling. The United States also endured the formality of
obtaining DSB authorization for retaliation on 19 April,' 86 and began imposing the
100 percent retaliatory tariff (retroactive to 3 March 1999). 87 The targeted products
included: batteries, bath preparations, and lithographs from the United Kingdom;
various paper products (e.g., uncoated felt paper and paperboard) and lithographs,
mainly from the United Kingdom; handbags from France and Italy; bed linen,
largely from France and Italy; and electro-thermic coffee and tea makers from
Germany.'" The DSB authorization was historic: it was the first time the WTO had
authorized the use of sanctions.'" Only once in the pre-Uruguay Round era had
sanctions been agreed upon-a 1952 case in which the GATr allowed the
Netherlands to implement quotas on imports of American wheat flour.19
What about the dispute between the United States and EC over the interpretation
of DSU Articles 21:5-6 and 22:2? The arbitral panel found the wording of the two

181. See U.S., Latin American Nations CriticizeEU, supra note 160.
182. See David Sanger, Ruling Allows Tariffs by U.S. Over Bananas,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,1999, at Cl.
183. See EU Changes to BananaImportRegime Will Take More Tune, supra note 179.

184. See Yerkey, WTO Says, supra note 179. The American calculation had been an all-inclusive one
covering, for example, consequential damages like potential sales of fertilizer to Latin American banana growers
that would have been made but for the EC's banana import scheme. The arbitral panel said the level of retaliation

ought to be the difference between the effect on American trade of (1) the EC's banana import regime that ran
afoul of GAT-WTO rules and (2) a WTO-consistent regime. See Yerkey & Ptuzin, U.S. Issues FinalList, supra
note 160.
185. Quoted in Nancy Dunne, U.S. Claims Victory in LatestRound of BananaTrade War,FIN.TIMES, Apr.

7,1999, at 16.
186. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Backs U.S. BananaSanctionRequest, Wrangling Continuesover Retroactive
Duties, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 660 (Apr. 21,1999).

187. See Yerkey, WTO Says, supra note 179. The United States picked 3 March to commence collection
of the bond because this was the original date on which the arbitral panel's decision was due. See Daniel Pruzin,
U.. Blocks EU RequestforBananaPanel While HormoneBeeflssueSimmersat WFO, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
945 (June 2, 1999) [hereinafter Pruzin, US..Blocks E.U. Request].

188. See Frances Williams, EU "Needs 8 Months to EndBanana Crisis," FIN. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at 7;
Nancy Dunne, U.S. to Impose Sanctions in BananaDispute,FIN TIMES, Apr. 10-11, 1999, at 4.

189. See Dunne, supranote 188, at 4.
190. See id.
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Articles "apparently irreconcilable." 19' It declined to resolve the matter, pointing

out-correctly-that a definitive solution was for the WTO to reach under the
auspices of its review of the operation of the DSU. t92 Nevertheless, it tipped its hat

in favor of the American position. The panel agreed that a winning Member would
be prevented from invoking its Article 22 right of retaliation if it were forced into a

new panel proceeding on compliance under Article 21:5.' 9 After all, Article 22:2
gives the winning Member just twenty days after the deadline for compliance to
request DSB authorization for retaliation, but completion of a new panel case would
take considerably longer than that. Thus, insisting on an Article 21:5 hearing would
render the Article 22 deadline, and thereby the all-important right attached to it,

meaningless.'
France, Spain, and Portugal lobbied the EC to appeal the 6 April arbitral
decision.195 The other twelve EC member states had cooler heads, or simply had no

energy for prolonging what had become a war of attrition.'9 6 The EC announced it
accepted the ruling (quibbling only about the retroactive imposition of retaliatory
duties). 97 However, the EC announced it would need at least 8 months-i.e., until
early 2000-to develop a plan for reforming its preferential trading arrangement for
bananas. 198 After all, the EC had to please the competing interests of the United
States (which sought an abolition of the tariff-rate quotas and licensing system), the

ACP countries (which were entitled to preferences under the Lome Convention), and
other Latin American producers, including the BFA countries (which demanded fair
market access).

The EC' s concern about the retroactive imposition ofretaliatory duties did result
in yet another panel report, but this time, one in favor of the EC.' 9 On 13 March

191. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Isolated on Sequencing Issues at WTO Dispute Reform Negotiations, 16 Int'l

Trade Rep. (BNA) 1171 (July 14, 1999) [hereinafter Pruzin, U.S. Isolated].
192. See Yerkey & Pruzin, U.S. Issues FinalList, supranote 160, at 623.

193. See id. at 622.
194. See ii.
195. See Williams, supranote 188, at 7.

196. See Joe Kirwin, EULeaningAgainstAppeal of BananaRuling; Decision CouldEndBitterBattlewith
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2000, a WTO panel issued an interim report upholding the EC's charge that the
USTR's decision to take action on 3 March 1999, before obtaining WTO
authorization, was inconsistent with the DSU. (The WTO published the final ruling
on 19 April.) After all, the United States had suspended liquidation of entries of EC
imports worth $520 million as of 3 March 1999 (one day after the arbitration
decision was due; on 2 March the arbitrators informed the United States and EC they
needed more time to make a decision). In contrast, the arbitral ruling authorizing
retaliation and setting the amount did not come until 6 April 1999, and the DSB did
not formally approve the American request to apply the sanctions until 19 April (on
which day the USTR published the final list of targeted imports). And the United
States had applied the 100 percent retaliatory duty retroactively to the earlier date (3
March), requiring importers to post bond to cover the duty as of that earlier date.
The panel agreed with the EC. The United States had been wrong to act
unilaterally and prematurely. The precise technical violation committed? Article 23
of the DSU,under which Members must avoid self-determinations of violations and,
instead, must follow the procedures laid out in Articles 21 (on surveillance and
implementation of recommendations and rulings) and 22 (on compensation and
suspension of concessions).
No matter, however. The EC's victory was a small and hardly face-saving one
in a long series of humiliating defeats in the Bananas War. True, no longer could the
United States claim it had based every decision about retaliation on the basis of
GAT-WTO requirements. Still, in the grander scheme of the War, it was a mere
irritant for the United States to which one could almost hear the USTR utter with a
twinkle "whoops, sorry."
D. Reform Options

In May 1999, the EC went to work. After consulting with the United States, ACP
countries, and Latin American countries, it unveiled three basic reform options.
Their options bore some resemblance to the suggestions of the arbitral panel in its
decision of 6 April 1999. The panel had urged a tariff-only arrangement with a
preference for ACP bananas (e.g., duty-free treatment). °° In the alternative, the
panel had suggested maintaining the existing tariff-rate quota categories, but
supplementing them with a global tariff-rate quota. °1 The new quota would have no
country-specific allocations whatsoever, or it would have country-specific
allocations agreed to after direct negotiations with supplier countries. 201

200. See European Commission Outlines Optionsfor Resolving BananaDispute with U.S., 16 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 944 (2 June 1999).
201. See id.

202. See i.
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Unfortunately, the panel gave no particular guidance to the EC on what to do with
its hated licensing system.'0
The first of the EC's proposed options was to abandon the tariff-rate quota
system entirely.2°4 In its place would be a tariff-only system, and thus there would
be no need for a system for distributing licenses to import within quotas. A high flatrate tariff would be imposed on banana imports, °5 but bananas from ACP countries
would be given duty-free access.' Possibly some compensation would be paid to
Latin American exporters. 207 This option had the support of EC members
encouraging greater liberalization, notably Denmark, Germany, Holland, and
Sweden. °8 It also promised the EC a high degree of autonomy in its banana import
policy, as the United States would have no say in the level at which the EC set the
tariff.209 Still, the United States liked the option, seeing it as the simplest and most
WTO-consistent. 2"° However, the problem with a tariff-only regime was that it
would have an uncertain
effect on the EC's budget and pose a threat to the poorest
211
ACP countries.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the EC emphasized that this was a high tariff option.
The United States suggested an appropriate tariff would be $125 per ton.21 2 The EC
had in mind a duty more than double this suggestion. 23 The Chief Market Economist
at Australia's Centre for International Economics, Brent Borrell, remarked incisively
that a duty of $295 a ton would be devastating for non-ACP exporters. 214 That duty

would translate into an ad valorem rate of 110 percent.215 If imposed, then the
competitive advantage of Latin American producers would be wiped out.216 Who
would benefit? African suppliers. The removal of the 857,700-ton tariff-rate quota
for ACP bananas would mean ACP suppliers could export all they wanted to the EC.
The most efficient of the ACP producers-the Africans-would take market share
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206. See Smith, Brussels Offers Options, supra note 204, at 4.
207. See id.
208. See Joseph Kirwin, EU Ministers Slip into Three Camps over ProspectiveBananaImport Regime, 16
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from the Latin Americans. The African producers would have unlimited, duty-free
access to the EC, whereas their Latin American competitors chafed under a virtually
prohibitive tariff.217 Of course, Europeans would continue to pay stratospheric prices
for their yellow fruit. In sum, whether a tariff-only option could bring peace in the
Bananas War would depend on the level of the tariff.
As for the second reform option, the EC proposed that the quantitative limit of
857,700 tons on imports of bananas from ACP countries could be eliminated. 2 18 This
option, favored by a number of EC countries, 219 would allow ACP countries to export
as many bananas as they liked, duty-free, to the EC.2 ° This option would not cut into
the EC's revenues, and it would please the ACP countries. 22' However, it would be
of no benefit to Latin American producers, 2 and it would not result in any increase
in the number of bananas American companies could export to the EC.m After all,
it would be only a modest change in the existing preferential trading arrangement.
It would leave the other two tariff-rate quotas-for third-country bananas, and for
non-traditional ACP bananas-intact, 224 along with the licensing system.
Finally, it would be possible to create a new tariff-rate quota to supplement the
existing three. 22 The volume would be higher than the existing ACP quota, 26 i.e.,
greater than 857,700 tons. Under the new scheme, a portion of the quota for ACP
bananas would be combined with a portion of the quota for Latin American
bananas. 227 Both categories of exporters could make use of the new tariff-rate quota,
though ACP bananas would receive duty-free treatment." Thus, the new tariff-rate
quota would be a zero-tariff quota for ACP bananas in excess of the 857,700-ton
limit, and would be available for non-ACP bananas at a set duty rate.
Under this option, one possible rule for distributing licenses for the new tariffrate quota would be first-come, first-served.m A second possibility would be
distribution through auctions, with separate auctions for the different tariff rates.230
The third option appeared to have the support of Ecuador,0' though it clearly was
the most complex of the three possibilities. Indeed, it would render the existing
217. See id.
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scheme all the more byzantine. Its principal saving grace seemed to be that

depending on the duty level set for the new tariff-rate quota, there might be no harm
to the EC's budget revenues. 3 2

As intimated above, the very fact that the EC put three options on the table
meant that its member states could not reach a consensus around one option. To

make matters worse, some of them-led by France and the United
Kingdom--deplored all three options.3 3 A very different position was taken by a
number of Latin American countries, including Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, and Panama, and reinforced by the United States. 234 They said the EC

232. See EuropeanCommission Outlines Optionsfor Resolving BananaDispute with U.S., supranote 200.
233. See Kirwin, EU MinistersSlip into Three Camps,supra note 208.
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would not be "practicable or effective" to do so. See DSU Art. 22.3(b), reprintedin DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 49, at 415. Because Ecuador imported raw materials and capital goods from the EC, raising tariffs on
those items would have a deleterious effect on Ecuador's economy. Therefore, it decided to forego the
conventional retaliation strategy, electing to seek permission to suspend concessions on European intellectual
property rights in the sectors of(1) geographical indications (e.g., wines and spirits), (2) copyrights of performers,
sound recordings (e.g., recorded music), and broadcast organizations (e.g., for films), (3) industrial (e.g., clothing)
designs, and (4) wholesale distribution of services (e.g., access rights). See EcuadorSeeks Sanctions over EU
Banana Policy, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1999, at 4; Daniel Pruzin, Ecuadorto Ask for WTO Approval to Retaliate
Against EU in BananaDispute, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1881 (Nov. 17,1999). Thirteen of the 15 EC member
states would be targeted; only Denmark and Holland would be spared. The EC sought and obtained WTO
arbitration as to the level of Ecuador's retaliation. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO to ArbitrateEcuador's Demandto
Retaliate in BananaImport Dispute, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1922, 1923 (Nov. 24, 1999); Frances Williams,
EcuadorSeeks to Retaliate in BananaDispute, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 21-22, 1999, at 4.
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www.wto.org.) Nevertheless, the panel accepted Ecuador's argument that it could not impose sanctions simply
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25, 2000); Frances Williams, EcuadorGiven Green Light on Trade Sanctions,FIN. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at 7.
The panel was right to accept the argument, for Ecuador's case was strong. Primary commodities and
investment goods account for 85 percent of Ecuador's imports from the EU, and include inputs in the domestic
manufacturing process. The largest consumer imports from the EU to Ecuador are (as of 1999) about $4 million
worth of dictionaries and encyclopedias from Spain, and about $3.5 million worth of lamp bases from
Germany-hardly key targets that would force a change in the preferential trading arrangement for bananas. See
Pruzin; Williams, supra.
However, Ecuador's victory may yet lead to a new problem: how can the level of cross-sectoral retaliation
be verified, particularly when it involves sanctions against intangible assets? The DSB gave Ecuador a green light
to halt royalty payments on sound recordings and television programs, and to suspend protection for industrial
designs and geographical indications on wines and spirits. See Pnizin; Williams, supra.Yet, the monetary value
of these sanctions (plus those Ecuador took against goods) could not exceed $201.6 million annually. Maybe the
value of "embargoed" royalty payments could be calculated, but what about the value of suspended property
rights? Would the correct measure be lost profits as a result of "authorized" pirating? If so, what would be the best
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lacked the will to reform its illegal banana import regime, and was engaging in
selective interpretation of the 6 April arbitral panel report." 5
By September 1999, the tariff-only option was gaining ground within the EC.z1 6
Some EC member states appeared to feel that on the merits, it would be the best way

to satisfy all-or most-interested parties. They also seemed realistic; the other
options probably would re-ignite the dispute. For its part, the United States was
frustrated that the EC had not moved with alacrity to modify its regime. In Congress,
a new weapon for America's trade arsenal was proposed: the carousel approach.
Under the "Carousel Retaliation Act," the USTR would have to switch targeted

products 120 days after it drew up the initial retaliation list, and every 180 days

thereafter237 The idea was to create uncertainty among European exporters, and

thereby compel them to pressure their leaders in Brussels to comply with WTO
rulings. The idea was also foolishly counterproductive: it would create the same
uncertainty as to costs among American importers of the potentially targeted
products, as well as among businesses and individuals that use those products.238

Nevertheless, the proposed legislation-which was not enacted-served to highlight
just how apt the analogy between the Bananas War and a real shooting war had

become.
Indeed, by May 2000, reality and the analogy took yet another step toward one

another. Through the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (H.R. 434),239 a piece of
legislation focused largely on amending the Generalized System of Preferences to
extend duty-free treatment to certain products from sub-Saharan African countries,

Congress resurrected the carousel retaliation idea. Section 407 of the 2000 Act
mandates USTR review of retaliation lists every 180 days when countries whose

way to estimate such losses?
By raising these questions I do not mean to cast doubt on the wisdom of cross-sectoral retaliation. If the DSU
really is meant, interalia, to create a level playing field among developing and developed countries, then crosssectoral retaliation is essential. There are destined to be plenty of developing countries in future cases in Ecuador's
position. These countries, by definition, do not boast diversified economies. They are critically dependent, to one
degree or another, on various imported goods and services. What will be needed to assist them in "hitting back"
at intransigent developed countries in a forceful but fair manner is a body of WTO jurisprudence on how to
measure and monitor the magnitude of retaliation in different sectors. The Ecuador case may be the seed for this
jurisprudence.
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products have been targeted fail to comply with adverse rulings.24° The USTR argued
unsuccessfully against the legislation, saying it already had the discretion to change

products on a retaliation list.241 But unable to resist the overall package of trade
benefits for Africa in the bill, President Clinton signed the 2000 Act into law on 18

May 2000. Shortly thereafter, the EU commenced dispute settlement proceedings
against the carousel retaliation provision, thus setting off another potential battle in
the Bananas War. 24 2 Significantly, the EU was not the only one to complain.
American importers-especially small businesses-chafed at the uncertainty created
by the carousel mechanism, and at the prospect of suffering heavy losses, even

insolvency,24as
a result of retaliatory tariffs, and hence sought a statutory exemption
3
from them.
In October 1999, the EC came up with yet another reform option, which it
approved on 10 November: 244 a hybrid. A tariff-only system would be introduced on

1 January 2006.245 At that point, banana exporters would have unlimited access to
EC markets .246 Until then, a transitional tariff-rate quota system would be used, and
ACP countries could take advantage of the time by readying themselves for the move

to the tariff-only system. 247 The 857,700-ton ACP tariff-rate quota would be replaced
by a new quota of 850,000 tons that would be open to all exporters.24 8 ACP suppliers

would have duty-free access for in-quota shipments, and their out-of-quota
shipments would be subject to a maximum tariff of 275 euros per ton.249 All
shipments from non-ACP producers would face the 275 euros per ton tariff."0
Possibly, the tariff could be revised according to an auction system.

St

However,

during the transition period, the main EC quota of about 2.2 million tons would be
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retained.5 2 It would be available to all suppliers, i.e., ACP and non-ACP countries. 25 3
Shipments of ACP bananas would enter duty-free. In-quota shipments of non-ACP
bananas would be subject to a low tariff (75 euros per ton), and out-of-quota
shipments would be assessed at a higher rate.2 Import licenses for the main quota
would be distributed on a first-come, first-serve basis. 25 For the new 850,000-ton
quota, a new "striking price system!'' would be used to distribute licenses. First, the
lowest level of bidding at which the quota could be filled would be determined. 7
Then, that level would be applied to all operators and assessed in relation to the
quantities for which they have put forward a bid.2 s
Initially, the USTR's response was lukewarm, maintaining a tilt in favor of a
tariff-only regime with a simple zero tariff preference for ACP bananas. 9 After
further review, it-along with Latin American trade officials-rejected the
proposal. 260 The 275 euro per ton tariff applicable to the new 850,000 quota was seen
as far too high (100-110 euros per ton was thought to be more realistic).26t More
generally, the hybrid proposal was the proverbial "worst of all worlds." Substituting
one tariff-rate quota for another, and using a striking price system to distribute
licenses for the new quota, hardly reduced complexity. Retaining the main tariff-rate
quota meant harboring all of its discriminatory implications. Putting off a tariff-only
regime meant perpetuating unfairness for six years. Small wonder why the United
States and Latin America counseled the EC to cease trying to please all
constituencies, and to focus on complying with the Appellate Body's
recommendations.
As of this writing, a final settlement has yet to be reached. One promising
possibility, which received the backing of the United States, was offered by
Caribbean nations in December 1999.262 Under the Caribbean proposal, ultimately
a tariff-only system would take hold, though exactly when would have to be
negotiated.26 During the transition period, there would be a two-tier tariff rate quota
252. See Ecuador to Ask for WTO Approval to Retaliate Against EU in Banana Dispute, supra note 234;
Michael Smith, Brussels Backs Plan for End to Banana War, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999, at 11. The 353,000-ton
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regime. The first tier would be a 2.7 million ton quota, equal to about 60 percent of
the EC banana market.2 4 The EC would establish a tariff rate for this quota and
apply it equally to ACP and non-ACP bananas.2 There would be no countryspecific allocations. 2 Import licenses would be distributed for*96.5 percent of the
quota volume based on the average of each qualified operator's pre-1993 average
2 68
import volume. 267 The second-tier tariff-rate quota would be set at 850,000 tons.
A tariff of about $116 per ton would be applied to non-ACP bananas.2 9 However,
ACP bananas would receive some margin of preference, and thus continue to receive
protection for their exports. 70 Licenses for 96.5 percent of the bananas in this tier
would be allocated on the basis of the 1995-97 reference period.271
The Caribbean proposal appeared to have at least five virtues. First, it probably
would meet GATT-WTO rules. Licenses distribution would reflect bona fide historic
trade. Moreover, there would be no artificial reservation of quota allotments for
individual countries. The preference for ACP countries would be within the confines
of the Lome Convention waiver, namely, a departure from the MFN principle in the
form of a tariff preference. Second, distributors of Latin American bananas, like
Chiquita and Dole, would not be hampered by individual country quota allotments,
nor by complex and discriminatory license distribution rules. Therefore, they could
look forward to expanding their business in the EC, though perhaps not as
aggressively as they might like. Third, the molly-coddled European banana
companies importing ACP bananas would not lose all of their income immediately.
They would still benefit from the second-tier quota. Fourth, the preferential
treatment granted to ACP countries in the second tier would afford their banana
exports a temporary measure of protection. They had the opportunity to use the time
wisely to diversify their economies. Finally, in the end, there would be no quotas and
no licenses. The long-run goal was a tariff-only system, presumably one in which
ACP bananas would receive duty-free or low-duty treatment under a Lome
Convention waiver granted by the WTO.
Yet, there was an irony lurking in the Caribbean proposal. Despite the legal
results of the Bananas War, in the form of WTO panel and Appellate Body reports,
or maybe because of them, there was no contemplation of free global trade in
bananas. Perhaps not even--or not especially-Chiquita could stomach the outcome
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that would most benefit consumers around the world.272 Even the eventual and
vaunted tariff-only system would confer a preference on countries lacking a
comparative advantage in banana production. In other words, so near and so dreadful
was the War that law, molested by the ongoing politics of the War, could not impel
the combatants to an economically simple, rational outcome.
VI. LESSONS FROM THE BANANAS WAR

Consequences,of course, cannot be foreseen.
Experience can, by contrast,all too easily be projected into thefuture.
John Keegan, The FirstWorld War 426 (1999).
I shall not presume to be able to draw conclusively all of the lessons from the
Bananas War. The War is too recent a memory for that. For instance, time shall give
us all a much better perspective on just how seriously the War has damaged the
credibility of the WTO. Yet no matter how much time has passed, I wonder whether
a definitive list is ever possible after any major conflagration. We continue to gain
new insights from Homer's epic poem The Illiad 73 roughly three thousand years
after the Greeks fought the Trojan War (as well as from ancient Greek historians
such as Herodotus and Thucydides on the Persian and Pelopennesian Wars,
respectively). We shall always stare out at Qadesh, in modem Syria, and wonder
about the tremendous battle between Ramesses II and the I-ittites-how the events
unfolded there in about 1274 B.C.,7r4 and why. These ancient conflicts always will
dwarf the Bananas War in every respect imaginable. Yet, I dare say that in several
decades, international trade scholars and practitioners will look back at the Bananas
War and see new consequences of which no hint is, or could be, made now.
Nonetheless, at this early juncture, clouded as my judgment may be given the
recency of the Bananas War, I should like to venture a few possibilities. I believe a
few lessons can be seen coming up from the still-smouldering battle fields, though
I cannot project into the future the order of importance of each lessons. Some lessons
may prove insignificant, overtaken by legal or economic developments, while other
lessons may wind up dominating the post-War debate. Most importantly, it would
be Pollyannaish to think that even the lessons mentioned below have been, or will
ever be, learned well by the international trading community. Some lessons might
be, and in these instances international trade law history will move progressively
forward toward a just constitution under which WTO Members interact for mutual
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benefit with minimal conflict and maximum sovereign freedom.275 But, if the history
of other conflicts-economic, political, or military-is any guide, other lessons will
be ignored, misunderstood, or not fully appreciated. In turn, the avoidable blunders
of the past will find new outlets in the multilateral trading system.
A. Trade and the English Language: How Not to Write
It may come as a surprise that I advance a point about writing style as the first
lesson of the Bananas War. To anyone who has endured each line of the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports, this ordering will be emotionally, if not logically, welljustified. My point is simple: two major features of my labor, concerning Parts l-IV,
should have been unnecessary. My solution is straightforward, though demanding:
learn how to write better.
First, I should not have had to write Part II of this article. Its content should be
readily accessible to anyone reading the Panel and Appellate Body Reports. Yet,
these Reports make a mockery of the transparency value embodied in GATE Article
X. The Reports are anything but transparent. I approached Part II as a vehicle for
providing at least a modicum of clarity-to put it bluntly, if rudely, to help readers,
and myself, figure out what the hell is going on.
Neither Report contains a clear, concise discussion of the facts. The discussion
that appears in the Panel Report requires a prodigious amount of study, and even
then several points remain uncertain. The reader may well feel stupid, until the
thought occurs that perhaps some of the panelists themselves lacked a complete
grasp of all of the facts. After all, that which one knows very well one ought to be
able to communicate in very simple terms. Panelists and Appellate Body members
need to remember what law professors know only too well: everything in a case
ultimately turns on the facts. Hence, a full discussion of them is a fundamental
element of any report. Without it, no one can figure out the legal points at issue. In
turn, the reasoning and recommendations lack force-even legitimacy-and any
precedential value the report might have, that is, any contribution it might otherwise
make to an emerging body of common law on international trade, is weakened.
I am not suggesting that every fact must be recounted in gory detail. The starting
point must always be that a short, sweet presentation of the relevant facts will do
quite nicely. The length of the discussion necessarily depends on the nature of the
dispute, and I would not sacrifice transparency for brevity. Having said this, both
Reports in the Bananas War are far too long-but not because of a dilated discussion
of the facts.
Rather, dozens and dozens of pages could be saved by deleting the regurgitation
of the arguments of the complainant, respondent, and third parties (and only some

275. I have elsewhere discussed this Hegelian conception of history as applied to international trade law.
See Bhala, Hegelian Reflections, supra note 10, at 214-24.
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of these saved pages would be spent on an improved discussion of the facts, yielding
a net decrease in length). In at least some, if not the majority, of cases, there is
simply no need for these portions of the reports. These arguments crop up again and
again in the discussion of the legal points that appears after them in each Report. It
seems there are only three reasons to include the arguments of the parties in a
segregated fashion: to adhere rather slavishly to the structure of reports used in some
civil law jurisdictions and international commercial arbitrations; to let the WTO
Members (especially the losing Member) feel assured that their arguments were
heard; or to stroke the egos of the WTO Members that presented the arguments. All
are bad reasons, and if they do explain the phenomenon, then I fear for the
competence and integrity of panels and the Appellate Body.
The first reason is incongruous with the practical impact of panel and Appellate
Body reports. As I have argued elsewhere,2 76 their recommendations are, in fact,
holdings that amount to nothing short of de facto precedents. Why mimic a structure
of writing that is perpendicular to the real effect of what is written? I do not deny
that segregated discussions of the arguments of the parties appear in some of the best
Anglo-American common law opinions, nor do I gainsay that in many opinions this
device is effective. Rather, I suggest simply that whether to entertain this structure
should be a case-by-case question, hinging solely on whether a separate discussion
of the parties' arguments will make for a more readable, coherent report. Ideally, the
rebuttable presumption-I believe-ought to be that the arguments can be woven
neatly and succinctly into the discussion of the issues and presentation of the
reasoning.
As for the second reason, I should have thought that panelists and Appellate
Body members are sufficiently well qualified that we can all trust that they listen
carefully to the oral arguments presented to them. Likewise, I would still cling to the
belief that they read conscientiously the briefs submitted to them. In other words, I
do not need a segregated discussion of the arguments of the parties as proof that the
panelists and Appellate Body members are doing their job. If I have doubts, then I
can scrutinize the portions of their reports setting forth the issues and reasoning.
Governments arguing in front of panels and the Appellate Body must develop this
same confidence and, moreover, be sufficiently resolute and persuasive to convey
it to domestic constituencies that are otherwise suspicious of the competence of the
adjudicators.
The third reason needs almost no discussion. WTO adjudication is not about
making litigants "feel good." It is about resolving disputes fairly and efficiently, in
accordance with agreed procedures, to ensure that the trade liberalization values
inherent in the GATT and Uruguay Round agreements are manifest in the laws and
policies of not only the parties involved in a particular case, but all WTO Members.
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The panelists and Appellate Body members ought not to feel obliged to prove
themselves to the parties; instead, it is the parties that need to do the proving.
What about the second dimension of my work that should have been
unnecessary? Fun as it was, I should have liked at least to have had the option of not
telling a story in Parts III and IV. The Panel and Appellate Body ought to have
presented the material in an interesting manner. Were they more conscious of the
tremendous importance of their work, and the need for it to be as accessible to as
many readers as possible, they would have.
In June 1999, I had the pleasure of hearing the world's foremost military
historian, John Keegan, speak at a Smithsonian Institution program in Washington,
D.C. Asked why his field is interesting, he replied that military history has fascinated
generations since Homer's time, because it makes for good stories. Thus it is for
international legal disputes aswell. Yes, these disputes, like open conflict, can have
global implications, and intellectuals can spin fine reasons as to why they are worthy
of attention. But, be it military history or international law, interest in a dispute is
higher, and lessons are more likely to be drawn from it and debated, if the dispute
makes for an interesting story.
In turn, a story is interesting because of how it is told, not just because of its
naked content. Furthermore, a story told well lives in immortality. The epics of the
Trojan War are cases in point. In contrast, a story, even an innately grand event, risks
premature burial if told poorly. Professor Keegan, like many English scholars of his
venerable but dying generation, has the gift of making nearly any aspect of military
history fascinating. Were it only so with international trade adjudicators.
The BananasPanel and Appellate Body took the greatest case in GATr-WTO
history and very nearly killed it with their prose. I have had to try to salvage
matters-as best as I am able with talents hardly redolent of the likes of a
Keegan-with a sustained war metaphor in Parts III and IV. I submit that this
metaphor is accurate. I certainly hope it has enlivened the material. But, the
metaphor would not have been necessary to trot it out if the Panel and Appellate
Body had told the story of the case like the epic it was.
I would go so far as to advance the generalization that for all but the most
enthusiastic international trade law professors, it is hard to imagine a more tortuous
or torpid document to read than the average WTO panel or Appellate Body report.
The Bananasreports are, sadly, two of several examples hovering about the average.
A sarcastic sportscaster would ask where the panelists and Appellate Body members
had learned to write. What she would mean is that to understand most reports,
including those in the Bananas War, two translations are necessary. First, the reports
have to be translated from "WTO-speak" to normal legalese. Next, the normal legal
parlance needs to be translated into plain English. This is a ridiculous state of affairs.
All of us in the international trade community have a right to demand an end to it,
particularly the panels and Appellate Body. They ought to insist on the quality of
their written work product, for then they can rightly demand that it be treated with
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reverence, and indeed expect that it serve not only to reinforce their legitimacy, but
also as a source of authority for their future decisions.
How can the judges of Geneva avoid repeating the performance of the Bananas
reports? First, a book like PlainEnglishfor Lawyers2 " ought to be required reading
for panelists and Appellate Body members. It may be too much to ask that, in the
short term, they learn to tell an exciting story. But, such books will at least get the
quality of their written product up to a bare minimum in terms of directness.
In the long run, however, the international trade law community has a right to
demand more of its flagship adjudicator than writing at a minimum. Why should we
tolerate reports bereft of both exact and lively diction? Why should we tolerate
reports crippled by jargon, plagued by circuitous phraseology, and lacking any effort
to create great turns of phrases and immortal lines? In brief, why should we expect
of the highest "courts" in the most sophisticated international legal mechanism
humankind has yet devised anything less than sincere efforts to write like the
greatest common law judges?
If this long-run expectation is not unfair, then how can it be realized? Reading
legal writing instruction books for lawyers will not help. Panelists and Appellate
Body members must realize that the best way to become a first-class writer, aside
from practice, is to read great writers. To write like the greatest common law judges,
they need to re-read the splendid reports of the likes of Lord Denning or (for the
most part) Justice Holmes. But, panelists and Appellate Body members have to take
pains to avoid the narrow confines of the law, for it is quite obvious that great
writing often is to be had elsewhere. More may be gained from a few weeks with
Homer, Gibbon, or Tennyson than a few months with a common law giant. Indeed,
I would venture that many of these giants learned the writer's trade from outside
their discipline. Only when these inter-disciplinary influences work their way into
panel and Appellate Body reports will the great cases of international trade law be
told like Professor Keegan tells military history.
B. Trade and InternationalLaw: Compliance with Appellate Body
Recommendations
Perhaps there is another aspect of my labor that ought not to have been
necessary: Part V. There ought not to have been a bloody aftermath to the Bananas
War. That there was one underscores the compliance deficit that crops up in some
WTO adjudications. This deficit has two sources. First, if the recommendations
contained in a report are to be taken seriously, not only by the parties to the dispute
but also by the rest of the WTO membership, then those recommendations need to
be clear. But, there is more to compliance than clarity. There is also the matter of
who sits in judgment of whether compliance has occurred. Neither the winning nor
277. RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (3d ed. 1994).
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losing party ought to be that judge. Both sources-what is to be complied with, and

who is to judge compliance-are evident in the Bananas War.
As to the first source, discussed in Part III above, in May 1997 the WTO Panel
ruled in favor of the United States, finding a large number of violations of GATT
and the GATS. The Panel's Report was historic in three senses: it was the first major
WTO victory for the United States; it was the the first major loss for the EC; and the
Panel found more violations than any other GATT or WTO panel had ever
uncovered.278 Yet, in retrospect, perhaps the Panel's biggest mistake was its failure
to be more specific in its recommendations. After over 400 pages, it said tersely:
"[t]he Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the European
bananas into conformity with its
Communities to bring its import regime for
27 9
obligations under GATT... and the GATS."

Immediately the problem of interpretation, that is, divining what the Panel's
words mean, is apparent. Did the Panel mean for the EC to scrap the preference
scheme in its entirety? Did it mean abolish the tariff-rate quota share allocation and
licensing rules-in effect, gutting the preference scheme? Did it mean simply
abandoning the BFA, or alternatively extending the BFA to all countries exporting
bananas to the EC? The paltry recommendation is all too susceptible to argument on
these critical questions-hence, the bloody aftermath.
The second source of the compliance deficit is authority. Who is the final
authority responsible for determining what the Panel had in mind? Is this authority
the Panel itself? The Appellate Body? The DSB? The winning party? The losing
party? Here, the Appellate Body performed no better than the Panel. At the end of
over 100 pages, all it could muster was that it "recommends that the Dispute
Settlement Body request the European Communities to bring the measures found in
this Report and in the Panel Report[], as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent
with the GATT 1994 and the GATS into conformity with the obligations of the
European Communities under those agreements."" °
Defenders of this sort of feckless and vague recommendation will argue it is in
keeping with GATr-WTO tradition. They will add that no WTO tribunal has the
power to compel a change in municipal law. They also will add that were a Panel or
the Appellate Body to be more aggressive-detailed and blunt-in its
recommendations, the hands of protectionists and their political spokespersons like
Patrick Buchanan and Ross Perot would be strengthened. What extraordinary
polemical use could be made of a recommendation from a WTO tribunal that read
more like a federal district court order! We might also count on these defenders to
point out that, at bottom, the DSU system worked in the Bananas War: the United
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States and the EC used it, and the judges of Geneva did what they were supposed to
do when they were supposed to do it.
Whatever ring of truth there is to these defenses, they all miss the mark. The
point is not to empower a panel or the Appellate Body at the expense of the
Members. WTO adjudication, unlike its pre-Uruguay Round incarnation, is not
supposed to be about power, but rather law. The point is also not to seek excuses for
praising-yet again-the DSU as basically not broken. The point is to help ensure
compliance with the letter and spirit of an otherwise careful, well-reasoned report.
Just as a fox cannot be trusted to guard a chicken coop, the winner cannot be the
judge of whether the losing Member has complied. Just as the chicken coop cannot
produce sentries, the loser cannot self-judge compliance.
Yet, the Bananas War produced both results: the United States and EC each
thought it was in the position ofjudging compliance-hence, the bloody aftermath.
Unfortunately, there was no express provision in the DSU that could be used to
disabuse both sides of this inanity. The United States went so far as to invoke
Section 301 before obtaining DSB authorization to retaliate, and then clung to DSU
Article 22:2 to seek DSB authorization to retaliate. Trumpeting DSU Article 21:5-6,
the EC refused to buckle under the unilateralist threat. The persistence of the specter
of unilateral retaliation on matters covered by the Uruguay Round agreements means
the "just constitution" established by the DSU (especially Article 23) remains
weak."8

The two sources of the compliance deficit are related. The less concrete the
recommendations contained in a panel or Appellate Body report, the more pressing
the need for help from a trusted authority. (To be sure, even where highly detailed
recommendations exist, unanticipated issues may arise, thus the need for the
authority.) The losing Member needs the help because it has to know exactly what
is expected of it. The winning Member needs help because it has to know exactly
what it can expect. Non-party Members need help in guiding their own future
behavior. The multilateral trading system needs help in avoiding disputes about
compliance that poison the atmosphere in Geneva among trading partners and
distract them from trade-liberalizing initiatives. In brief, an authoritative voice to
judge compliance, particularly where precise recommendations are missing, should
not be feared as a sledgehammer. It is the absence of this voice, and the
consequences, that should be feared. As long as winning and losing Members are
able to behave as the United States and EC did after the Bananas War, the legal
infrastructure on which freer, more open trade is conducted, and more generally the
international rule of law, shall remain rickety.
The obvious candidate to provide authoritative answers about compliance is the
adjudicatory body whose recommendations are at issue, i.e., the panel or Appellate

281. See Bhala, HegelianReflections, supranote 10passhn(discussing the DSU and the concept of ajust
constitution").

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31

Body that issued them. There is a certain poetic justice in foisting this role on a panel
or Appellate Body that produced ambiguous recommendations that spawned a
compliance dispute. Why not let the adjudicator that created the problem clean it up?
Put more positively, why not give that adjudicator the incentive to "get it right" in
the first place? If the panel or Appellate Body wants to avoid seeing the same
litigants "in court" again, then it will avoid any muddle-headedness in its
recommendations.
The principal difficulty with giving final say over compliance to the panel or
Appellate Body may be one of time. Why should the winning and losing Members
bear the possible burden of re-litigating much of their cases, and await the nine-totwelve months it may take for a decision? Why not proceed automatically to an
arbitral panel in the event of compliance disputes, just as recourse is made to one
when the scope of retaliation is at issue? And, why not mandate a decision within,
say, ninety days?m To be sure, an arbitral panel cannot know exactly what the panel
or Appellate Body had in mind when making its recommendations. But, this
deficiency may be an incentive for panels and the Appellate Body to draft
recommendations carefully to avoid misinterpretation. The point is simply that an
arbitral panel can give an unbiased ruling expeditiously, possibly at lower cost to the
parties. However, for that ruling to be legitimate in the eyes of the parties and the
WTO membership, it cannot sacrifice rigor for speed. It must be well-drafted and
well-reasoned.
C. Trade and Development Economics: Helping and Hurting the Third World
One of the most regrettable aspects of the Bananas War was the rhetoric about
helping developing countries. The EC was particularly vocal in asserting that it had
their interests at heart. Anything less than a vigorous defense of the preferential
trading scheme for bananas would be a betrayal of the poor farmers in ACP
countries, to whom the Europeans owed a special obligation given the colonial
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to retaliate either within twenty days of the deadline for compliance, or within twenty days of the issuance of an
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past.283 What about, for example, Belize, where bananas account for one in every ten
jobs?"
The United States fired back with its own high-minded contention: in addition
to the four thousand Americans who lost their jobs with Chiquita as a result of the
illegal EC preference regime,28 what about the poor banana growers in Latin
America? Ten percent ofEcuador's population was employed in the banana growing
industry.m In other words, the EC's preferential trading arrangement hurt other
developing countries. Both sides were hiding the real driving forces behind their
cases: their own banana companies. After all, since when do hegemonic powers fight
a trade war solely over developing country interests? The preferential trading system
for bananas benefitted-in effect if not design-European producers, and Chiquita
and Dole calculated accurately that its destruction would benefit them. Yet, I am
cynical enough to expect a veil over corporate greed. I am even cynical enough to
entertain the notion that some interests in the United States and EC did not mind the
divisive effect their War had on the Third World. Dividing banana producingcountries into ACP and non-ACP camps, and causing them to do battle through their
hegemonic benefactors, might well have been a neo-colonialist manifestation of the
old "divide and conquer" strategy. But, suspicion and conspiracy theory is for
another time and forum. What I find truly regrettable is that the veil hiding each
side's true motivations extended to the underlying economics of the world banana
market and, consequently, inhibited a dialog about how to help banana producers.
The world is about as far along as it was before the War in coming up with
constructive ideas.
There are three essential facts about the world banana market that were lost
amidst the rhetoric. First, ACP bananas are more expensive than dollar bananas. 28 7
Differences in production costs are the reason for the price differential. ACP bananas
from the Caribbean are grown on small farms set amidst hilly terrain. 88 In contrast,
dollar bananas are grown on large plantation farms benefitting from economies of
scale and low wages.2 Production costs are on average about one-third lower than
in the Caribbean. 290The differential can be even greater: whereas ACP production
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percent of the population is dependent on the banana industry.293 In some Caribbean
economies, banana exports account for 60 percent of all exports. Caribbean farmers
say they do not possess the technology to grow other crops, and in any event a
banana crop blown down from a hurricane (a not infrequent occurrence) recovers in
just nine months.294 Caribbean banana producers also warn that if the EC preference
scheme were dismantled, trade in associated products (e.g., avocados and citrus
fruits) would be damaged, because banana boats would no longer visit their ports. 5
The island farmers then would have no choice but to shift to lucrative crops such as
cocaine."'

Third, the EC's preferential trading arrangement is rotten for European
consumers, and provides far less succor to ACP countries than is commonly realized.
The World Bank puts it more delicately, calling the arrangement highly inefficient. 297
However stated, the point is that Europeans pay far more than they need to for
bananas, and banana plantation workers in poor countries get far less. The
micro economic distribution effects of the EC's arrangement are entirely incongruous
with its noble rhetoric. The FinancialTimes rightly observed that EC consumers pay
at least ten times more for bananas, through prices made artificially high by the
preference scheme, than the benefit that redounds to banana producers.29 Likewise,
The Economist incisively pointed out that
the European banana regime is a rich man's racket, not a boon for the poor.
It costs European consumers around $2 billion a year-50 cents per kilo of
bananas. Of that, around $1 billion goes to the distributors. Banana growers
in the poor countries that the Europeans claim to care about gain only $150
m[illion] a year.299
If French carpenters and Belgian dentists are paying so much for bananas, and
Caribbean growers are getting so little, who is capturing all the rent? As The
Economist suggests, none other than European fruit companies. The "insider"
European companies-particularly those Category B operators-awarded import
licenses collect monopoly rents at the expense of the ostensible beneficiaries of the
arrangement, the ACP countries. In sum, the scheme hardly serves as a ladder out
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in the poor countries that the Europeans claim to care about gain only $150
m[illion] a year.299

If French carpenters and Belgian dentists are paying so much for bananas, and
Caribbean growers are getting so little, who is capturing all the rent? As The
Economist suggests, none other than European fruit companies. The "insider"
European companies-particularly, those Category B operators-awarded import
licenses collect monopoly rents at the expense of the ostensible beneficiaries of the
arrangement, the ACP countries. In sum, the scheme hardly serves as a ladder out
of poverty for ACP countries, yet that ladder is the altruistic metaphor used to justify
its existence.2
What are we to make of these three facts? I submit that if the United States and
EC are not disingenuous in their concern for developing countries, and if they care
at all about consumers, then they will work together not only to dismantle entirely
the preferential trading arrangement for bananas, but also to devise an adjustment
assistance mechanism for banana producing countries. To retain the arrangement in
virtually any conceivable form is to sell short consumer interests in favor of those
of a cabal of corporations. To liberalize trade in the world's banana market without
a compensatory mechanism for countries damaged by that liberalization would be
heartless. To fail to take both steps would reveal a lack of commitment to, and
understanding of, free trade theory.
Even the most staunch advocates of free trade must admit that trade
liberalization results in net gains to an economy. There are "winners" and "losers"
from free trade, as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the avatars of free trade, pointed
out. Yes, the benefits accruing to the winners more than offset the injury felt by the
losers. But, this net gain is little comfort to a worker who experiences real wage
declines, or unemployment, as a result of fair foreign competition. Nor is it much
comfort to a firm, or an industry, forced to downsize or go bust. And, what of the
communities in which these workers and firms are located? They suffer economic
and social dislocations.
The central challenge for trade officials on both sides of the Atlantic is,
therefore, not to convince themselves and the public that liberalizing the world
banana market would be a "good" thing. That is axiomatic. Rather, the central
challenge is to persuade producer interests likely to be injured by free trade that a
creative solution exists to deal with the damage. To be sure, nothing in international
trade law-specifically, the GAT' or the Uruguay Round agreements--compels a
country to develop a program for helping workers. Still, if American and European
trade officials are to avoid the unsavory epithet of "uncompassionate," then they
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must have an answer to ACP countries at risk of being left behind by a new trade
deal that is, on balance, in the global interest.
The most obvious, efficient, and fair possibility is to transfer some of the net
gain from free trade to injured workers. In other words, direct aid whereby the
"winners" compensate the "losers" by sharing a bit of their gain. It is an old idea
stemming from an understanding of what Adam Smith and David Ricardo
themselves knew: that free trade based on the law of comparative advantage is, on
balance, beneficial for society, and some of this benefit can be channeled to those
who need help to face the challenges posed by free trade. If ACP countries,
particularly Caribbean countries, do not have a comparative advantage in banana
production, then there is no point in perpetuating their dependence on this industry
through a preferential trading arrangement that wreaks havoc on consumer interests
and channels rents to special corporate interests. The wise long-term strategy is to
provide financial and technical assistance to these countries to transfer their
productive resources into endeavors where they have, or can gain, a comparative
advantage.
Exactly what endeavors these might be is for economic, business, agriculture,
and industry experts to determine. Perhaps the Caribbean countries of the ACP ought
to focus on different crops, on light industry, or on certain service sectors. Perhaps
the answer differs from one country to the next. Exactly how to finance the new
endeavors is also a matter for the experts. It may be crippling for some countries to
service debt; for them, outright grants will be needed. Other countries may be good
candidates for "soft" (i.e., long-term, low interest rate) loans. The United States and
EC can provide answers through an ad hoc bilateral working party. Or, they can pool
their expertise with that of the WTO and the World Bank, two institutions that have
pledged to work together to assist developing countries.3"' In the end, if a successful
transition adjustment assistance program is devised, it might serve as a model for
future cases in which trade liberalization adversely affects certain developing
country producers. As such, it may embolden trade officials in benefactor and
beneficiary countries to dismantle their more protectionist preferential schemes and
face up to free trade.
Critics of a trade adjustment assistance scheme for developing countries
doubtless will make two arguments. First, the scheme smacks of a 1970s-style "new
international economic order" in which massive resources are transferred from First
to Third World countries. The scheme may be aimed at smoothing the transition to
free trade. But, this end cannot be justified by the means, namely, a socialist redistributive mechanism. A resource transfer would be nothing short of a bail-out for
countries plagued by mismanagement and corruption. At best, it would encourage
the adoption of industrial policies by developing country governments. At worst, it
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would create a moral hazard problem, encouraging bad behavior by other developing
country governments. Only the hard discipline imposed by global economic forces
will strengthen these countries.
Second, trade adjustment assistance for workers, firms, industries, and
communities has been largely unsuccessful in developed countries. If a single rich
country like the United States cannot make it work within its own borders for
literate, well-fed, but out-of-luck recipients, 3 2 then how can it possibly be made to
work on a much larger scale-the principal export industry of an entire country?
Certainly, two international bureaucracies-the WTO and the World Bank-are no
more efficient, and have no more market sense, than the American government.
The criticisms cannot be ignored, but equally, they must not be overestated, for
that would lead to paralysis. As to the first point, whether trade adjustment assistance
amounts to a bail-out and spawns a moral hazard problem depends on how it is
structured. If the assistance is simply a wire transfer of funds to a country's treasury,
then the critics' worst fears may be realized. But, if funds are disbursed only after
careful conditions have been agreed upon, and then only to a special administrator
acting independently of the government, they stand a better chance of being put to
good use. The conditions ought not to be a template imposed by a WTO-World Bank
team on every country. Rather, they ought to be based on an adjustment plan initially
drafted by the recipient country's government in consultation with overseas and
domestic experts.
The heart of that plan should be a specific strategy for transferring factors of
production-labor, land, human capital, physical capital, and technology-from one
sector (e.g., bananas) to another. It must identify the barriers to factor mobility that
exist within the country, and explain how those barriers can be reduced. For
example, with regard to labor and human capital, it ought to explain what sort of
worker re-training will be necessary. With regard to land, physical capital, and
technology, the plan ought to set forth the tax and other financial incentives needed
to make the necessary shifts. Overall, the plan must be realistic in its time frame.
Perhaps most importantly, the plan ought to make clear that no assistance is to be
provided to reluctant factors of production. Assistance must reward
entrepreneurship.
The second criticism, the poor record of adjustment assistance in the United
States, is not unfair. But, the reasons for that record need to be examined. A case can
be made that politicians on both sides of the aisle in Congress have never given the
various trade adjustment assistance programs that began in 1962 and were revamped
in 1974 a fair chance. 3°s In many fiscal years, the programs have been underfunded,

302. For a discussion of trade adjustment assistance in the United States, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra
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and some have been cut back or eliminated. 4 Equally relevant is the fact that
eligibility for assistance depends on a complex web of criteria that are difficult to
administer, in large part because they try to identify the cause of injury. An applicant
is only eligible if the cause of injury is import competition.30 5 If, for instance, a
worker is displaced because of technological change, then her only recourse is
regular unemployment insurance.
In both of these critical respects, assistance for a developing country trying to
wean itself off of bananas, or some other industry in which it lacks a comparative
advantage, need not be like domestic trade adjustment assistance. If the United States
and the EC are serious about helping ACP countries reduce their dependence on a
single, uncompetitive crop, and more generally if the WTO and the World Bank are
serious about smoothing the transition for developing countries undergoing trade
liberalization, then the assistance program for countries ought to be adequately
funded. Perhaps the "gain" accruing to the "winners" could be taxed in a nondiscriminatory way to provide funds for the program (e.g., a small, temporary
surcharge on the income of multinational fruit companies). The point is that the
cause of free trade will be damaged rather considerably if the developed countries
and multilateral organizations promise a compassionate brand of free trade and then
deliver far less than their promise. That may be incentive enough to "get it right."
Likewise, the mistake of nightmarish eligibility criteria need not be repeated at the
international level. For countries, the cause of injury is already clear-trade
liberalization as a result of, for example, the dismantling of a preferential
arrangement. Thus, establishing and navigating a myriad of rules about injury
causation are unnecessary. As proposed above, the focus ought to be on a plausible
adjustment plan.
In sum, one lesson from the Bananas War is that important underlying economic
facts on which sound policy should rest tend to be forgotten, if not intentionally
hidden, in nasty trade disputes. The losers are not the workers that the law of
comparative advantage would predict. Rather, they are the very people that one or
both sides in the trade dispute claim to help. The winners are, again, not what
Ricardo's law would predict, but rather a club of insiders. A trade policy stance that
matches rhetoric would have two uncompromising principles. First, developing
countries ought not to be pitted against one another in trade battles between
hegemons. The days of using them as pawns in some greater crusade should have
ended with the Cold War. Second, developing countries should not be encouraged
through preferential trading arrangements to remain dependent on one or a few
uncompetitive industries. Rather, through meaningful, incentive-oriented, assistance,
they ought to be encouraged to help themselves meet the challenges posed by free
304. See id., § 9-5(b)(4), at 1003, § 9-5(e), at 1007.08 (discussing program funding and the elimination of
assistance to communities).
305. The exact statutory requirement is that import competition must "contribute importantly" to both
layoffs and the decline in sales or production. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2272(a)(3) ( West 1994).
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trade. Fidelity to these principles might just lead to the de-escalation of trade friction
and a greater spirit of shared purpose: the creation of healthy trading partners.
D. Trade and Domestic Politics:A Victory for Public Choice Theory
Is the Bananas War an illustration of public choice theory? Perhaps. I have asked
many trade lawyers, with direct or indirect involvement in the War, why the United
States brought the case, and why the EC defended its preferential trading
arrangement so vigorously. The consistent answer is corporate lobbying influence,
that of Chiquita and Dole in the United States,' and large fruit companies in the EC,
particularly in the United Kingdom (e.g., the Irish banana distributor Fyffes Plc.3 W)
and France. For instance, The Economist was hardly the only influential publication
covering the Bananas War to observe that Carl Lindner, Chairman of Chiquita, was
politically well-connected, had actively lobbied the Clinton Administration, and was
a major donor to both the Democratic and Republican Parties.308 Not surprisingly,
EC officials voiced their concern that Mr. Lindner has undue influence over
American trade policy in regards to bananas.' This brutally realistic-indeed, rather
cynical-answer suggests public choice theory may be powerful in explaining how
the War started, and once it started, why it dragged on for so long. The answer also
suggests a sinister irony: if American fruit companies are so influential in the White
American
House and Capitol Hill, is the United States, which
3 0 used to "buy" Central
"banana" republics, the new "banana" republic? 1
31'
In brief, public choice theory is microeconomic logic applied to politics.
Politicians are viewed as suppliers of a product, namely, policy initiatives. Voters
are viewed as consumers of that product. Votes are the currency they use to "pay"
political officials for new policies. Accordingly, there is an upward-sloping supply
curve for policy initiatives-more votes, more policies. There is a downward-sloping
demand curve for these initiatives-the cheaper the cost, in terms of votes, the
greater the demand. Where the two curves intersect an equilibrium is reached.
However, voters do not all weigh in with equal force. Some voters-particularly
well-organized, well-financed groups that work through sophisticated lobbyists-are
306. Chiquitais the biggest American banana distributor. Guy deJonquieres, U.S. and EU ConsiderFurther
BananaTalks, F TIMES, Mar. 11,1999, at 1.The United States claimed that Chiquita and Dole lost half of their
business because of the EU's preferential trading arrangement for bananas. See Yerkey, WTO Says, supra note
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more influential in pressing their case to political officials. These groups can provide
a large number of votes in exchange for favorable policy initiatives. Thus, they have
a particularly strong influence on policy. (It will be recalled, unhappily, that Austrian
pigheadedness and Serbian intransigence set off a chain of events whereby
inconsequential states led major powers into a dreadful war.)
To the "inside-the-beltway" crowd in Washington, D.C., all of this is hardly
surprising. Public choice theory merely dresses up the obvious in a sophisticated, if
somewhat antiseptic, jargon. In the trade context, the point is simply that America
has no trade policy; rather, it has clients. 12 Nevertheless, the theory has been used
to explain the rationale for certain international trade statutes.1 3 The jargon
notwithstanding, the application of the theory to trade is entirely reasonable. If the
law of comparative advantage were translated literally into multilateral trade
agreements and domestic trade statutes, those agreements and statutes would be far
shorter than they are now. The essential language would be, simply, that "all tariff
and non-tariff barriers are hereby abolished," and thereafter would follow a broad
definition of "tariffs" and "non-tariff barriers." In reality, of course, agreements and
statutes contain trade-liberalizing commitments, followed by pages and pages of
exceptions thereto, plus a host of remedies to combat unfair, and sometimes fair,
import competition. How can the exceptions and remedies be explained? Public
choice theory provides an answer: they are the product of interest-group pressure on
trade officials.
This explanation is a plausible one for the Bananas War. Consider the first
question: how did the War start? The United States is not a banana exporter. 4 But,
two prominent American multinational corporations-Dole and Chiquita
Brands-produce bananas in Latin America for export to third countries like EC
member states, as well as to the United States. 1 Dole and Chiquita, along with Del
Monte, owned by Jordanian interests, are the largest banana companies in the world.
They account for roughly two-thirds of world trade in bananas, and have 42 percent
of the EC market. 6 In contrast, bananas produced in the ACP account for just 19
percent of total EC banana imports. 7 (Caribbean bananas, in particular, account for
only 7 percent of the EC market, 31' and only 3 percent of the world banana
312. See At DaggersDrawn, supranote 180, at 17 (quoting Sylvia Ostry).
313. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionismas a "Safeguard":A Positive Analysis of the GA2T "Escape
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exports. 319) Obviously, the ACP countries seized on these statistics to support their
view that dollar bananas hardly are prejudiced by the EC's preferential trading
arrangement. More importantly for public choice theory is that defenders of the
arrangement highlight that powerful executives of some of the American-based
multinational fruit companies have contributed handsome sums to influential
political organizations. The allegation is that these executives were successful in
persuading the Clinton Administration to champion the corporate cause of making
war on the EC's arrangement. It is exactly the allegation that public choice theory
would suggest.
Indeed, given that not a single banana is exported from the United States, ACP
countries, particularly in the Caribbean, were incensed when the United States
initiated a WTO complaint that jeopardized their economies. Consistent with public
choice theory, they claimed the American complaint was motivated more by pressure
from politically important firms than national economic self-interest, concern for
developing countries, or legal principle. So influential were these corporate interests
that they were successful in persuading the American trade officials to use (abuse?)
the country's economic largesse to beat up on struggling democracies in the
Caribbean. In 1992, the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of three of the four
Windward Islands (Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines) was less
than $1 billion, just one-quarter of Chiquita's gross revenue that year.320 The
combined GDP of the seven principal Caribbean nations (the four Windward Islands
plus Belize, Jamaica, and Surinam) is less than 0.4 percent of America's GDP.
What about the tenacity with which the EC defended its preferential trading
arrangement, and the bloody aftermath? The explanation may lie in corporate
lobbying influence. British and French companies were said to have particular clout.
They were the most vocal advocates of a no-compromise position after the Appellate
Body issued its Report. In contrast, other EC member countries in which there were
no such corporate interests--Germany, for example-took a much softer line,
advocating full-scale reform, or even dissolution, of the arrangement.
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VII. NOT A WAR TO END ALL WARs
They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into
pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more.
THE BIBLE, Isaiah 2:4.
It would be overly optimistic, even laughable, to say that the Bananas War was
the trade war to end all trade wars. So highly-pitched were the battles in the Bananas
War, so deep-rooted were the interests at stake, and so protracted was the fighting,
that the wounds inflicted on economic relations between the United States and EC
will not heal quickly. At the dawn of a new millennium, it is not at all clear that the
warring countries have foresworn this kind of war as a means of trade policy. Are
we not in the midst of another war between the same combatants, this time over beef
hormones? Even if major trading powers like the United States and EC were to
forsake war, the simmering emotions on both sides suggest their resolution would
suffer the same ignominious fate as the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact; the agreement
that, in the words of one historian, "artlessly outlawed war.' 32' The Bananas War
leaves us with the same despondent sense of utter waste, sheer madness, that one
feels at the end of John Keegan's chronicle, The First World War.3z
Is there any good that might yet emerge from the Bananas War, aside from it
serving as what should be an unnecessary catalyst to ameliorate the quality of
writing produced by the judges of Geneva, or being yet another illustration of public
choice theory? Perhaps it will focus attention on the need to strengthen compliance
mechanisms in the multilateral dispute resolution system. Perhaps it will redouble
efforts to help developing countries integrate into a freer multilateral trading system.
Might the War also yield a more accurate assessment of the proclivities of the major
trading countries? Perhaps the very hegemons that worked so skillfully during the
Uruguay Round to design the architecture for world trade law are the powers that,
when diametrically opposed and cocksure they are right, are most likely to risk
destroying it. Some good may yet come from seeing the modem-day Greeks and
Trojans in this light. Some good also might come if these American and European
trade warriors remembered that in Homer's Illiad,the Greeks and Trojans worshiped
the same Gods.
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